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On January 30, 1933, Hitler became the chancellor of Germany, and with 
him the reign of the National Socialist regime began. Very few people sus-
pected at that time that this date would mark the beginning of a new era, not 
only for Germany, but for all mankind. Only the pessimists stressed such dis-
turbing omens as: the renewal of the 1926 Treaty of Berl in between Germany 
and the Soviet Union; German withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, as 
well as from the League of Nations in October; rumors of German economic de-
signs concerning Central Europe; 1 secret negotiations between Germany and Po-
land;2 and, Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. The optimists, 
however, were able to point out that France was still the most powerful con-
tinental power, the Little Entente was strong, Mussolini was in a cooperative 
mood, Germany was seemingly quiet, and the new regime was not in a position 
to challenge the status quo drafted by the Versailles Peace Treaty. 
Three years later, however, the situation was different. Hitler's moves 
were so spectacular and unexpected that very few Western statesmen had the 
time or the nerve to pay attention to anything but the German problem. Cen-
tral Europe and its problems came to the foreground again only during the Czech 
crisis and at the time of the Munich Agreement. They came too late, however, 
and developments led to World War~ I I. 
le. A. Macartney and A. w. Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe (London: 
MacMillan, 1962), pp. 314-17. 
21bid., p. 320. 
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It is understandable, therefore, that modern historians describe the his-
tory of Central Europe from 1933 to 1938 only when they write about the his-
tory of Central Europe or of a specific Central European country. In books 
which narrate the history of Western Europe, only a few pages or footnotes are 
devoted to the Central European events and their relations with Western Europe 
in the crucial period from Hitler's rise to the Munich crisis. 
To exclude possible misunderstanding and for the sake of easier defini-
tions, I shall use the expression "Central Europe" when I refer collectively 
to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. 
Keeping this in mind, we may and should ask some questions from the his-
torians' point of view. Did the events of Central Europe develop separately, 
without influencing Western European affairs? Had the Western European states 
no reason to pay more attention to Central Europe before 1938? Were not the 
events related at all? Or did the historians and those contemporary Western 
statesmen make a great mistake when they neglected and still neglect the his-
tory of Central Europe? Is it not possible that back in 1934-1936 they could 
have prevented the future annexation of Austria, the destruction of the unity 
of the Little Entente, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, and even the out-
break of World War I 17 
All these questions, if they were asked at all, were asked from the point 
of view of the Great Powers, and this is the second interesting characteristic 
of that period. Only a few nationalist writers have attempted to understand 
and interpret the pol icy of the s~all Central European states from their re-
spective nationalist points of view. However, these interpretations have been 
,.· .. 
dismissed by our Western academic authorities as biased, chauvinistic, and 
narrow-minded. Are these authorities right? Can we really pass judgment on 
the Central European statesmen according to our own standards--praising them 
''"""'""' 
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if they were useful for the Western Powers, and condemning them if they were 
not? Should we not try to understand them as they were-~representatives of 
small nations? Do we have the right to downgrade them? Should we blame the 
Austrian, Hungarian, or Yugoslavian leaders, who after experienceing the un-
concern of the Western democracies, tried to save and serve the interests of 
their respective peoples by accepting an anti-Entente and pro-Nazi foreign 
po 1 i ti ca 1 1 i ne? 
Furthermore, the basic question of whether the small states ever had a 
chance to make a real independent decision in their foreign policy, or whether 
they were always pressured to fall in 1 ine with the foreign policy of their 
respective Great Power patrons has not been decided. 
It is impossible to make a thorough analysis of all the small states of 
Central Europe within the framework of this dissertation. Such an analysis 
should cover Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, 
the Balkan states of Bulgaria and Albania, and their relationships with Bri-
tain, France, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Consequently, I have 
·1 imited my study to dealing with only Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, and 
shall try to answer the foregoing questions from my study of the foreign rela-
tions of these three pivotal states. 
The reasons for selecting these three countries are manifold. Austria 
has the same language, a Jong similar past, a cultural tradition, and other 
experiences in common with Germany. Hungary, unique in her language, had a 
long anti-Habsburg and anti-Germa~ tradition. Yugoslavia was the successor of 
the Serbian kingdom, and for a long time a strong follower of the French po-
litical designs. Based on their past histories, one might expect that Austria 
would, by all means, work for a unification with Germany, and yet just the op-
posite happened. One might expect that Hungary would be the firmest enemy of 
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Germany and Austria, and yet just the opposite happened. Also, one might ex-
pect that Yugoslavia would follow the old sentimentalist, panslavic political· 
plans, and again just the oppos~te happened. Au~tria was created by the vic-
tors of World War I, and naturally one might expect that the victors would de-
fend her most vigorously. Instead, her traditional foe, Italy, became her best 
patron. Hungary and Yugoslavia became friends after a Jong, agonizing period 
of double-dealing statesmanship in the camp of their greatest enemy, Germany. 
There are as many puzzles as there are countries. The oversimplified answers 
of the historians writing from the Great Powers' point of view are partly mis-
leading, and partly unsatisfactory. 
The reasons for analyzing the relationship of these countries with France 
are also many! Up to 1934, France seemed to be the unchallenged leader of the 
European continent. All of Central Eruope, with the exception of Austria and 
Hungary, was firmly allied with her, and even within these two countries there 
were influential political groups who would have welcomed stronger ties with 
her. France's attempts to utilize these conditions for her own benefit were 
less than fortunate. She displayed almost complete unconcern toward Hungary, 
she was hesitant toward Austria, and she was bossy and aggressive toward Yugo-
slavia. This French indecisiveness and aggressiveness equally influenced the 
political decisions of these three states. It was not Germany, but France who 
created the opportunities for the German penetration of Central Europe. It was 
the incomprehension of the interests of small states (among them the special 
nationalist interests of Austria, ttungary, and Yugoslavia) on France's part 
that started the chain-reaction ending with the complete dissolution of the 
French security system. 
shall try to analyze and interpret, therefore, the actions and passivity 
ot the three states from their own particular points of view. The basis for 
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judging these states will not be their usefulness or uselessness to the Allied 
powers. Rather, the judgment will be based on how the Austrian, Hungarian, and 
Yugoslavian statesmen served the interests of their respective countries. 
With this approach, the study will hopefully make some worthy conclusions, 
which will help to explain the seemingly very complicated history of Central 
Europe in the years 1934-1936. It will also hopefully serve to help the 
statesmen and diplomats of the present to avoid mistakes that are usually com-
mitted because of the misunderstanding of the Central European politics, and 
because of the disregard of the special Central European interests. 
CHAPTER I 
FRENCH RETREAT FROM CENTRAL EUROPE 
France's Situation Up to 1934 
The economic crisis that struck Europe in 1930 had avoided France for a 
while. Curiously enough, among the French statesmen, only Andr~ Tardieu (prim 
minister, November 2, 1929-February 17, 1930; March 2, 1930-December 5, 1930; 
and February 20, 1932-May 10, 1932; and foreign minister, February 20, 1932-
May 10, 1932) understood the world-wide scope of the crisis, and he alone 
tried to warn his country of the possibility of a crisis in France also. The 
Chamber of Deputies, though, disregarded his warnings and 11 con ti nued in their 
customarily irresponsible attitude toward economics and finance. 111 It is, 
however, too harsh of a judgment to call the deputies irresponsible. Since 
1929 there had been an oversupply of raw materials, especially of wheat. The 
financial crisis had effected, first of all, the producers of agricultural 
, 
products. Albrecht Carrie describes the possible consequences of such a situ-
ation in the following words: 11 ••• agricultural interests will clamor for 
subsidies and tariffs, which least appeal especially to industrial interests, 
while industrial workers will equally resist a diminuation of their wages and, 
if wholly deprived of employment, will turn to the state for assistance. 112 
l H. Stuart Hughes, Contemporary Europe, a History (Englewood, New York: 
Prentice-Hall, 1961), p. 207. 
2Rene Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress 
of Vienna (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 449. 
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The government, as well as the deputies, were equally pressured and 
caught in the middle in this situation. Not so much the political principles 
of the different parties, but their ability or inability to deal with the 
crisis caused the fall of many French governments in a rapid succession be-
tween the years 1930-1934. 
International Trade 
The frequent change of leadership undoubtedly weakened France's interna-
tional authority, hindered the cooperation with other nations, and very deci-
sively influenced and promoted the decline of the French pre-eminence in Cen-
tral Europe. However, it was perhaps more important that France lost her im-
portance economically in the trade-transactions of these states, and with her 
declining role in economics, she also lost political influence. A short re-
view of the foreign trade will explain this statement. 
The economic relationship with Austria showed a steady decline from 1929 
to 1932. The amount of French export to Austria fell from 94 mill ion schil-
lings to an al I-time low of 31 million schillings, while the import from Aus-
tria declined from 79 mill ion schillings to 29 mill ion schillings. 3 The fol-
lowing two years brought some improvements, and the French export reached 36.9 
million schillings, while the imports climbed back to 33.9 million schillings~ 
Still, France ranked only tenth among the most important business partners of 
3Jean Morini-Comby, Les tchanges Commerciaux entre la France et les ttats 
Successeurs de 1 'Empire Austro-Hongrois (Paris: Centre d 1 ttudes de Politique 
d 1·ittrangere, No. 2, 1936), p. 91.' 
4 rbid., p. 13. 
8 
Austria, and was even surpassed by the U.S., which imported 61.9 million schil 
lings of merchandise.5 
Nor did France do much better in Rumania. She imported the greatest 
amount of goods in 1931, buying 565.6 million francs worth of Rumanian prod-
ucts, and at the same time selling an amount of 115.1 million francs of mer-
chandise.6 In 1934, however, the Rumanian imports fell to 246.7 million 
francs, while France increased her exports to 167.1 million francs.7 With 
these amounts, Rumania ranked fifteenth as a client in the French trade and 
ranked twenty-third as supplier among the forty most important business part-
8 
ners of France. Rumania was most sensitively hit because of the decline of 
Rumanian oil exports to France, which was due to the Soviet-French and I raqui-
French commercial treaties signed in 1934.9 
Czechoslovakia also imported the greatest amount of merchandise in 1931. 
It was close to 220 mill ion francs, while France, on the other hand, bought 
more than 330 million francs of Czechoslovakian products. lO In 1934 the ex-
port to Czechoslovakia had risen to 225 mill ion francs worth of goods, though 
the imports declined to 190 mil lion francs. 11 
5Morini-Comby, Les {changes Commerciaux, p. 13. 
6 I b i d • , p • 94 • 
71bid. 
8 1bid., p. 92. 
91bid., p. 62. 
101bid., p. 101. 
ll1bid. 
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Yugoslavia exported to France 74.3 million dinars worth of merchandise in 
1933, but only 51.4 million dinars in 1934; 12 and France sold to Yugoslavia 
120.6 million dinars worth of merchandise in 1933 and 177.6 million dinars in 
1934.13 By 1934 France had slid to a rank of sixth as supplier and to a rank 
of eleventh as a customer of Yugoslavia. 14 
Interestingly enough, during the period 1930-1934 France's share in the 
import business of Hungary grew, although, the amounts showed a decline from 
24.7 mill ion pengos to 10 mill ion pengos. l5 France remained the fifth most 
important business partner of Hungary, holding only 3.2 per cent 16 of the Hun-
garian foreign trade.17 
The general picture that can be drawn from these statistics shows a 
steady decline of the dominant role of France in the economic life of the Cen-
18 tral European states. The successor states searched desperately for new 
markets to sell their wheat, oil, and timber (to mention only the most impor-
tant ones), and found ready buyers in Germany and Italy. 
12M. Vugl ijenovic, Die Stellung Engl ands und Frankreichs am Yugoslawishen 
Markte in Verhaltniss zu der Ital iens und des Deutschen Reiches (Wien: Holl-
nek, 1940), p. 17. 
13 1bid. Though the full amount of Yugoslavian trade declined only $9 
mill ion~e trade balance became strongly unfavorable. See Table I. 
14Morini-Comby, Les Echanges Commerciaux, p. 46. 
l51bid., p. 36. The reason for the decline in amounts 
values in the relationship of the franc and the pengo. 
16 Calculated on the basis of: Ibid., p. 36. 
17 1bid. 
18
see Table I. 
was the changes of 
10 
This decline of French-Central European trade increased during the first 
half of 1935, and drastically changed the position of France by allowing Ger-
man economic penetration of these areas. 19 
The roots of this disastrous French foreign trade policy can be found in 
the even more disastrous domestic economic policy of the consecutive French 
governments aad the methods they applied to fight the economic crisis. In-
stead of cooperating with England and the U.S. in their efforts to stabilize 
the world financial situation, France remained stubbornly faithful to the gold 
standard. She alone of the Great Powers refused to devalue her currency and 
in this way priced herself out of the foreign markets. 20 At home they fol-
lowed a deflation pol icy, and as a result the prices sank at least 15 per cent 
during the year of 1934.21 The closing of the gap between the agricultural 
and industrial prices was intended to regain the competitive capacity of the 
French products on foreign markets. However, this deflation policy created 
great hardship in France: salaries were cut back, wages declined, and produc-
tion lowered. The conditions of the French workers (in offices, factories, 
and on the farms) deteriorated. 22 
It is small wonder that the dissatisfaction with the economic situation 
took the form of political protest. It is also natural that this political 
protest was directed not only against the government, but also against the po-
litical parties, groups, and ideologies, as well as against the system. The 
19see Table I I. 
20Elisabeth Haag, Die Franzosische Aushandelspolitik, 1931-1938 (Lachen: 
A. Kessler, 1942), p. 24. 
21 Revue de la Situation Economigue Mondiale, 1934-1935 (Geneva: League of 
Nat ions , 19 3 5) , p. 9. 
22Haag, Aushandelspol itik, p. 25. 
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president of the Chamber of Deputies was correct when he said, "(All) peoples 
are alienated from parliamentarianism without anyone knowing what one can use 
to replace it. 1123 The irony of this situation was that not only the Communists 
but also the moderate Marxist-Socialists (under the leadership of Leon Blum) 
frequently joined forces with the Right in their effort to undermine and de-
feat the existing bourgeois-radical governments. 
These efforts were too successful; clubs, leagues, and organizations 
sprang up in France looking at the economic and political successes of Nazi 
Germany with admiration. At first these leagues were only advocating, but by 
the beginning of 1934 they were already demanding the overthrow, not only of 
the respective governments of France, but also the whole parliamentary repub-
lican system. 
It is necessary to analyze in a few sentences the French domestic politi-
cal affairs during the year of 1934, in order to fully understand the foreign 
policy of France during the same year. 
Domestic Pol icy 
The history of the Third Republic is rich in scandals. The most impor-
tant and the best known in the 1930 1 s was the Stavisky affair, not so much be-
cause of its preponderation and size, but mostly because it triggered political 
events of great consequences. 
Serge A. Stavisky was an adventurer. Born in Kiev, he migrated to Paris 
with his Russian-Jewish parents in 1900. As early as 1912, at the age of 26, 
' 
he was brought to trial for frau.d. In 1926 he was arrested again, but his 
23Reports of the Austrian ambassador, Lothar Egger-Moellwald to Chancellor 
Dollfuss, RAA, Jeanneney to Egger-Moellwald, Paris, Zl, 19/Pol., March 12, 
1 9 34 ' p. 480 • 
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trial was postponed, and in 1927 he was released from prison due to the inter-
vention of his mysterious patrons. He continued his fraudulent activities, 
floating worthless bonds in different French cities. In January 1934 the 
French newspapers discovered these new frauds and demanded his and his patrons' 
punishment. Among his patrons were high government officials, and possibly 
the chief of police. Stavisky committed suicide, but the papers, especially 
the L1Action Fran~aise kept the issue alive and demanded the resignation of 
the government. 24 
The political Right found a common cause in the Stavisky affair. They 
united, not only to discredit the government circles, but also to stage mass 
demonstrations and street fights, and if necessary, by means of revolution in 
order to force the direction of French politics toward the Right. A concerted 
effort of the Rightist groups produced a mass demonstration and street fights. 
on February 6, 1934, between the Rightist groups, ironically joined by many 
Communists 25 and the pol ice, who were supported by units of the mobile guard. 
Though the pol ice gained the upper hand, and the Chamber of Deputies voted con 
· fidence for the Daladier government, Daladier submitted his resignation. On 
February 9, 1934 Gaston Doumergue (a former president who was thought to be 
above parties) formed a new coalition government in which all the other po-
litical parties held positions, with the exception of the Socialists and Com-
munists, who refused to participate. The government was dominated by the con-
servatives. The general workers• strike indicated that the February days pro-
duced a negative effect from the R,ghtist point of view: it called the 
24L'Action Fran1aise (Paris), January 9, 1934. 
25wi11iam L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1969), p. 214. Shirer's book is quoted here as an eye witness 
account. 
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attention of the Left to its dangers and urged them to unite against these 
dangers. Only the Corrmunists continued to oppose every action of the 11 bour-
geoi s 11 government. 
The danger of a Rightist revolution was over for the time being, but the 
self-confidence of the Republican leaders was badly shaken. On March 12, 
1934, one month after the riots, the president of the Senate, Jules Jeanneney, 
addressed the following words to the visiting Austrian ambassador· "In every 
country, energetic authoritarian government chiefs should take over the leader· 
ship, as was the case in France during the time of Clemenceau, in order to 
surmount the general political difficulties all over Europe. 1126 
At the end of May 1934 the Human it~ republished in its May 31 issue the 
article of the Pravda. The article called for the cooperation of Socialists 
and Communists against Fascism. Perhaps it is only a coincidence, but cer-
tainly an interesting one, that the Pravda published that article shortly 
after the meeting in Geneva (May 18, 1934) of Maxim H. Litvinov, the Soviet 
people's commissar for foreign affairs, and Louis Barthou, French foreign 
· ministe~ for the discussion of Barthou 1 s plan of an Eastern Pact. 
Doumergue aroused high hopes in the country concerning the possibility of 
curtailing inflation and creating, with the use of constitutional reforms, a 
more stable government. The political party interests, however, proved to be 
stronger than the patriotic appeals of Ooumergue. He was forced to resign in 
November 1934, and was followed by Pierre Etienne Flandin, and then by Pierre 
Laval on June 7, 1935. French ecohomic conditions remained in distress, and 
the domestic political situation was in turmoil for one more year when the 
26 RAA, Jeanneney to Egger-Moellwald, Paris, Zl, 19/Pol., March 12, 1934. 
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general elections again put the Socialists in control, and the Popular Front 
government was organized by Leon Blum. 
Military Situation 
From the end of World War I_, France's main concern had been the possible 
revival of Germany's power, and the possible turn of German foreign pol icy 
toward revisionist 1 ines. To be ready to deal successfully with such a situa-
tion, France had al ready created a network of alliance with the Little Entente 
states in the 1920 1 s. 27 Although these treaties looked impressive on paper, 
their application actually depended on the military capacity of France, and on 
the will of the French governments to use that military might in case of neces-
sity. However, the French army became the victim of its own victory of 1918. 
The French military and political leaders had made two basic mistakes. 
The first mistake was the evaluation of the events of the world war and its 
conclusion, which stressed the superiority of defensive tactics and strategy 
over the offensives. As a result, they spent millions of francs on the build-
ing of the Maginot line, while they neglected the development of mobile units. 
The second mistake was their unilateral disarmament following the peace trea-
ties. They gradually reduced the number of their army between 1921 and 1933 
from 857,000 men to 560,000, with almost 40 per cent of them not serving on 
the continent, which left only 224,000 men for the defenses of France proper;28 
and the fifty-two infantry divisions were reduced to twenty. 29 
27Treaty with Poland, Februa~y 19, 1920; with Clechoslovakia, January 25, 
1924; with Rumariia, June 10, 1926; and with Yugoslavia, November l I, 1927. 
28speech of Colonel Jean Fabry on February 20, 1933, at the "Conference 
on International Cooperation" organized by the "Old Students" and the "Students 
of the Free School of the Political Sciences in Algir" (Paris: Edition of the 




According to the plans of the French general staff, for the modernization 
of equipment, retraining of personnel, and completion of the Maginot 1 ine, the 
army needed 5,040 million france in eight annual amounts of 630 million 
f~ancs.30 From 1927 until the end of 1934 the French government appropriated 
only 2,097 million francs for the military budget,3 1 less than half of the 
amount the general staff originally requested. The army leaders were alarmed 
when they learned at the end of 1933 that the military budget proposed for 
1934 would force them to further reduce the size of the army to less than 
100,000 men.3 2 This reduction sounded terrifying in the light of the reports 
of the Deuxieme Bureau, which estimated the strength of the German army to be 
twenty-one combat divisions, backed by thirty to fifty reserve divisions.33 
Yet, the new, lower army budget bill was not altered; it was passed by the depu 
ties against the protest of the Army Council. Why did the deputies close their 
eyes to the threatening signals produced by Germany when Hitler withdrew from 
the Disarmament Conference on October 14, 1933, and then five days later left 
the League of Nations? 
The reasons for this behavior of the deputies are numerous. The first 
and most widely accepted reason refers to the effects of World War I. In 1917 
the French army had al ready displayed strong signs of war weariness. 11 The 
thirty-two months of hardship that many soldiers had experienced, the repeated 
promises of swift victories that seemed forever to go unfulfilled, the lack of 
30Maurice Gamel in, Servi r (3 vols.; Paris: Pion, 1946), 11, 20. 
f 
31 1bid. 
32Paul-Marie de la Goree, The French Army (New York: George Braziller, 
1963), p. 254. 
331bid. 
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confidence in their leaders and a growing feeling of the pointlessness of so 
much carnage had led to a number of mutinies ..... 34 
The memories of this hardship and frustration were not erased from the 
minds of the former soldiers by the victorious end of the war. Howeve·r, while 
this hardship left its imprint only in the minds of the soldiers, the Joss of 
human life influenced the thinking of the civilian population also. France 
Jost a million and a half soldiers,35 which was slightly less than German's 
Josses, but Germany had a population of 65 million while France's population 
was only 41 million, with tendencies toward further decl ine.36 The psychologi-
cal effects of these conditions prevailed in the sinking popularity of the 
army, in the spreading of pacifist convictions, especially among the Social-
ists, and in the mood of the consecutive governments and deputies, who hesi-
tated to vote for the appropriations for the army. 
This reasoning is only part of the picture since the losses suffered in 
World War I "left no permanent scar. 1i37 Paul-Marie de la Goree argues con-
vincingly that the French army, after the victorious end of World War I, found 
no new mission for herself, since "Alsace Lorraine was French once again and 
the deepest source of inspiration for patriotism or nationalism, in pre-war 
days, no longer existed. 1.38 The economic consequences of the war, such as the 
34Herbert Tint, The Decline of French Patriotism (London: Weidenfeld and 
N i co 1 son, 1964) , p. 1 56. 
35The exact figures were: 895,000 died in action; 245,000 died of wounds; 
175,000 died of illness. 16.5% of tpe French soldiers died during the war; 27% 
of all the losses were 18-27 years old. See: Jacques Chastenet, Jours San-
,9lants (Paris: Hachette, 1964), pp. 190-91. 
36Tint, Ibid., p. 195. 
37A. J. P. Taylor,~ History of the First World War (New York: Berkeley 
Publ. Corp., 1963), p. 178. 
381a Goree (de), The French Army, p. 181. 
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devastation of northern France, the termination of the German indemnity pay-
ments, and the great depression forced the French political leaders to be more 
concerned with the imminent social and economic problems than with the ques-
tions of national security. The declining army budgets and the declining pay 
forced more and more army officers 11 to look for an opportunity to leave the 
service. The youthful elite turns away from out military schools."39 
This decline of patriotic spirit and the bad financial conditions within 
the army were not the only reasons for the deteriorating military conditions 
and for the disconcern of the deputies.· Patriotism and the respect for the 
army had not declined so catastrophically as one might suppose after studying 
the actions of the deputies. The growing membership of the patriotic Right 
wing organizations proved that national ism was not dead in France. 11 ln 1936 
the Croix de Feu, for example, boasted two mill ion members. 1140 Even the So-
cial ists and Leon Blum agreed on the importance of the defense of France. 
Their opposition to the army was rooted in the Socialist dogma, which put po-
1 itical consciousness of a soldier ahead of military skill, equipment, and 
training. ''The working class, 11 Blum said, 11would rise as one man if ever ther 
• • II 4] 
were an 1nvas1on. 
Finally, Maurice Baumont expresses the conviction that the overriding 
issues in the eyes of the respective governments and in the minds of the depu-
ties were centered more on party strifes and struggles than on the questions 
f . 1 . 42 o nat1ona security. The recognition of this short-sighted policy led to 
• 
39de la Goree, The French Army, pp. 191-192. 
40Tint, The Deel ine, p. 201. 
41 1bid., p. 203. 
42 Baumont, Les Origins, pp. 98-101. 
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the formation of the Government of National Unity under Doumergue in February 
1934. This idea of national unity was not yet dominant in the last months of 
1933· 
In 1 ight of these arguments (each of them has a certain amount of merit), 
we may more easily understand the actions of the deputies, yet we cannot ab-
solve them from their responsibility. 
On December 18, 1933, (while the new budget was discussed in the Army 
Council and in the Chamber of Deputies) Hitler sent an official proposal for a 
disarmament agreement. In this proposal he put forth a plan that decided the 
strength of the German army in half of the French. 43 Germany was ready to re-
nounce the use of offensive weapons (tanks, airplanes). Hitler also suggested 
a reciprocal control system. He asked for the return of the Saar Valley to 
Germany and recommended the conclusion of a Non-Aggression Pact. 44 French do-
mestic problems delayed the answer to this proposal until April 1934 when it 
was rejected against the wish of Barthou. 45 In other words, after the further 
reduction of the size of her army, France closed the doors to diplomatic nego-
tiations. In February 1934, newspaper reporters already had begun to send 
alarming reports about the speed of the German rearmament, thus corroborating 
the information of the Deuxieme Bureau: ''Germany may have 3 million men in 
her army in case of mobilization. The German air force, according to Goring, 
will already equal the French air force in May 1933. 1146 
43 Georges Bonnet, Quai d 1 0rsa~ (New York: Times Press, 1965), p. 112. 
44 1bid. 
45~., p. 113. 
46Le Temps (Paris), Sundy Referee, February 5, 1934. 
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After the February riots, Marshall Philippe Petain, the hero of Verdun, 
took over the defense ministry. The conditions of the army continued to de-
teriorate; the military leaders, now had to fight even their own minister, 
since Petain felt that the M3ginot line provided satisfactory defense and op-
. 47 posed the modernization of the army. They sent desperate appeals to the 
government stating: "In its present state, the French Army will be in no situ-
ation to face a threat without grave risks. 1148 The government, however, was 
not moved. 
The political conseguences of the weakening of the army were far more im-
portant for the time being than the military consequences. The weakening of 
the French army alarmed her allies and created doubts in the allied govern-
ments as to whether or not France could fulfill her obligations, of which she 
had many. Although the alliances with Poland and the Little Entente were de-
signed as 11mutual assistance" treaties, the secret military clauses provided 
actual assistance only for the small states, and not for France. 49 
Poland was to be helped with war material and technical personnel. 
France's duty was to secure the communication 1 ines and the maritime trans-
portation routes to Poland in case of war, and the control of the "Sound" be-
tween Denmark and Sweden was the key to the success of that plan. However, 
the French navy was far too weak to accomplish such a great task, although 
among the branches of the armed forces, the navy was in the best condition. 
47Gamelin, Servir, II, 112-29. Pierre Cot, Triumph of Treason (Chicago: 
Ziff-Davis, 1944), pp. 181-84. Cot~s testimony is the more significant since 
he was an admirerer of Leon Blum, and also a Socialist. 
48 la Goree (de), The French Army, p. 255. 
49For the text of the treaties see: Gamel in, Servi r, 11, 465•75. 
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The army had not even prepared plans to fulfill this obligation. 
therefore, was a military absurdity. 
The treaty, 
The treaty with Rumania envisaged a military cooperation "in case of 
necessity," but no exchange of views ever took place between the two general 
51 
staffs. 
The Czech treaty projected the creation of a coordinated military opera-
tion against a ''common enemy, 11 but no such plan was ever worked out.52 
The security treaty with Yugoslavia did not envisage any military conven-
tions. When the Yugoslavian general staff proposed a "conversation" between 
the two staffs in 1928, the French government found the time to be "inoppor-
tune," and with that answer the subject was dropped forever. 53 
Naturally, for France the most important question was her own defenses 
against Germany. Mutual assistance treaties especially with Belgium, Poland, 
and C7-echoslovakia, were of utmost importance to her. Yet, the building of 
the Maginot 1 ine, the openly accepted principle concerning the superiority of 
defense, and the drastic reduction of her army brought home the point even to 
her most faithful allies that France was concerned only with her own security. 
11 To maintain the Versailles treaties, it would have been necessary to organize 
an 'offensive' army," wrote General Gamel in. 54 This mistake of France was 
rightly evaluated by her allies: Poland negotiated and signed a Non-Aggression 
Pact with Germany on January 26, 1934. Benes began to look for security in 
50The speedy occupation of Denmark in case of war. 
~ 
51Gamel in, Servi r, 11, 465-75. 
52 1nterview with General Julien Fl ipo (chief of staff of the French Mili-
tary Mission in Prague, 1931-1938), Paris, June 15, 1971. 
53Gamelin, ~-
54~., p. 25. 
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the soviet Union, and Yugoslavia sought an understanding with Italy. On the 
scene of the Great Power politics, Britain continued negotiations with Germany 
for an agreement on the proportion of German rearmament, and the U.S. refused 
to participate in European politics. 
The security system, designed for France by Clemenceau was near total col-
lapse. French domestic conditions remained fluid under the influence of the 
economic crisis. Her allies became the business partners of Germany and Italy. 
Their economic interests demanded rapprochement with these two states, even at 
the expense of possible French rancour. The French army was only a weak shado 
of her former strong past. It was Barthou's task to rebuild France's security 
system or to provide a new one, negotiating from a position of weakness and 
not of strength. It was quite a task! 
French Foreign Pol icy under Barthou's Direction 
Louis Barthou (1862-1934) began his career as a politician in 1889. He 
served in several governments during the years 1894-1922, was a member of the 
Senate, and was chairman of the Reparation Commission until 1926. He was se-
lected as foreign minister by Doumergue. Basically a conservative, his foreign 
political conceptions generally followed Clemenceau's "hard line" policy, in-
eluding the desire of his own predecessors to have Russia as an ally against 
Germany. 
As we have seen in the preceding analysis, Barthou had to start almost 
from the beginning in order to rebuild a security system for France. While 
the governments changed frequently, the aim of the foreign pol icy--to by all 
means defend the status guo created by the Versailles treaties-- had never 
changed. However, while the predecessors of Barthou could believe that the 
status quo could be defended by using the existing system of international 
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treaties, Barthou had to realize (and he did), especially after the German-
polish Non-Aggression Pact, that the system, itself, was in a stage of disso-
lution. He found himself in a situation in which he could more or less freely 
decide the formula that would serve France's interest the best. Taking into 
consideration the existing situation as I see it, he had the following options 
from which to choose: 
to continue the old pol icy based on the idea of international 
cooperation within the framework of the League of Nations (under 
French domination) and revitalize the alliance systems of France 
with Poland and the Little Entente; 
to start a completely new foreign pol icy concerning allies and 
methods, but leaving unchanged the aims, that is, the containment 
of Germany; or 
to give up the idea of French domination and start a rapproche-
ment pol icy with Germany based on equality and reconciliation. 
Which of these options promised the most benefits for France? On the fol-
lowing pages we may attempt to evaluate the above-mentioned alternatives and 
decide which one promised the greatest advantages for France. Then, by com-
paring the best one with the pol icy of Barthou, we shall be able to judge his 
activities more objectively. 
Alternatives for France in February 1934 
Continuation of the Old Foreign Policy 
The basis of this foreign policy was the idea of international coopera-
tion within the framework of the League of Nations, and at the same time, a 
system of alliances of the pro-status quo nations, that is, Poland and the 
Little Entente states with France. 
The advantages of this foreign pol icy seemed to be well-proven in the 
1920's. The League of Nations was more or less under French domination and 
devoted its activities to the preservation of the status quo. At the same 
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time, it represented a supra-national moral authority which commanded the re-
spect of the world's public opinion. 
Poland and Czechoslovakia represented a second front against Germany in 
case of a possible armed conflict. The Little Entente states firmly con-
trolled the Danube Basin and their alliance successfully restrained the Hun-
garian revisionism, prevented a rapprochement between Germany and Austria, and 
blocked the Habsburg restoration attempts. In the Balkans, Bulgarian revision-
ism was held in check by Rumania and Yugoslavia. 
Conditions changed greatly in the first few years of the 1930 1 s. The 
League of Nations lost a certain degree of international respect, due to the 
Japanese withdrawal from membership on February 24, 1933, as a result of the 
hopeless deadlock of the disarmament negotiations from February 2, 1932 to 
April 17, 1934, and due to the withdrawal of Germany from the League on Octo-
ber 14, 1933. The League of Nations could not enforce its resolution against 
the will of a Great Power. It was futile and senseless to seek soiutions and 
resolutions within the framework of the League of Nations on the part of 
France if the power that France wanted to check most was no longer a member. 
It became clear that the League had lost importance which suggested to France 
that she also seek solutions outside of the League. 
Ironically enough, instead of strengthening their already existing al-
liances, the predecessors of Barthou began to look for a new ally, and found 
it in the Soviet Union; with this step they, themselves, began to destroy the 
already existing alliances. Later~ the signing of the French-Soviet Non-
Aggression Pact (November 29, 1932), its ratification in the French Chamber the 
following year (May 18, 1933), the visit and friendly reception of Litvinov in 
France in July 1933, the French Radical Socialist Party leader, Edouard Her-
riot1s visit to the Soviet Union in August 1933, and the trip of the French 
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air minister, Pierre Cot, escorted by an air squadron to Moscow in September 
193355 all alarmed Rumania, as well as Poland, and speeded up the new foreign 
policy of Pilsudsky. Pilsudsky tried to disengage his country from the French 
alliance and secure for Poland some kind of neutral status between France, 
Germany, and the Soviet Union. French politicians and diplomats denied that 
any reasons had existed for this new Polish foreign policy. Yet Poland's dis-
trust in French diplomacy appeared to the Poles to be well-founded. While 
"both Germany and Soviet Russia had shown the desire to revise their frontiers 
with Poland to their own advantag~• 56 since the peace treaties of Versailles 
and Riga were signed, the French-Polish Guarantee Pact (October 15, 1925) was 
not strong enough to counter-balance the Rapallo Treaty. "Poland could not be 
too sure of French support, as was shown by Locarno and deficiencies in French 
57 deliveries of arms. 11 Pilsudsky was confronted with this situation as soon 
as he assumed power, and it forced him to pursue a pol icy of non-engagement.58 
This pol icy led to the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact in July 1932 and to 
the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact in January 1934, which frightened 
55Frederick L. Schuman, Europe on the Eve. The Crisis of Diplomacy, 1933-
1939 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), p. 96. 
56Hans Roos, A History of Modern Poland (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 
1958), p. 126. 
571bid., p. 127. 
58For more detailed discussions of Poland's problems concerning French 
diplomacy, the reader may consult the following works: Colonel Josef Beck, 
Final Report (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1957), pp. 2-15; Roman De-
bicki, Foreign Pol icy of Poland, 1919-1939 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1962), Chapters I I I and IV; Robert M. Kennedy, The German Campaign in Poland 
(Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, 1956), pp. 2-4; S. Konovalov, Russo-
Polish Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1945), pp. 37-43; 
William Evans Scott, Alliance Against Hitler (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1962), Chapters Ill and IV. 
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'Czechoslovakia even more than France, although some French political experts 
had already arrived at the conclusion that 11 one cannot count on Poland any-
1159 
more. 
To make the traditional French policy work again, it was absolutely neces-
sary to bring Poland back into the French camp. The price that France would 
probably have had to pay was the dropping of the Soviet friendship. Which had 
more value? This is what was Barthou•s duty to decide. 
A new shock which weakened the confidence of the Little Entente in France 
was caused by the French participation in the Four Power Pact negotiations. 
The basic idea of the pact came from Mussolini, who seeing the impotence of the 
League of Nations, wanted to place the preservation of the peace in the care 
of only the Four Great Powers--Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. 60 The 
cooperation was to be based on mutual understanding and satisfaction and, 
therefore, the basic text indicated the necessity of the revision of the peace 
treaties. This one sentence alone was enough to mobilize the foreign ministers 
of the Little Entente against the pact. They protested against it and con-
fronted France with the dilemma of choosing between the cooperation with the 
Great Four and her alliance with Poland and the Little Entente. France gave 
way to her allies• wishes. Although the pact was signed in June 1933, due to 
the French counter-proposals, it resembled very 1 ittle the original draft, and 
finally was not ratified by the Chamber. 
Yet, there were other consequences of the Four Power Pact negotiations. 
The Little Entente states and the B~lkan states began to look after their own 
59~, Moellwald to Dollfuss, Paris, ZI, 34/Pol., May 4, 1934, p. 524. 
60Albrecht-Carrie, Diplomatic History, p. 467. Carrie compares the Four 
Power Pact's idea to the idea of the Concert of Europe. 
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security instead of relying completely on France. Already by February 16, 
1933, CY.echoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania had signed a pact of organiza-
tion; and on February 9, 1934, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia signed 
a new treaty called the Balkan Entente. 
These treaties signalled to F~ance a certain amount of distrust on the 
part of her allies and presented her with a new problem, because although the 
treaties served the idea of 11 collective security, 11 they did not interpret it 
anymore from the French point of view. To make the old French policy prevail, 
it was necessary to convince these states to incorporate their new pacts into 
the broader French security system. 
In light of the diminishing French economic relations with these states, 
the weakened French military power, and the new political developments, the 
policy, which was aimed at the restoration of the old French alliance system, 
promised a very dim success. 
The Start of a New Anti-German Foreign Policy 
It had to be clear for Barthou that the only way to stop the growing Ger-
many was to create new, stronger anti-German alliances. He had prospective 
allies for such a design--the Soviet Union, Italy, Austria, and Hungary on the 
European continent, and Britain outside the continent. 
The Sovi~t Union 
An alliance with the Soviet Union was already the goal of the preceding 
French governments. Yet, this all i~nce promised real is tic benefits in case of 
war .£!l!.x if the Soviet Union would have had a common frontier with Germany. 
Not having that, it would have been necessary to secure the permission of the 
Polish and the Rumanian governments for Russian troop crossings, but neither 
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""the poles, nor the Rumanians were willing to see Bolshevik troops pass through 
their territories. In the absence of Polish and Rumanian cooperation, the 
alliance with the Soviet Union had only a theoretical value, and it did not 
provide any security for France. The pushing of such an alliance would pos-
sibly deteriorate the French-Polish relationship without any results; the pur-
suit of the Soviet alliance simply meant the chasing of utopian dreams. 
Under the leadership of Mussel ini, Italy was an unpreferred ally in the 
eyes of the French political Left. At the same time, France and Italy had a 
common interest in the prevention of the Anschluss and in the blocking of Ger-
man penetration in Central Europe. The pursuit of a rapprochement with Italy 
was of primary interest to France, but the question of Italian friendship had 
other aspects, which made the realization of it harder. France and Italy had 
their differences in colonial questions, but these were unimportant. 61 A more 
sensitive problem was the fact that Mussolini was the champion of revisionism. 
Furthermore, he advocated the revisions of~ the peace treaties. His thesis, 
if accepted, would have led to the mutilation of Czechoslovakia for the bene-
fit of Germany, ~ungary, and Poland; of Rumania for the benefit of Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and the Soviet Union; and of Yugoslavia for the benefit of Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Italy. In the final analysis, it would have produced the com-
plete collapse of the French alliance system by weakening ad absurdum the 
capacity of the Little Entente to survive. A rapprochement with Italy seemed 
feasible only if it was restricted to French-Italian cooperation for the mu-
tual guarantee of Austria's independence. Yet, at the same time an Italian 
61 la Goree (de), The French Army, p. 257. 
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~pprochement was an absolute necessity for France in order to prevent, in 
case of armed conflict with Germany, the formation of a second (Italian) front 
at her back. So, Barthou had to find an acceptable basis for cooperation with 
I ta I Y· 
fil!S t ri a 
Austria represented a difficult problem, too. It was France's interest 
to preserve Austria as an independent state, but the political Left in France 
and the government of Czechoslovakia were extremely unhappy with the autocratic 
rule of Dollfuss. After the February events in Vienna, 62 there seemed to be 
no chance to secure very much understanding between Czechoslovakia and Aus-
tria. 63 It was Barthou's. problem to find some basis for their agreement, and 
if possible, an alliance between them, and in this way strengthen the anti-
German front. 
Hungary 
Hungary played no important role in the eyes of the French government. 
French foreign policy was directed toward Hungary according to the interests 
of the Little Entente states, and any special agreement reached without their 
consent would alienate them from France. On the other hand, a modus vivendi 
62The Socialist uprrsrng was crushed by Doll fuss and the following inves-
tigation proved that Czech Social is ts were actively involved in the preparation 
of the revo 1 t. 
63RAA, Paris, ZI, 19/Pol., Marfh 12, 1934, p. 480. Bouisson, president 
of the Chamber of Deputies said to Egger-Moellwald on March 11, 1934 (speaking 
o~ the February 17, 1934, uprising in Vienna): "On the sixth of February Mr. 
Leon Blum was informed through a phone ~all from Prague what was in preparation 
f21: the next days in Austria. If Mr. Leon Blum would have informed Mr. Dala-
dier about that phone call, he could have warned through the French ambassador 
the Bundeschancellor not to irritate the Social Democratic Party. 11 (italics 
mine) 
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_...... ched in a common agreement with the Little Entente would release the pres-
rea 
sure, especially on Czechoslovakia, and would enable her to concentrate her 
efforts according to France's interest in the containment of Germany. It was 
to Barthou to find such a formula. up 
B ri tal.!l 
-
A cooperation with Britain in Central Europe was very uni ikely because of 
the basic differences between the political views of Britain and France con-
cerning Germany and concerning the question of a possible revision of the 
peace treaties. However, there was one agreement Barthou needed to seek and 
reach with Britain: to remain absolutely neutral and, if possible, renew the 
agreement of Anglo-French cooperation declared on July 13, 1933. 
After this short review we may draw the following conclusions concerning 
the feasibility of new allies: 
Alliance with the Soviet Union had no practical value without 
the cooperation of Poland and Rumania. Negotiations toward that 
goal should proceed only with their complete agreement and par-
ticipation. 
Alliance with Italy was of primary interest to France. 
Alliance with Austria was not a necessity, but Austria's 
independence was a basic interest of France. 
Alliance with Hungary was not feasible, yet it was important. 
Alliance with Britain was preferable, but not a vital question. 
Rapprochement with Germany 
A step toward a rapprochement ~ith Germany would have demanded a complete 
reversion of the French foreign policy. In light of the February events, it 
could have triggered a renewal of demonstrations, possibly a revolution, and 
most certainly a further split in the national unity. Yet, there were many 
reasons why this pol icy could have won the support of the majority. The 
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"";verage Frenchman was 11 a social reactionary, tending altogether toward conser-
vat ion and resistance to change, a man who fears revolution. 11 The political 
organizations of the Right counted some 70,000 active members, and their num-
bers were growing rapidly, while the Left (Communists) commanded about 30,000. 
65 Even if we add to it the hesitant Socialists with their 130,000 members, the 
Left still represented only a small minority of the population. Because of the 
fear of revolution, and because of the disappointment in the whole parl iamen-
tary system, many Frenchmen believed that 11 the power of the Executive will have 
to be increased. 1166 This conviction was widely held not only among the politi-
cally less-educated people, but also among the politically most-influential 
personalities of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies. 67 It was natural 
that people with such convictions were more or less ready to accept rapproche-
ment with an authoritarian Germany. 
A similar conclusion was reached on the basis of practical reasons. 
French industrial production sharply declined and had no hope to catch up with 
. l d" G 68 aggressive y expan 1ng erman economy. Certain French capitalist circles 
worked for the creation of a German-French economic block69 as a way out 
from the decline. Furthermore, French military weakness, a rapidly declining 
population, and an aging society70 were good enough reasons for the 
64Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., The European Right, A Historical Pro-
~ (Berkeley: University of California, 1966), p. 118. 
6S1bid., p. 106. 
66Phillip Gibbs, European Journey (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 
Doran & Co., 1934), p. 28. ' 
67RAA, Moellwald to Dollfuss, Paris, Zl, 19/Pol., March 12, 1934, p. 480. 
68Rogger and \.feber, Ibid., p. 120. 
69RAA, Moellwald to Doll fuss, Par.is, Zl, 11/Pol., February 3, 1934, p. 461. 
70Rogger and Weber, Ibid., p. 122. 
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discontinuation of the alienation from Germany and for the change of basic 
foreign political principles. 
Finally, there was the genuine pacifist argument against any confronta-
which could lead to war. Even the "Ancien Combattants de Guerre" believed tha 
"if a vote were taken (what is called a plebiscite) the whole French working 
class would be against war for any reason. There would be a revolution 
first • 11 71 (italics mine) 
We may say that there were three reasons: a fear of Communism and disap-
pointment in parl iamentarianism, realistic economic and military conditions, 
and finally, pacifism that presented the rapprochement with Germany from the 
domestic political point of view as a feasible foreign pol icy. 
France also needed a rapprochement with Germany because of her present 
weakness. Only a mutual understanding with Germany could stop a complete Ger-
man rearmament; only a mutal understanding on the economic field could stop 
the German penetration into Central Europe and could perhaps produce a divisio 
of spheres of interests; and only a rapprochement pol icy with Germany could 
secure time for France. Time was needed to stabilize the domestic political 
scene; time was needed to reorganize the crisis-ridden economic life; time was 
needed to rebuild and modernize the army; and time was needed to restore the 
confidence of old allies. These considerations demanded a rapprochement polic 
with Germany. 
On the other hand, there were several disadvantages of that policy, too. 
( 
First of all, a German-French understanding outside of the League of Nations 
could cause the complete collapse of that institution. If the rapprochement 
policy were to be initiated on the part of France, then Germany and all of 
7 1 G i b b s , Jou rn e y , p . 2 4 . 
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Europe would interpret it as a sure sign of France's weakness, thus producing 
a complete loss of confidence in France. It could bring the complete al iena-
tion of the Soviet Union; it could endanger a complete break with Italy; it 
could strengthen the revisionist movement; it could lead to a complete col-
lapse of the existing alliance system; and it could lead to a situation in 
which, like in the time of Bismarck, France would live in complete isolation, 
depending on the goodwill of Germany. The disadvantages and the risks in-
valved were undoubtedly much, much greater than the advantages. However, the 
consideration of the time factor, alone, suggests that in case of a German 
proposal, France should not reject it flatly, but should start negotiations in 
accord with her allies, and secure time for herself to put her household in 
order. 
The results of the above analysis clearly show that Barthou could have 
done a successful job by flexibly selecting one of the options which could de-
rnand--as conditions changed with the passing of time--a possible switch to 
another option, or even using different details of the different options if 
the use of them were to promise the most advantages for France. The most ac-
ceptable pol icy could be built on the following axioms: 
not to flatly reject any German proposal to gain time; 
secure the friendship of Italy; 
guarantee the independence of Austria; 
try to bring Poland back to the side of France; and 
( 
restore the confidence of the Little Entente. 
The simplest and most promising solution of all these problems could be 
reached if all the states concerned would agree and sign a new pact, which 
would guarantee and protect the basic interests of al 1 the signatories. 
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The Course of Events 
11 Barthou wanted to recreate European balance of the collective security. 
For him, Fascist Italy and Soviet Russia were representing two master cards, 
two trump cards against Hitler. He would have 1 iked to organize a common 
front against Nazism 
Most historians agree with Baumont in his definitions of Barthou's for-
eign political aims. However, his methods, as we shall see below, sometimes 
caused confusion. 
Barthou, himself, stated in his speech in the Chamber of Oeputies on 
May 25, 1934, that his policy was the continuation of the foreign pol icy of 
the preceding French governments.73 However, such statements should not be 
taken at face value. Because his actions seemed to be the continuation of 
the "unchanging" French foreign pol icy, it does not necessarily mean that his 
~and methods were the same. One example of this is the French rejection 
of Hitler's rearmament proposal, an action which was decided in the cabinet by 
majority vote against the vigorous objections of Barthou.74 
It is, therefore, advisable to take into consideration in the following 
analysis, not only the actions,but also his plan~ and only then can one pass 
judgment on his foreign pol icy concerning Central Europe. 
72Maurice Baumont, Les Origines de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale (Paris: 
Payot, 1969), p. 103 
f 
73chambres des Deputes, Journal Officiel de la Republigue Fran~aise, 
"Debats Parlementai res, 11 Paris, 1934, pp. 1254-55. 
74Bonnet, Ouai d 1 0rsay, p. 112. 
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The Eastern Pact · 
Barthou had only about a week's time to get acqua.inted with the foreign 
political conditions of France when the events began to speed up. Germany 
had already meddled in Austria's domestic affairs in 1933. Though the Paul-
Boncour government protested against it, Hitler renewed the German-supported 
Nazi activities in Austria in 1934. Austria submitted her complaints to 
France, Britain, and Italy, and the Three Powers signed a communiqu~ on Febru-
ary 17, 1934. In this declaration the Three Powers expressed "their common 
views concerning the necessity to maintain the independence and integrity of 
Austria in accordance with the existing treaties. 1.75 There was no question 
in Barthou 1 s mind that Austria's independence was a primary interest of 
France. Because of this he continued the foreign pol icy of Paul-Boncour, who 
had already stated on November 14, 1933, in his speech in the Chamber that 11 an 
independent Austria is an essential element of Central Europe's stability and 
equil ibrium. 11 76 
The first signs of a new French foreign policy can be traced in the com-
ments on the Balkan Pact that had been recently signed. In the view of the 
former governments, Bulgaria· was a revisionist state, and therefore an enemy. 
Circles near the foreign ministry of Barthou, on the other hand, expressed 
their conviction that 11 the Bulgarian claim for territorial revision has mainly 
a theoretical and sentimental character, 11 77 and emphasized that everybody 
should give time to the 11 Bulgarian(publ ic opinion to bury the long existing 
75Le Temps (Paris), February 18, 1934. 
76Journal Officiel, 1934, p. 4103. 
77 
'?-A.A, Moelhvald to Doll fuss, Paris, Zl, 13/Pol., February 12, 1934, 
p, 467.-
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-- . . . 11 . .. 7~ revis1on1st 1 us1ons. These statements indicated that Barthou better un-
derstood France's real situation (economic, military, and political) and 
changed the method from the enforcement of the peace treaty to a reconciliation. 
The Rome Protocols 
A month later, Italy, Austria, and Hungary signed the Rome Protocols 
(March 17, 1934). 79 It caused alarm among the members of the Little Entente. 
The French Left interpreted it as the alliance of Fascist, Revisionist states. 
Barthou, on the other hand, expressed sympathy: II France has to co-
operate with Italy in the rebuilding of the Danube Basin and welcomes the 
protocols. 1180 However, he went one step further and expressed his hope that 
"the members of the Little Entente will find out that the Rome Protocol will 
be beneficial for them, as well as for Europe. 1181 Le Temps, which had 
78RAA, Moellwald to Doll fuss, Paris, ZI, 13/Pol., February 12, 1934, 
p. 467. 
79The Rome Protocols consisted of one political and two economic agree-
ments. The political agreement stressed the importance of the political co-
operation of the three states. They agreed that in case of foreign political 
problems, they would consult each other if anyone of the three states should 
desire to do so. 
The first economic agreement projected the widening of the Austrian-
Hungarian-Ital ian trade relations, and the second agreement planned a new 
Austrian-Italian commercial exchange. 
The economic clauses of the protocol were realized in May 1934 when the 
three states signed new commercial treaties. 
In I ight of the economic crisis, of the discriminating custom policy of 
the Little Entente states, and of the deteriorating French foreign trade, it 
could be interpreted as a defensive(economic policy which, if it hindered the 
commercial plans of any state, then it hindered the German economic penetra-
tion of Austria and Hungary. 
67 RAA, Ibid,, 26/Pol., April 2, 1934, p. 496. 
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"';Xcellent connections with the French foreign ministry, had already begun to 
publish sympathetic articles about Austria in February 1934, giving Dollfuss' 
side of the history of the Social Democratic uprising of Vienna. The foreign 
ministry, in response to a reporter who had asked about the Leftist intellec-
tual efforts to organize a committee for the investigation of the Austrian 
"massacre, 11 expressed the view that "from the practical political point of 
view, the effect of the activity of that committee up to this time is insig-
1182 
n if i cant. 
These articles and comments indicated that Barthou had taken the decision 
of the Three Great Powers seriously and sought some kind of friendly under-
standing with Italy on a more 11 direct11 nation-to-nation basis. However, be-
fore starting out on this scheme, realism demanded of him to try to salvage 
the old alliances of France with Poland and the Little Entente. 
His visit to Poland was carefully monitored by the French press, and it 
certainly did not help him to create a friendly atmosphere, repeating the old 
charges of treason by referring to and even republishing the article from the 
Yzvesti ja, which was pub! ished on February 5, 1934. It said, 11 The German-
Polish Non-Aggression Pact is a denial of the French-Polish Alliance of 1921; 
it reduces the quality of Poland as a member of the League of Nations; 
it gives a free hand to Germany in Austria and gives the freedom of action to 
Germany against the Balkan states. 1183 
The main reasons for Barthou 1 s failure to reconcile Poland, however, were 
not the hostile French public opini~n and press. The reasons already existed 
82 RAA, Moellwald to Dollfuss, Paris, Zl, 32/Pol., April 30, 1934, p. 513. 
83Le Temps (Paris), February 28, 1934. 
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and after the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact, Poland reached 
the point of no return. Barthou could conclude after his trip that "France 
cannot count on Poland anymore, and it is, therefore, urgent and necessary to 
85 befriend Italy." 
The visit to Czechoslovakia was refreshing after the Warsaw experiment. 
The Czechs displayed their friendly feelings toward France; their policy was 
a strict pro-status quo policy. Benes was sympathetic toward the Rome Proto-
col and agreed with Barthou that it was a further assurance against the An-
86 
schluss. The Czech army was the best equipped and strongest army in Central 
87 Europe, and Edouard Benes, the foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, was re~ 
vising his former judgment concerning the main enemy of his country. He ac-
cepted the French position, that is, that the main enemy was not Hungary any-
88 
more, but Hitler's Germany. 
The news from Rumania also seemed to be reassuring. Though Nicolai Titu-
Jescu, the Rumanian foreign minister, still refused to consider the possibility 
of Russian military aid, he became more flexible toward Italy and expressed 
his conviction to a French news reporter that 11 only an entente with Italy can 
84 1 intend to devote a whole chapter to the Polish view in a book, which 
will also incorporate my whole dissertation. To explain the origins of Polish-
French disagreement is out of the frame of this study. 
85 RAA, Moellwald reported this to Dollfuss. He based this conclusion on 
the rep-;;-;::t of one of his informers planted in the French Foreign Ministry. 
Paris, ZI, 34/Pol., May 4, 1934, p. 524. 
86 I I f I • • / Magda Adam, Magyarorszag es a K1santant a Harm1ncas Evekben, 11 Hungary 
and the Little Entente in the Thirties" (Budapest: Akademia Pub!., 1968), 
p. 62. 
87 1nterview with General Flipo. 
88 !£.!_£. 
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bring the necessary relaxation which is needed to solve the problems of Cen-
1189 
tral Europe. 
The creation of a corrvnon front with Italy seemed to be the best solution. 
Not the French-Italian differences, but the differences between the clients of 
the two governments hindered the French-Italian rapprochement. Because both 
states considered their clients as indispensable~ both governments made re-
assuring statements to them. During his visit to Hungary, Fulvio Suvich, the 
assistant secretary of Italian foreign affairs, expressed his feeling that "my 
joy would be greater only if I could have stepped on the soil of Great Hungary, 
instead of the present, mutilated Hungary. 1190 This declaration alarmed the 
Little Entente, which demanded reassurance from Barthou against a revisionist 
attempt. The creation of a common understanding with Italy seemed to be dis-
tant because of the conditions in Central Europe. 
In the absence of an imme~iate better solution, Barthou renewed the plans 
of the Paul-Boncour government concerning the creation of an Eastern Locarno. 
Barthou, himself, regarded the participation of the Soviet Union in the Eas-
·tern Locarno as the most important condition for the security of France. He 
could not create a simple French-Soviet al 1 iance, because "he could neither 
challenge the Locarno Pact, nor appear to turn away from the spirit of the 
League of Nations. 1191 The idea of an Eastern Locarno seemed to solve this 
problem. The Soviet willingness to take part in such a plan was already 
S9Le Temps (Paris), February 23, 1934. 
90 1bid., February 22, 1934. 
9lde la Goree, The French Army, pp. 233-234. 
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"';ignalled in the speech of Stal in during the XVI I Congress of the Soviet Com-
92 
munist (b) Party. He said: 
Certain German politicians say that the Soviet Union is now oriented 
toward France and Poland, that she changed from being an enemy of the 
Versailles Treaty to being a supporter of it ••• if the interest 
of the Soviet Union demands to make rapprochement to one or another 
country which does n~t want to disturb the peace, we shall do so 
without hesitation.9 
The undisguised admiration of the French military experts for the Soviet 
armed forces also urged the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. On May 18, 
1934, Barthou met with Litvinov to discuss the Eastern Pact; he was accompa-
nied by General Gamel in as military advisor. Gamel in advocated a French-Soviet 
rapprochement from the military point of view because "Russia represented the 
94 
only really great Eastern counter-weight needed against Germany. 11 He stated 
that the French military leaders attached great importance to a French-Soviet 
military collaboration, and he hoped to obtain from this collaboration not so 
much of an actual Russian military aid, but rather the intensification of the 
French military build-up.95 
Litvinov responded positively to the French suggestions. Barthou, since 
on April 11, 1934, he was already able to secure the consent of England96 to 
the Soviet Union's entrance as a member of the League of Nations, began to 
make the necessary preparations, and at the same time, announced his great 
plan for the Eastern Locarno. 
92January 26, 1934. 
93Quoted in M~ria Ormos, Franc4aorszag es a Keleti 
11 France and the Eastern Security, 1931-1936 11 (Budapest: 
p. 297. 
94Gamel in, Servi r 11, 132. 
951bid., p. 133. 
96ormos, Eastern Security, p. 305. 
Biztonsag, 1931-1936, 
Akademia Publ., 1969), 
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The Barthou-Litvinov discussions represent a turning point in the foreign 
policy of Barthou. Up to that point, he had rightly evaluated the realistic 
political conditions. He had tried to bring Poland back to the French all i-
ance, but failed; he tried to reassure the Little Entente and--especially in 
the case of Czechoslovakia--he was successful. He tried to initiate a rap-
prochement with Italy, and as far as Austria's independence was concerned, he 
was 100 per cent successful. Then after so much success, he suddenly gave in 
to the pressure of the French Left, and to the pressure of the French general 
staff, and he began a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.97 It was a fatal 
mistake, not only because a Soviet alliance did not promise any positive 
security for France, 98 and therefore, it was not a question of first import-
tance, but rather it was a fatal mistake because of its consequences. 
It indicated to Germany that France arrived in her decline to the point 
where, instead of enforcing the peace through unilateral actions based on her 
· I · . h 99 h f . h d I mr rtary mrg t, s e was rrg tene to act a one. It proved not only to Ger-
many, but to the whole world as well, that France 1 s mil.itary power was in such 
an inferior and handicapped position that her hope no longer lay in the 
strength of her army, but in international agreements that would provide se-
curity for France without forcing her to rebuild her own army. In other words, 
France wanted to maintain her superiority in Europe by asking others to make 
the necessary sacrifices, JOO and the Eastern Pact did not conceal this hidden 
97For a more detailed discussion of this domestic power play see de la 
Goree, The French Army pp. 233-34. ' 
98see Chapter I, p. 26 of this study. 
99Like the Ruhr Occupation in 1923. 
IOOwaclaw Jedrzejewicz, ed., Diplomat in Berl in, 1933-1939 (New York: Co-
lumbia University, 1'3fi8), Lipski to 8c'C:<. Gerl in, June 22, 1934, Doc. ~Jo. 23. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Lipski Papers.) 
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goal. The former obi igations and alliances of France became unimportant in 
the basic idea of the Eastern Pact: to gain guarantees for the Rhine Frontier 
without French participation. The Soviet Union, being the only Great Power 
-to express her willingness to participate in the Eastern Pact, was designated 
by France to control Central Europe. The German accusation was not unfounded 
when it had stated that the Eastern Pact would only increase the Soviet influ-
ence in Central Europe. 
The consequences of such an arrangement were even greater. Britain dis-
liked the idea of a French-Soviet all iance; 101 and Poland, on whose cooperation 
the Soviet help really depended, stubbornly refused to grant the passage right 
102 
to Soviet troops, and made her joining conditional on the German accep-
tance. I03 Also, Italy was skeptical and prepared counter-proposals. 
In conclusion, we may say that the idea of the Eastern Pact did more 
damage for France than good. It did not increase the security of France; it 
did not restore the Polish-French al 1 iance; it did not bring the English gov-
ernment out of isolation; it did not dismiss the Yugoslavian suspicion con-
cerning a French-Italian rapprochement; it did not gain the unconditional ap-
proval of the Rumanians; and it did not obi ige even the Soviet Union to sub-
scribe unconditionally to the French designs. However, most important of all, 
it did not help the Central European states to solve their immediate economic 
problems of not having any commerical clauses. It did, on the other hand, 
create a greater host ii ity toward France in Hungary; it did create a suspicion 
in Italy; it did leave the door wide open from the French point of view for the 
IOlsaumont, Les Origins, p. 112. 
102 1bid., p. 114. 
103.J...1?..!.i., p. 150. 
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continuous German economic penetration in Central Europe, and it did help pave 
the road for a Hitler-Mussolini meeting, which took place in Venice, June 14-1~ 
1934. 
The negativism was overwhelming; the positivism was almost nil. One may 
wonder what made Barthou, who was such a strong realist, follow this utopian 
1 ine. One explanation is that the whole idea of the pact was picked up and 
aired for tactical reasons: 11Though France knows that among others, neither 
England, Italy, nor Poland will accept the pact, she offers it so that in case 
of a refusal, she may put the responsibility for the failure of the disarmament 
104 
and peace on these powers. 11 Even if this 11 tactical 11 success was achieved, 
the value of it was questionable. More acceptable were the reasons that were 
a result of the French domestic situation. The political scandals were neither 
solved nor stopped. The financial reform was a flop, and the work programs 
- ff . l 05 were une ect1ve. 11 The unhappy cond i ti ons in the Chambe r111 06 indicated dis-
unity among the deputies. The Socialists and Communists formed a block against 
the government and decided to strengthen their attacks on the government. l07 
Foreign observers did not see too much of a chance for the Doumergue government 
to survive the Autumn. lOB However, following the Barthou-Litvinov meeting in 
Geneva, this situation suddenly changed. 109 The question of survival justified, 
104Report of the Italian and (with similar wording) of the Hungarian am-
bassadors from Paris. Quoted in Ormos, Eastern Security, pp. 506-07. 
l05RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 57/Pol., July 30, 1934, p. 581. 
l06RAA, Moellwald to Dollfuss,~Paris, Zl, 19/Pol., March 12, 1934, p. 480. 
l07ormos, Ibid., p. 300. 
l08RAA, Ibid. 
109see p. of this study. 
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from the government's point of view, the tactical step expressed in the propo-
sal for the Eastern Pact. Did the French government submit the national in-
terest to its own party interest? No! If the Doumergue government would have· 
fallen, the "anti-Fascist" block would have followed a stronger pro-Soviet 
pol icy. By making these concessions, Barthou secured the government's position 
and kept the door open for a possible and vital French-Italian rapprochement, 
1 h . h h d d f h b . . llO a p an w 1c e a vocate rom t e eg1nn1ng. 
For the time being, this rapprochement did not promise too much success. 
Barthou delayed his visit to Italy, and the government indicated that such a 
meeting could take place only if Musso] ini should ask for it. 111 Hitler was 
not so proud, and he realized that this was the right moment to approach Mus-
solini. On June 14-15, 1934, the two dictators met in Venice, an occasion 
which came as a surprise to the French government. During the meeting, while 
Musso] ini shared Hitler's negative views concerning the Eastern Pact, he was 
completely hostile to Hitler's plans concerning Austria. 112 From the French 
point of view, it meant that Musso] ini proved to be a trustworthy ally for the 
containment of Germany, and Hitler's visit did not present any obstacles in 
the way of a rapprochement. However, the French public opinion became sus-
picious of Italy and 11 in the light of the Hitler-Mussolini meeting ••• they 
did not value the possibility of an entente with ltaly. 1111 3 The opposing poli-
ticians explained that Italy was a Great Power with a population equal to that 
11OGame1 in, Servi r, I I , 1 31 • 
111 RAA, Moellwald to Dollfuss, Paris, ZI, 36/Pol., May 8, 1934, p. 526. 
112Lipski Papers, Lipski to Beck about the Hitler-Musso! ini meeting, Ber-
lin, June 22, 1934, p. 145. 
113 RAA, Ibid., 50/Pol., July 5, 1934, p. 566. 
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-of France, and that alone was reason enough to be discontent. 114 French gov-
ernment circles, on the other hand, stressed the necessity of a Barthou• 
Mussolini meeting, but added that "it would make sense only after all the dif-
ferences have been settled between France and ltaly. 111 13 (italics mine) It 
indicated unwillingness to accept compromise,and so it meant the postponement 
of the Italian visit--forever. 
While Barthou visited England to enlist her support of the Eastern Pact, 
he tried to obtain not only the British support, but also British pressure to 
make Mussolini more agreeable in his attitude toward the pact. France be-
Jieved that because of Italy's long seashores, she could not resist an English 
- d 116 deman • Also, the slow moving French diplomacy was then surprised by the 
Austrian Nazi Putsch and by Mussolini's reaction to it. 
The Nazi Putsch in Vienna (July 25, 1934) 
The Nazi Putsch in Vienna created a c,·isis for Barthou. He probably won-
dered whether or not he should act immediately with energy and decisiveness? 
It would have demanded some military demonstrations alone or in harmony with 
Italy and Czechoslovakia, but they were and had to be cautious! The French 
army was organized for defense; only a few divisions were motorized, and their 
provisions would be sufficient for only six months. ll7 No commercial or mil i-
tary agreement took care of further provisions, especially of motor fuels. 
To chance a possible prolonged armed conflict with Germany, or even a war 
114RAA, Moellwald to Dollfuss,~Paris, Zl, 50/Pol., July 5, 1934, p. 566. 
ll5RAA, Ibid., 51/Pol., July 8, 1934, p. 568. 
116RAA, Ibid. , 
11 ?G 1. . ame 1n, Serv1r, I I, 129. 
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would have been risky! It was necessary to secure England's consent and help, 
but England's attitude was characterized by the absence of their ambassadors 
from Berl in and from Rome at that time. They spent their vactions in London 
and did not intend to interrupt their vactions because of the Austrian cri-
118 
sis. 
The Czech army, though superior in strength to the German army, was com-
pletely trained for defense purposes and had no strategic plans prepared for 
h . . 119 sue a s1tuat1on. 
Only Italy acted with swiftness, moving four divisions to Brenner Pass. 
However, instead of relief, it caused even greater 11 nervousness 11 in the French 
. I . . I 120 drp omat1c c1rc es. The English diplomacy's attitude may be best summed up 
in the words of Sir Eric Campbell, Charge d 1 Affaires in Paris: 11 0ne more step 
121 fonvard and that would mean a general war. 11 Barthou warned Musso] ini about 
the prompt and unforeseeable consequences of further isolated steps on the part 
122 
of I ta I y. 
The French nervousness was understandable. A good part of the Czech 
press and the whole Yugoslavian press openly raised the matter that "France 
has to get out from the anti-German front of the Great Powers 123 or has to 
118Le Temps (Paris), July 1934. 
ll91 . "hG lFI. nterv1ew wit enera 1po. 




123Reference made to the Three Power Declaration (February 17, 1934). 
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deny her political and military solidarity with Yugoslavia. 1 ilLL+ If France did 
not give up her solidarity with Yugoslavia, it would mean--as the Austrian am-
d . h t h Id b 11. • • t. 11 ·A • 125 bassa or put 1t--t a s e wou e 1ncr1m1na 1ng ustr1a. 
France tried to avoid an open stand, though she recognized that 11 the 
price she has to pay for the preservation of Austria is cheaper than what she 
would have to pay in case of Austria's collapse. 11126 No actions followed up 
their conclusions, though. The only step~ the French took was a great press 
campaign, in which they proved beyond a doubt the responsibility of Hitler for 
the Austrian Nazi Putsch. 127 
Barthou suggested two alternatives to avoid the possible repetition of 
the crisis. 128 According to the first one, Austria should secure the promise 
of Germany through direct negotiations to discontinue the Nazi propaganda in 
Austria. The second alternative was the signing of a general pact, which 
would obi ige the contracting parties to respect the principle of non-
intervention, demand them to refrain from interferring in the domestic affairs 
of other states, and demand them not to tolerate any subversive activity on 
their own soil directed against a foreign state. 
None of these was satisfactory for Austria. She, on the other hand, 
readily accepted the suggestions of Mussolini, who suggested that 11 the Three 
124RAA __, 
p. 609. 
Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 64/Pol., August 11, 1934, 
l25RAA __ , Ibid., p. 610 
126 1bid. 
127An illustrated report of the Excelsior showed that the official German 
press service prepared the news release concerning the Nazi Putsch three days 
before it actually happened. Excelsior (Paris), August II, 1934, p. 1. 
128 
RAA, Ibid., 62/Pol., August 8, 1934, p. 604. 
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Great Powers who are interested in the preservation of Austria's independence 
should announce with the greatest firmness and clearness that they will not 
tolerate either an Anschluss nor a Gleichschaltung under any circumstances. 1112 
He thought that this declaration "should be worded so categorically and 
brutely (italics mine) that not only Berlin, but also her sympathizers in 
Austria would understand it and would give up every hope of realization of 
their goals. 11130 The French answer was negative to these suggestions. 131 
In the eyes of Austria, Italy remained to be the only sure champion. In 
the eyes of the Little Entente, the insecure feeling grew stronger. It was 
time, especially for Austria, to review her foreign relations and if necessary, 
change them according to her basic interests. 
129RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 62/Pol., August 8, 1934, 
p. 604. -
l30lbid. 
l 3 I Ibid, 
f. 
CHAPTER 11 
THE FIRST. CRISIS: THE MURDER 
OF CHANCELLOR DOLLFUSS 
Conditions in Austria 
The first half of 1934 continued to be a time of great tension and of 
temporary diplomatic successes and setbacks for Austria. Although the rowdy 
propaganda campaign of Germany was softened to a certain degree, Hitler had 
not given up his plans for the Gleichschaltung of Austria. He had kept the 
economic pressure on, 1 while diplomatically trying to isolate Doll fuss from 
2 the rest of Europe. Austria, however, was a member of the League of Nations, 
and Dollfuss considered the support of this international organization to be 
of primary importance. He was prepared to present the Austrian grievances 
against Germany in the League of Nations session.3 At the same time, he sue-
cessfully tried to secure the assi.stance of Britain, France, and Italy and 
received their support in the "Three Power Declaration" (February 17, 1934). 
IThe German government imposed upon the German tourists visiting Austria 
a 1,000 mark 11 visa-fee11 in May 1933. This regulation brought German tourism 
to a standstill and increased the economic problems. United States Depart-
ment of State, Documents on German Foreign Pol icy, 1918-1945, Series C, I I I, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), Doc. No. 262. 
(Hereinafter referred to as DGFP.) 
2 Horthy, the Regent of Hungary, saw the possible annexation of Austria 
by Germany as a "natural development" and expressed his views to the German 
Minister, von Machensen, in Hungary. Magyar Tudomanyos Akad~mia Tort~nettu­
dom~nyi lntezete, ("Historical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Science") 
A Wilhelmstrasse ~s Magyarorsz~g. N~met DiplomJciai lratok, 1933-1944 (''The 
Wilhelmstreet and Hungary. German Diplomatic Documents Concerning Hungary, 
1933-194411 ), (Budapest: Kossuth Pub I., 1968), Doc. No. 21. 
3Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 93 
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Ironically enough, this support was lost the very same day, as it was 
published because of the Social Democratic revolt in Vienna. It was crushed 
mercilessly, and the Social Democratic Party itself was outlawed--actions 
which alienated the. Western Democracies, as well as the Little Entente states.4 
so the isolation came about, not by German diplomatic steps, but by the domes-
tic events of Austria. The following month the declaration of the Rome Pro-
tocols (March 17, 1934) seemed to compensate for the lost Western support. 
Even more favorable for Austria was the outcome of the Hitler-Mussolini meet-
ing (June 14-15, 1934), in which Mussolini warned Hitler that Austria's inde-
pendence was a main concern of Italy. Dollfuss seemed to have secured for Aus-
tria the time to introduce the 1 'corporative state•• system step by step. 
Then, on July 25, 1934, the Austrian Nazis made an attempt to overthrow 
the government. Though the attempt was unsuccessful, Dollfuss was murdered 
during the attack •. His successor, Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg, was con-
vinced that in order to save Austrian independence, he 11 had to embark on a 
course of appeasement. This meant that everything had to be avoided, which 
·would give Germany a pretext for intervention, and that everything had to be 
done to secure some way for Hitler's toleration of the status quo. 11 5 This 
statement creates the impression that Schuschnigg had made up his mind con-
cerning the possible alternatives for Austrian foreign policy and found the 
solution in the good grace of Hitler, which if kept, meant that Austrian 
4see p. 28, footnote 63 of this study. Also, the Czech minister to Aus-
tria, Dr. Zdencky Fierl inger, 11 dee~ed it necessary to intervene, 11 since cer-
tain members of the Czech minority in Vienna had become implicated in the So-
cialist movement. Felix J. Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, 
1918-1935 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 380. 
5Kurt von Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem (London: Victor Gollanz Ltd., 
I 94 7) , p. 14- I 5. 
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independence wou1d stand forever. Yet, the events following the misfired 
Naxi coup--such as the Italian troop movements, Husso1ini 1 s declaration, 6 and 
the sudden decrease of German militancy7--indicated that he could have chosen 
another course for Austria, possibly even anti-German. He however, did not. 
What were the conditions in Europe, and what were the factors in Austria that 
forced him to follow Oo11fuss' unchanged policy? Was he right or did he make 
mistakes, and could he have selected other alternatives that would have been 
more beneficia1, not only for Austria, but for all of East-Central Europe? 
These are the questions which, if answered objectively, create a basis to pass 
judgment on the foreign po1icy of Austria after 1934. 
Hitler had hoped to rea1ize the G1eichscha1tung of Austria without using 
force. The Austrian economic conditions were deteriorating, and he thought 
that by speeding up the economic dec1ine through the app1 ication of pressures 
(such as the restriction of German tourist traffic), he would cause the down-
fall of the Austrian government and would prepare the way for a Nazi takeover. 
To understand the po1itica1 developments, it is necessary to know a few de-
tai1s of the economic conditions of Austria. 
Economic Conditions 
Since the end of World War I, Austria had always had acute economic prob-
1ems. These prob1ems were caused partly by the consequences of the St. Ger-
main Treaty (11 head without an empire••), and partly by the Nationalist Pro-
tectionist Economic Po1icy, 8 which was practiced all over Europe in the late 
' 
6DGFP, C, Ill, Hitler to Papen, Berlin, August 19, 1934, Doc. No. 165. 
71bid. 
BThe expression tried to cover the real meaning: strong protectionist 
trade policy in imports and state-subsidized exports to prevent a Joss of the 
foreign markets. For example, Hungary sold sugar to Austria for half the 
home consumer price. 
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1920 1 s. A custom union with Germany could have helped, but it was prohibited 
by the victorious powers. The Tardieu Plan (custom union of the Central Eur-
opean states under French patronage) was blocked by England and Italy. Being 
alone and not having fertile plains and great material resources, Austria was 
hit by the depression and the economic crisis more than any other country of 
Central Europe. 
Between the years of 1922-1934, the Austrian ~opulation decreased by 1-2 
per cent,. which amounts to 107,680 in a country of 5,384,000 people.9 The 
active population 10 numbered 3,134,000 (58.2 per cent). The unemployment 
rate reached its peak (480,000) during the winter of 1933 and remained high 
in 1934 (440,000). 11 Of the unemployed, the number of the industrial workers 
12 
was the greatest (44.5 per cent). 
More than half of Austria's import and export business was transacted in 
1933 with Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia. 13 The volume of 
her exports was also highest with these countries. 
However, in order to draw val id conclusions concerning the influence of 
the political situation on the economic conditions and vice versa, it is 
necessary to group the different countries into friendly, neutral, and un-
friendly blocks. The friendly ones in 1933 were Germany, Hungary, and Italy 
and in 1934, only Hungary and Italy. Those outspokenly hostile in 1933 were 
9Frederick Hertz, The Economic Conditions of the Danubian States (New 
York: Howard Fertig, 1970), p. 93. 
IOThe actual working populatibn. 
11 Hertz, Danubian States, p. 98. 
12 I b i d. , p. 49. 
l3See Table 111. 
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Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and France; but in 1934, Germany also 
entered this group, while France moved into the neutral group. The neutral 
group consisted of Poland, the U.S., Switzerland, and England in 1933, and 
. 14 
was joined by France 1n 1934. 
The following statistics, grouped in the above described fashion, reveals 
some interesting facts. While in 1933 Austria's foreign trade was fairly dis-
tributed in the friendly block (34.3 per cent import and 30.2 per cent ex-
port), the hostile block (28.7 per cent import and 22 per cent export), and 
the neutral block (23.3 per cent import and 29.1 per cent export}; in 1934 
the situation changed for the worse. Austria's foreign trade altered so that 
45 per cent of its import and 34 per cent of its export depended on the hos-
tile nations, 22.9 per cent import and 31 per cent export on the neutral na-
tions, and only 15.2 per cent import and 14.2 per cent export on the friendly 
nations. 
Austrian economic interests demanded a good political relationship with 
all of her trading partners, because even the smallest economic malfunction 
of the export-import trade would have created a grave crisis. The German 
tourist restrictions were intended to do just that. 
Political Conditions 
On March 9, 1933, Chancellor Doi I fuss assumed "emergency power'' and be-
gan to rule by decrees. l5 He was thereby freed from a possible parliamentary 
14see Table IV. 
ISThe emergency power was granted by a law passed during World War I and 
had not been repealed since. 
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defeat, but he was still short of a mass support. The Nazi movement, due 
to the vigorous support of Hitler's Germany, became stronger and attracted 
many Pan-Germans, who formerly supported the government's policy. Receiving 
encouragement from Mussolini, Dollfuss banned the Nazi Party in Austria on 
June 19, 1933. The next year, in February, after receiving encouragement from 
Mussolini, he organized a show-down with the Social Democrats, who had re-
ceived help from Czechoslovakia in the form of secret armshipments.17 On 
March 17, 1934, Austria, Hungary, and Italy together signed the Rome Protocol, 
which announced not only new commercial agreements between the three coun-
tries, but was designed to give some kind of guarantee against a German at-
tempt of annexation. On May l, 1934, Dollfuss announced a new constitution, 
fashioned after the Italian corporate state system. The ground work was laid 
down for a relatively sound course of Austrian consolidation. 
The murder of Dollfuss and the unsuccessful Nazi coup created some un-
rest, but the government held firm and defeated the Nazi attempt. Mussolini's 
reaction proved to Hitler that it was more profitable for him to not continue 
the support of Austrian Nazis, and thereby avoid creating more disturbances. 
When Schuschnigg took over the chancellorship after the murder of Doll-
fuss, Austria was dependent on the economic cooperation of the Little Entente 
state~ of Italy, Hungary, and Germany. On the other hand, the Little Entente 
and Germany were sharp opponents of Austria on the political field, both fear-
ing a possible restoration of the Habsburg Monarchy. This could have blocked 
Hitler's plans for the annexation(of Austria, and could also have meant an 
16He had only a slight majority if the Pan-Germans voted on his side. 
The Pan-Germans advocated a custom union and, if possible, a political union 
with G~rmany. 
Ile. A. M3cartney and A. W. Palmer, Elstern Euro~e, p. 310. ;lso ~cc 
Chicago Daily News, February 13, 1934, p. 2. 
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end for Czechoslovakia by drawing away the different national minorities from 
the support of the Czech state. 
On the field of domestic policy, the two most aggressive opponents of 
the Austrian government, the Social Democrats and the Nazis,. were defeated. 
The murder of Dollfuss spiritually united the Austrians so that Schuschnigg 
was in a unique position to select and pursue a foreign policy that would 
best serve the interest of Austria. 
Alternatives for Austrian Foreign Policy 
As I see it, the following main alternatives could have been pursued by 
Schuschnigg: 
continuation of Doll fuss' pol :cy, that is, the further strengthening 
of the relationship with Hungary and Italy; and maintaining friendly 
relations with Germany, though, firmly standing up against the Nazi 
Gleichschaltung plans. Also, at the same time, maintaining 11 cool 11 
but correct economic connections with France, as well as with the 
Little Entente states; 
start a new pol icy of appeasement with Germany and place Austria's 
independence at the grace of Hitler more than at the grace of the 
Rome Protocols; 
completely change the traditional 1 ine and start a rapprochement 
and a closer cooperation with France, as wel 1 as with the Little En-
tente states, at the price of loosing the support of Hungary and 
possibly of Italy. 
Continuation of Doi lfuss' Pol icy 
Relations with Hungary 
Relations with Hungary had been most cordial since the signing of the 
new commercial treaty and the Rome Protocols. However, Hungary alone did not 
offer too much of a security for Austria against the German danger. On his 
first visit to Hungary, Schuschnigg saw Horthy who said to him about the fu-
ture political outlook of Austria: "For poor Austria, which I love and know 
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almost 1 ike my own fatherland, there is nothing left but to seek ·unification 
with the German Reich. 1118 
Strangely enough, Schuschnigg did not record his own reaction to this 
statement. If there was a substantial number of people who thought along 
Horthy 1 s 1 ine of thinking (and there was), then Hungary certainly did not 
represent a country of special value for Austrian independence. 
There were other opinions in Hungary concerning the future of Austria, 
too, such as the conviction of Prime Minister Julius Gombos. He had tried to 
introduce a Hungarian authoritarian system similar to Hitler's Germany, but 
considered a great Germany to be a dangerous neighbor, and therefore, had 
h . II d h" . . A . I • d d 19 A h emp at1ca y asserte 1s interest 1n ustr1a s 1n epen ence. t t e same 
20 
time, he did not believe that the Anschluss could be prolonged forever. 
A constant fea~ of an Austrian Habsburg restoration was noticeable not 
only in the Little Entente states, but also in Hungary. The Habsburg restora-
tion question was the first that Schuschnigg had to explain during his visit 
in Hungary. There was a small Legitimist group in Hungary, not too great in 
number, but powerful and influential--the Catholic higher clergy, a good num-
ber of the aristocracy, and higher ranking army officers who in the past had 
served in the Kaiser] iche und Konig] iche (KUK) 21 Army. Horthy, himself, was 
an admirer of the Old Monarchy, and he had said to Schuschnigg, 11 lf the old 
Empire were to be re-established, I would walk on my two feet, no matter how 
18
schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 88. 
' 190 • h · . . . G . J 1933 ur1ng 1s v1s1t 1n ermany 1n une • 
Fifteenth (2 vols.; Edinburgh: University Press, 
C. A. Macartney, October 
1961 ) , I , 3 I 2 • 
20wilhelmstrasse, Professor Bleyer 1 s report to the German Embassy in 
Budapest, August 11, 1933, Doc. No. 13. 
21 imperial and Royal 
56 
great the distance, to offer my services again. 1122 This kind of nostalgic 
statement, however, did not influence his realistic actions. Horthy was anx-
ious not to violate the respective clauses of the peace treaty and the earlier 
decision of the victorious powers, because it could endanger the very indepen-
dence of Hungary. As early as 1922, Horthy, himself, blocked the way of a 
Habsburg restoration in Hungary, 23 and in 1934 he believed a restoration was 
''no longer within the range of possibility. One cannot bring the dead to life 
. ,,24 
again. 
The new generation of Hungarian politicians and Prime Minister G'0mbos 
were strongly anti-restorationists. They wanted to modernize Hungary, and 
they saw the embodiment of a modern state in the Fascist and Nazi systems. 
Thus, a monarchist restoration would have blocked the realization of their 
plan. The German 11 solution 11 to the Austrian problem would efficiently forever 
block any Habsburg restoration attempt. 25 
Schuschnigg declared to Gombos that "an active monarchist pol icy was 
nothing but romantic nonsense. 1126 However, he also remarked that, privately 
and personally, he was a monarchist. 27 This statement seemingly satisfied 
Gombo·s--at least that was Schuschnigg 1 s impression, although actually Gombos 
worked more diligently from then on for the "German solution," and especially 
22schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 88. 
23For Horthy's description of these attempts see The Admiral Horthy Mem-
£i.!2. (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1957), pp.116-127. 
24schuschnigg, Austrian Regu~em, p. 88. 
25wilhelmstrasse, MacKensen to Neurath, Budapest, May 10, 1934, Doc. 
No. 24. 
26schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 90. 
271bid. 
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when the German diplomacy obtained its first success in Yugoslavia and Ru-
mania28 in August 1934. 
Hungary, therefore, represented a very weak ally for Austria as far as 
the independence of Austria was concerned. One reason for this was that the 
Hungarian fear of a Habsburg restoration in Austria also directed Hungary to 
Germany 1 s side. Although Hungary would not have welcomed a strong Germany as 
her next door neighbor, it was, in Horthy 1 s and Gombos' eyes, less dangerous 
than a restoration. When Germany took a successful step in the Rumanian and 
Yugoslavian market, Hungary became frightened that she would Jose Germany 1 s 
support for Hungarian revisionism29 and was willing to servilely fol low Hit-
ler's designs for Austria. 
For Schuschnigg to follow Doll fuss' pol icy concerning Hungary would have 
been a naive and unrealistic pol icy. Although it was in Austria's interest 
to maintain friendly relations with Hungary in 1934, he had to realize that 
this friendship was a temporary one, and the most that could be expected from 
Hungary in case of a German-Austrian open conflict was neutrality. Even this 
neutrality was questionable, because Austria included (since the peace trea-
ties) Burgenland--the former Hungarian territory, which was excluded from the 
Hungarian revisionist demands only temporarily.30 Schuschnigg had to seek 
28wilhelmstrasse, Conversation of K~nya with Hitler, Berl in, August 6, 
1934, Doc. No. 25. 
291bid., Doc. No. 26, 27, 28, 83. 
30ln this study I am using tfie words 11 revision 11 and 11 revisionism 11 in the 
following manner: 11 Revision 11 refers to the peace treaties that followed World 
War I. According to Article XV of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the 
decisions of the peace treaties concerning the newly drawn borders could have 
been revised by the unanimous vote of the Assembly to correct possible injus-
tices. The revisionist states that demanded the application of that article 
were Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Bulgaria. 1 'Revisionism" 1r1as the , 
name of the movement pursuing the aim of revisions in each rrc~D<_:ctivrc: u .inc:-,1. j 
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security for Austria in other countries and had to change Dollfuss 1 pol icy. 
lielations with Italy 
Schuschnigg visited Musso! ini in August 1934. Mussolini's reaction to 
the murder of Dollfuss and to the unsuccessful Nazi coup in Vienna seemed to 
be the best assurance for Austria's independence. However, Schuschnigg 1 s 
11frank11 answers to Mussolini's questions probably did not help to improve 
Austrian-Italian relations. 
The first thing that Mussel ini learned from Schuschnigg was the undesir-
ability of Italian armed intervention in case of any Anschluss attempts of 
Hitler. "Actual military assistance within our borders would have been, quite 
frankly, out of the question. The presence of Italian troops on our soil 
would have rendered the position of the Austrian government unattainable. 1i3 1 
He also explained that in case of Italian intervention, the Czechs, as wel I as 
the Yugoslavians, would mobilize and possibly enter Austria. 32 Therefore, 
11 a demonstration of Italian military might1133 would be satisfactory, even in 
the future. What he particul iarly asked of Mussolini was to intervene with 
Hitler in order to curtail Nazi propaganda in Austria. However, his dislike 
of the Italian military aid most probably forced Mussolini to think twice be-
fore taking any step against the Anschluss, especially since in July the 
French and British reactions were far weaker than the Italians•. 
31schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 99. Italian-Austrian antagonism 
existed in 1934 because of the Italian oppression of the Austrians in the 
former Austrian provinces awarded•to Italy in the St. Germain Treaty. 
32see p. 74 of this study. 
33schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 99. 
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Mussolini, on the other hand, expressed his belief that the strengthening 
of the Austrian and Hungarian armies, and the expansion of the commercial 
preference treaties (which would create almost a custom union between the 
three nations) would create a united block of 60-70 million people, which 
would undoubtedly have great political weight in Europe. 
Just as in Hungary, so too in Italy the question of restoration arose. 
Mussolini declared that he was a monarchist, because "monarchy, as a stabil iz-
ing factor, was of the greatest value. 1134 Schuschnigg explained his personal 
convictions and then went on to say that a restoration would endanger Aus-
tria's existence. Mussolini understood the problem, but was pushing ques-
tions in the same direction and even declared that Italy "would certainly not 
object1135 to a restoration. 
In the remainder of the conversation, Schuschnigg rejected Musso] ini 's 
idea that in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia, Austria might incor-
porate southern Moravia and stressed the importance of peace for Austria. 
Musso] ini, on the other hand, urged the speedy build-up of the Austrian armed 
forces and offered his help in it. 
Having had this conversation after his Budapest visit, Schuschnigg 
needed to clearly see the following: 
Musso] ini whole-heartedly supported the ideas of the Rome Protocols 
and wanted to go even farther by creating a de facto custom-union 
between Italy, Austria, and Hungary, without 11 alarming11 36 every-
body by open talks about it; 
34schuschnigg, Austrian Reguifem, p. IOI. 
351bid. 
36 1bid., p. JOO. 
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Mussolini and G0mbos were far apart in their judgment concerning 
the Habsburg restoration, as well as the necessity of an Anschluss; 
Mussolini had doubted, and Schuschnigg enforced his doubt about the 
feasibility of using Italian troops in defense of Austria within 
Austria's borders; 
Musso! ini 1 s support of Aus~rian independence was firm, but depended 
on the possible changes of Italian-German relations in the future. 
Logically, the conclusion that Schuschnigg ought to have drawn from his 
negotiations in Florence was that for the present, Mussolini was Austria's 
best friend, but that this friendship would last only if a rapprochement would 
not develop between Italy and Germany. The best guarantee against such a 
rapprochement would be a French-Italian understanding. It was Austria's in-
terest, therefore, to prepare the way for such an understanding by normalizing 
her own relations with France, with France's allies, and especially with 
Czechoslovakia. However, Austrian negotiations and negotiations with Czecho-
slovakia should not endanger the unity of the Rome Protocol and, therefore, 
should be led in harmony with the Italian and Hungarian foreign political de-
signs. Due to the hard revisionist line of the Hungarian government, this 
seemed to be an impossible task, yet worth trying. These facts again sug-
gested a change for the foreign pol icy of Austria. 
Relations with the Little Entente 
Austria had common borders with two Little Entente states--Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia--and while Yugoslavia was more concerned with Italy, Czecho-
slovakia's main interest focused on Germany. Of course, both states were 
equally cautious, first of all toward Hungary, and then toward Austria. 
Czechoslovakia recognized the danger that Hitler's Germany represented, 
and Benes made every effort to also enlist the support of powers other than 
France for Czechoslovakia. He whole-heartedly supported Barthou's E~st~rn 
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pact, and with less enthusiasm, the Balkan Pact; and at the same time, he pre-
pared the way for the Czech-Soviet Assistance Treaty, which was finally signed 
in May 1935. 
The greatest menace in the eyes of most Czech statesmen was Germany. It 
was their basic desire to lessen the German threat with these treaties. 
Therefore, they considered the independence of Austria to be in their own in-
terest. The Rome Protocols, which created an uproar in Rumania and Yugosla-
via, were interpreted in Czechoslovakia as a counter balance to the Anschluss, 
and therefore, was received with calm and even approva1. 37 A real rapproche-
ment, however, between Czechoslovakia and Austria was blocked because of sev-
eral other reasons. Namely, Benes, 11 up to the time of the Second World War, 
was very much concerned with the danger--represented by Austria and Hungary--
for Czechoslovakia. The ideological problems complicated matters even fur-
ther. Benes seemed to detect something too rightist to his taste in the re-
gime of Dollfuss. 1138 Thomas G. Masaryk, President of Czechoslovakia, on the 
other hand, was more concerned with reality and expressed his conviction on 
September 27, 1933, to Ferdinand Marek, the Austrian ambassador to Prague, 
that a confederation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would give the 
necessary security for all three states. 11 lf the three of us would unite 
again, it would be best for the whole of Central Europe. To put it concisely, 
it was necessary to create something 1 ike a new Austria-Hungary. 1) 9 Even if 
Benes would have been willing to accept Masaryk's plan, Austria certainly 
could not have changed her foreig~ policy so radically without consulting her 
37Adam, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 62. 
38 1nterview with Dr. Francis Schwarzenberg, Chicago, May 10, 1971. 
39Quoted in Adam, Hunqary ~nd the Little Entente, r. 57. 
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allies (Italy and Hungary}. Both countries, and especially Hungary, repre-
sented further obstacles in the way of such plans. First of al I, there was 
the Hungarian revisionist pol icy, which was considered a real threat to the 
integrity of Czechoslovakia. Benes was very much afraid that Hungary could 
gain sufficient support from pub! ic opinion in England and France for a major 
40 
revision of the peace treaty arrangements. Because of the rigid conviction 
of Benes and Hungary, Austria would have to choose between Czechoslovakia's 
and Hungary's friendship. Since the signing of the Rome Protocols, Italy and 
Hungary represented the real friends for Austria. It would have been naive 
to give up this already-existing friendship for a 11 possible11 Czech friendship. 
What the new Austrian government could have done was to assure the Czech 
leadership about the harmless character of the Hungarian revisionist aims, 
which were propagandized more for domestic purposes 41 than for real foreign 
1. . 1 42 po 1t1ca purposes. 
The second obstacle in the way of the Austrian-Czech understanding was 
the question of the Habsburg restoration. In Hungary, as wel 1 as in Rumania 
and Yugoslavia, the governments were very much opposed to the possibility of 
a Habsburg restoration in Austria and would have welcomed a declaration on the 
part of the Austrian government. This would have blocked Otto von Habsburg's 
chances to the Austrian throne forever. Interestingly enough, while the Aus-
trian leaders never considered the restoration possible, they refused to make 
43 
such a declaration. 
40 1nterview with Gustav Henn~ey, Munich, July 17, 1969. 
41 1 bid. 
42
wilhelmstrasse, Hassel to Neurath, Roma, June 30, 1933, Doc. No. 9. 
43G. E. R. Gedye, Betrayal in Central Europe (New York: Harper, 1939), 
p. 146. 
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The third obstacle was the question of Austrian Socialist emigrees~ who 
enjoyed political asylum in Czechoslovakia and directed a strong propaganda 
campaign against Austria, not only on Czech soil, but also in Austria proper. 
They printed and smuggled in the Arbeiterzeitung, which was outlawed in Aus-
. 44 
tr1a. 
Czechoslovakia considered the independent Austria to be an important link 
in her own security. For Austria to have closer cooperation with Czechoslo-
vakia was a risk that might have involved losing the support of Hungary and 
possibly Italy, unless an Italian-French rapprochement would pressure Czecho-
slovakia to remove some obstacles standing in the way of more friendly 
Austrian-Czech relationship, and unless Italy would pressure Hungary to change 
her revisionist foreign policy. Without an Italian-French and a Czech-
Hungarian rapprochement, the continuation of Dollfuss' policy as a cold and 
correct political relationship seemed to be the best course, not only with 
Czechoslovakia, but also with the other members of the Little Entente in order 
to at least secure their economic cooperation. 
Relations with France 
A friendly relationship with France was a vital matter for Austria. 
France had a commanding role in the League of Nations, and Austria badly 
needed the help of this organization, riot only politically (as a safeguard 
for Austria's independence by the virtue of its Covenant), but also finan-
. 11 9 1932 h L f . I c .. 45 d d c1a y. On June , , t e ea~ue o Nations omm1ss1on recommen e 
that a loan of 300 million schillings be granted to Austria, and on June 30, 
44 Gedye, Betrayal, p. 153. 
45set up to deal with the economic problems of the Danube Basin. 
1932, the Powers agreed. However, because of technical difficulties, it was 
not put into effect until the summer of 1933. 47 
During the following period, Doll fuss established his authoritarian re-
48 gime, outlawed the Nazi Party, destroyed the Social Democratic Party, and 
in 1934 attached Austria to the Rome Protocols. The first actions, naturally, 
did not improve Austria's image in France, and she was considered to be a mem-
ber of the opposing group, which caused the failure of the Tardieu plan. 
In February 1934, due to the changes in the French government, 49 Austria 
could hope for the sympathy of the French government, and the Three Power 
Declaration (February 17, 1934) was a positive sign of the improving rela-
tionship. However, it was clear that from the French point of view, the Lit-
tie Entente was much more important than Austria. The French indignation 
during the Nazi Putsch (July 25, 1934), compared with the vehement reaction 
of Musso] ini, indicated the reliability and value of a possible French patron-
age. 
The rapprochement of Austria with France was a desirable goal, but only 
in concord with the Italian foreign policy. Continuing Doll fuss' foreign 
policy seemed to be a good solution. 
46J. D. Gregory, Dollfuss and His Times (London: Hutchinson & Co., 193~, 
p. 181. 
47England assuming one-third of the amount. 
48For a strong pro-Social Democratic description of these events see: 
Charles A. Gulich, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1948), 2 vols.' More objective, but still pro-Socialist is 
Gedye, Betrayal. 
49ooumergue, with Barthou as foreign minister. 
65 
~Relations with Germany 
-
continuation of the Old Policy 
The Nazi Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss changed the situation to the 
advantage of the Austrian government. As the Gennan military attache pointed 
out in his report from Vienna, 11The moral setback suffered by the aggressor 
is considerable, the initiative has passed to the other side. 11 50 The Euro-
pean reaction to the Nazi Putsch, and especially Mussolini's troop movements 
toward the Austrian frontiers, 51 forced Hitler to abandon his annexation plans 
(at least for the time being). Hitler assured Schuschnigg through the newly 
appointed German ambassador, Franz von Papen, that he was "determined, for the 
sake of a detente in Europe, to respect Austria's formal independence 
he also recognized Austria's right to settle her own internal affairs inde-
pendently.1152 In order to support these intentions with tangible proof, Hit-
ler ordered the re-organization of some Nazi paramilitary groups in Austria 
(such as the Kampfring) as Relief Societies, and ordered them to be "con-
cerned only with the cultural, social, and economic care of its members. 11 53 
Austria could cooperate in the future with Germany, if the relations were to 
remain in good standing. As far as the Austrian economic grievances (tourist 
traffic) were concerned, it seemed wiser not to open the German-Austrian fron-
tier for a while.54 On the other hand, Papen asked Schuschnigg to allow ex-
change of ideas (newspapers), but Schuschnigg's reply was vague and emphasized 
50DGFP, C, 111, legation in Austria to Neurath, Vienna, July 26, 1934, 
Doc. No. 125. t 




Papen to Bulov, Berlin, August 19, 1934, Doc. No. 167. 
Hitler to Papen, Berl in, August 19, 1934, Doc. No. 165. 
541bid., Papen to Bulov, Berlin, August 19, 1934, Doc. No. 167. 
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that he would not a11ow Austria to become a colony or province of the German 
Reich. 
Oo11fuss 1 policy seemed to be successful, and a good relationship with 
Germany seemed to appear on the horizon. The cornerstone of this relationship 
was not an Austrian-German mutual understanding, but rather an Italian-German 
disagreement. 
A review of the international situation at the time of Do11fuss 1 death, 
as well as during the remaining months of 1934, did not indicate any reason 
for a drastic change in Austria's foreign policy. Italy stood firmly behind 
the Rome Protocol and unconditionally supported Austria's independence. His 
rapprochement with France was in the initial stage; his disagreement with Hit-
ter seemed to be unbridgeable. Mussolini gave 100 per cent approval of the 
Austrian governmental system which was strong enough to repel the attacks of 
the opposition from the Left, as well as from the Right. Nothing suggested 
that Schuschnigg should start a new policy concerning Austrian-Italian rela-
tionships. 
Germany suffered a moral defeat. The world reaction to the Nazi Putsch 
forced Hitler to give up his plans for the annexation of Austria. All his 
actions indicated that for the time being, he would respect Austria's inde-
pendence. It was clear, however, that he did not abandon his plans altogethe~ 
and that he had enough sympathizers in Austria to stir up new dissatisfaction 
so as to try to overthrow the anti-Nazi government again in the future. A 
strong anti-Nazi domestic policy,•coupled with a cautious foreign policy 
seemed to be the best solution to prevent the success of future Nazi attempts. 
Hungary represented a friend of doubtful value. Though the Hungarian 
government was anxious to have Austria as a buffer state between Gennany a~d 
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Hungary, the remarks of the regent, Horthy, indicated that in case of a new 
conf1ict, they wou1d not be the strongest supporters of Austria. Hungary was 
strong1y dependent on M~sso1ini 1 s support for the revisionist pol icy. If 
lta1y would give up this support, Hungary very like1y wou1d have been willing 
to seek support in Germany, which wou)d have endangered Austria's rear in a 
new German conflict. The key to the right Austrian-Hungarian re1ationship was 
in the hands of Mussolini. Yet, another possibility existed, and that was to 
pave the way for a possible Czech-Hungarian understanding. It could have come 
about if the Czech government would have been willing to agree to a partia1 
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revision of the Czech-Hungarian border. However, with Benes in control, it 
was not feasible, even though a change in the Czech government could have made 
this solution acceptable to both parties. This combination (suggested by 
Masaryk) of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would offer the greatest 
security against a German aggression. A modification of Dollfuss 1 policy 
seemed to be justified along these 1 ines. 
Among the two Little Entente states, Yugoslavia did not represent a great 
problem until Italy was on Austria's side. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, 
was equally concerned with the German expansion, as was Austria. As far as 
this question was concerned, she was Austria's natural ally. However, a 
rapprochement with Czechoslovakia would have necessitated too great a sacri-
fice: the abandonment of Hungary, the denunciation of the possibility for a 
Habsburg restoration, and the permission for the Social Democratic Party to 
function again. Two of the demands were not negotiable from the Austrian 
point of view, but the Habsburg restoration question was. It would not demand 
55Hungary demanded as a m1n1mum the application of the National Self-
determination principle on the Magyar-inhabited territories. See Map I. 
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too much sacrifice from Austria, and the gesture would prove a basis for a 
rapprochement. The basic condition was the better relationship between Czech-
oslovakia and Austria. The modification of Do11fuss 1 strong anti-Czech 
pol icy seemed to be justified. 
The Western Democracies and the League of Nations were necessary friends 
for Austria, not only financially (loans), but also politically. The reaf-
firmation of the Three Power Declaration on September 27, 1933, concerning 
the independence of Austria, greatly improved her security. To continue a 
friendly policy was in the interest of Austria. Nothing indicated that a 
great change was necessary, but improvement of these relations could not have 
been pursued without the consent of Italy. 
It seemed to be a good pol icy to continue along Dollfuss 1 foreign pol iti-
cal I ines, and slight modification of his pol icy was advisable only in the 
case of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
Appeasement of Germany 
There were many well-founded reasons why Austria should appease Germany. 
The economic interests of Austria demanded the normalization of trade rel a-
tions; since Hitler still "kept the German borders closed for any Austrian 
export. 1156 A great number of Austrians (those supporting the government and, 
even more so, the Nazis) agreed with Schuschnigg that the'~ustrians were not 
only a German-speaking people, but actually a German people and as such, they 
could never accept an anti-German combine. 11 57 This romantic idealization of 
German loyalty never influenced Germany, neither in the times of Bismarck, 
56schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 107. 
571bid., p. JOO. 
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nor in the period of Hitler; but astonishingly enough, it seemed to be the 
right attitude for the Austrians to have. It is also true that a great num-
58 
ber of Austrians were opposed to the Anschluss idea. Strangely enough, the 
Nazis found allies in the disappointed Austrian socialist workers, who could 
never forgive the government for the February days. They sought revenge 11 in 
overalls or in brown shirts 11 against the regime .that brought horror to 
them.59 The Schuschnigg government 1 s survival at home depended on the con-
dition to find a modus vivendi with Germany, and thus eliminate the German 
interference in the domestic affairs of Austria. Hitler's response to this 
Austrian aim was very controversial. On August 6, 1934, he explained to the 
Hungarian foreign minister, Kalma'n Kanya that ''if the Austrian government was 
able and wil I ing to prove that they constituted the absolute majority of the 
German people in Austria, then German resistance to cooperation with Austria 
would automatically wane. 1160 It sounded 1 ike a threat to Austria, although 
in the same conversation he stated that "Germany did not aspire to the acqui-
sition of territory through the Anschluss of Austria. Moreover, Austria's 
Anschluss with Germany would mean that Germany would have to take over al I 
economic and financial commitments which today, as a 1 poor Reich', she would 
not be in a position to do."6l It sounded 1 ike a renunciation of the pas-
sibil ity of the Anschluss, but it did not eliminate the future interferences 
in Austrian domestic affairs. Two weeks later Franz Papen, Hitler's special 
envoy to Austria said to Schuschnigg that Hitler was "not only determined to 
53schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 100. 
59Gedye, Betrayal, p. 84. 
60oGFP, C, Ill, Lammers to Neurath, Berlin, August 7, 1934, Doc. No. 150. 
61 1 bid. 
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respect Austria's formal independence, but he also recognized Austria's right 
62 
to settle her own internal affairs independently." It sounded reassuring, 
although in the same speech Papen emphasized that the National Socialist 
ideological revolution "must, naturally, also have repercussions beyond the 
frontiers of Germany, especially in a country with the same culture, customs, 
language, and tradition. One could not hope to dam the ebb and flow of 
spiritual struggles by barricading the frontiers with police posts. 1163 It 
sounded ambiguous. However, later Papen made himself absolutely clear with 
the following sentence: "If the present policy (of the Schuschnigg govern-
ment) and the severe persecutions and sentences continued, fresh revolts 
64 
might perhaps result.'' This was a clear statement which left no doubt that 
Germany did not give up her idea of the Gleichschaltung. She wanted to con-
tinue to work for it, not necessarily through 3 forceful annexation, but 
rather through the ''ideological revolution" a-,d its "repercussions." 
Schuschnigg knew the role of the Germ3n government and party organs in 
the Nazi Putsch from the results of the investigation of the murder of Doll-
fuss. After he had received this and other inform3tion about the real in-
tent ions of Hitler, he certainly had to realize that an appeasement policy 
toward Germany would not satisfy Hitler while Austria remained independent. 
Instead of an appeasement he, by all means, had to prepare to block the pos-
sible future attempts of Germany directed against the integrity of Austria. 
It was clear that to trust the independency of Austria entirely to the Italian 
goodwill would have been a gamble! The natural choice in the selection of 




other guarantors had to fall on France and Britain. From the beginning of 
the Fall of 1934, Schuschnigg tried to enlist the support of these two great 
powers by trying to pave the way for a French-Italian understanding. 65 
A rapprochement with Germany would have only endangered Austria's in-
dependence. To acquire greater security, Schuschnigg had to enlist Britain 
and France among the guarantors of Austrian independence. This probably 
would demand from Austria the creation of a better relationship with the Lit-
tie Entente, which could lead to the alienation of Hungary and Italy, but 
which nevertheless was a possibility to be explored. If a common understand-
ing were to be created between Italy and France, Austria would profit even 
more greatly. 
Complete Change in Foreign Pol icy by Exchanging 
Italy's and Hungary's Support for the Patronage 
of France and the Little Entente 
The Social Democratic Party, as wel I as the Communist Party of Austria, 
continued to work underground against the Austrian 11 total itarian11 regime 
after the February days. They enjoyed, if not the support of the majority of 
the Austrian workers, then at least the support of their sister parties in 
the free world. With their help, the Arbeiterzeitu~, as well as the Com-
munist Rothe Fahn~, was printed in foreign countries and smuggled into Aus-
tria. The Social Democrats and Communist underground, with the help of sym-
pathetic foreign newspapermen, tried to undermine the authority of the Doll-
fuss regime and used every occasion to discredit it in the eyes of foreign 
governments. It is no wonder that after the murder of Dollfuss, the British 
government recommended reconciliation for Schuschnigg (hoping that the French 
65ulrich Eichstadt, Von Doll fuss zu Hitler (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner 
Verlag, 1955), p. 82. 
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and Italian governments would do likewise) with the responsible elements of 
N . 1~ d h S . 1. 66 Th" ld h k d pan-German at1ona 1sts an t e oc1a 1sts. 1s step wou ave wea ene 
Schuschnigg's power in that neither the Nazis not the Socialists wanted a sim-
pie cooperation with the government. What they wanted was to oust Schuschnigg 
and establish their own power. 67 Therefore, to even try a reconciliatory 
policy would have demanded Schuschnigg to take a great risk. If for this 
price the great powers were willing to guarantee the independence of Austria, 
however, it certainly would have been worth trying. The Great Powers, on the 
other hand, did not offer anything other than 11 all possible moral support, 
should Germany make demands during Herr von Papen 1 s negotiations or at other 
times. 1168 The cooperation and support of the Little Entente states were con-
nected with the same condition. It seemed that the Western democracies were 
demanding the right to interfere 1n the internal affairs of Austria. Schusch-
nigg had to choose between the danger of German and Western cooperation, be-
cause both demanded the same condition--the establishment of a regime to their 
own 1 iking. At that point the government crisis was avoided successfully, 
thanks to the support of Italy. Without Italy, it was clear, both Britain 
and France were willing to give 2!!.l_y_..J]lQ.~~~ and only at a very high 
price. 
The possibility remained that Schuschnigg could have resigned, handing 
over the government to a Social Democratic-Communist coalition, and it is 
worth analyzing how things would have changed in that case. 
( 66Her Majesty 1 s Stationery Office, Documents on British Forei9!!...._f~, 
1919-1939, Second Series (Oxford: Her Majesty 1 s Stationery Office, 1958), VI, 
Sir~./. Selley to Sir J. Simon, Vienna, August 3, 1934, Doc. No. 563. (Herein-
after referred to as DBFP.) 
67Gedye, Betra~~. p. 167. 
680 BFP, Ibid. 
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As far as the domestic political situation is concerned, most probably 
a bloody civil war would have erupted with the terror directed especially 
against the former supporters of the government, the clerics, and the Nazis. 
The reaction of foreign governments to these internal situations is 
easily predictable. The Little Entente would have applauded the turn of 
events; Italy and Hungary would have turned hostile; Germany most probably 
would have taken more aggressive measures, and possibly an annexation attempt; 
while France and Britain would have morally supported the Austrian regime. 
In other words, the annexation of Austria, which did not happen until 1938, 
would have al ready occurred in 1935. 
To follow such a drastic political change was an impossible task for 
Austria, because the end product of events promised the same tragic end any-
1vay. 
A complete turn-around of the Austrian foreign pol icy was not feasible, 
and it seemed best to follow Dol I fuss' pol icy toward France and the Little 
Entente. 
Effects of the Austrian Crisis on 
Barthou 1 s Foreign Pol icy 
The attitude and actions of the Little Entente states during and after 
the Austrian crisis revealed the 11 serious gaps of opinions within the French 
69 Alliance system concerning Austria 1 s independence. Austria's neighbors 
closed their borders to her with the exception of Germany and Yugoslavia. 
Hungary strengthened her border g~ards to carefully filter out the refugees who 
70 
arrived from Austria. 11 Czechoslovakia alarmed her troops along the Austrian 
69RAA, Moel lwald to \./aldenegg, Paris, Zl, 64/Pol., August 11, 1934, 
p. 610. -
?Ole Temos (Paris), July 27, 1934. 
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border, as well as along the Hungarian border,7 1 artd ordered the arrest of 
Austrian Nazi refugees.72 Yugoslavia moved seven battalions to the Austrian 
73 . border, gave asylum to the fleeing Austrian Nazis without even disarming 
74 
them, and declared that ''they will act in accord with the Great Powers if 
the Austrian situation should become more serious. 1175 
The marching up of the seven Yugoslavian battalions was not, however, in 
accord with the desire of the Great Powers, nor was the Czech mobilization 
along the Hungarian frontier. Both events brought home to Barthou some im-
portant lessons: Austria's independence was not considered to be a vital in-
terest of Yugoslavia if it meant the strengthening of Italy's influence in 
Central Europe. The asylum given to the Nazi refugees indicated that Yugo-
slavia was more concerned about this growing Italian influence than about a 
possible Anschluss. The Czechoslovakian reaction suggested that the Czechs 
were more afraid of a possible Italian-Hungarian occupation of Austria than of 
an Anschluss. Barthou's foreign political designs lay in ruins; France's 
security system proved to be practically worthless. Her al lies simply re-
jected French leadership when their immediate interests demanded a different 
solution. 
The French politicians in government circles, as well as in the camp of 
the opposition, did not fully understand these implication of the Austrian 
71ormos, Eastern Security, p. 323. 
72Le Temps (Paris), July 27f 1934. 
73ormos, Eastern Security, p. 322. 
74Jbid.; John F. Montgomery, Hungary, the Unwilling Satellite (New York: 
Devin Adair Co., 1947), p. 66. 
75Le Temps (Paris), July 27, 1934. 
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11They were shocked by the painful and disappointing experiences that 
france had had with Yugoslavia. 11 76 However, Barthou realized that a complete 
re-examination of his foreign policy was necessary along the following 1 ines:77 
Was the Eastern Pact still a promising combination? 
Was the independence of Austria more important for France than 
the unc?nditional support of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia? 
Was it possible to find a compromise in this question with Czecho-
slovakia and, or with Yugoslavia? 
Was Mussolini's support worth more than that of Yugoslavia? 
Was there any possibility for a compromise between Italy and Yugo-
slavia? 
First of all, Barthou again found the reply to all these problems in the 
Eastern Pact. The French diplomacy renewed its efforts to convince the Polish 
government that it would be in their favor to accept the French designs. The 
strong French pressure on Poland resulted not in a reconciliation, but rather 
in further alienation. In August the Austrian ambassador reported that the 
French-Polish relation was 11spoiled. 11 78 Incidents in Poland and in France, 
such as the arrest of the French directors of the Polish Textile Trust in 
Jirardow,79 and the expulsion of sixty alleged Communist mineworkers from 
France80 helped to deteriorate the relationship. The French ambassador, Jean 
Laroche, presented a strongly worded demarche in Warsaw demanding the release 
76RAA, Moellwald 1 s report to Waldenegg based on the evaluation of his in-
former,--r;ris, Zl, 64/Pol., August 1, 1934, p. 610. 
771bid. 
78 1bid., 67/Pol., August 20, 1934, p. 621. 
79ormos, Eastern Security, p. 326; also RAA, Ibid. 
80 RAA, I bid. 
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of the French directors of the Textile Trust. The Polish government re-
fused to intervene in the interest of the French directors and stated that 
they could not influence the juridicial procedure. 82 The Polish reply was so 
offensively worded that Laroche wanted to leave Warsaw, and stayed only be-
. 83 
cause of the strong advice of the French government. Barthou threatened 
Alfred Chlapowski, the Polish ambassador, that he would stop supporting Poland 
economically, as well as politically, if Poland continued a German rapproche-
ment pol icy. At the same time, Chlapowski declared that France "cannot free 
herself11 from the mistakes of the previous French governments, which treated 
their allies as 11 vassals. 1184 
The situation ended in a hopeless deadlock, and the final break came 
soon after. Germany (on September 5, 1934) and then Poland (on September 27, 
1934) refused to participate in the Eastern Pact. 85 
Barthou had rescued what he could, but in the Little Entente, only 
Czechoslovakia paid divided attention to the German menace. Yugoslavia's main 
concern was Italy. Loosing the Polish support, and realistically evaluating 
the weight of the possible Soviet help, Barthou had to realize that the only 
rescue for France was represented in a stronger British support and a closer 
relationship with Italy. The British support was looked upon as being of 
doubtful value, and it is true that Baldwin openly stated in the House of 
81 RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 67/Pol., August 20, 1934, 
p. 621. 
82ormos, Eastern Security, ~. 326. 
8 3 RAA , I b i d • 
841bid. 
85A more detailed description and analysis of the Polish-French disagre~ 
ment lies beyond the frame of this study. 1 
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commons, 11 When you think of the defense of England, you no longer think of the 
chalk cliffs of Dover; you think of the Rhine--that is where our frontier 
86 lies. 11 However, this statement did not mean that Britain was backing 
France's pol icy. She opposed Barthou's Eastern Pact designs; she reconmended 
reconciliation with Germany; she did not prepare herself to live up to her 
promises. The British government had rejected the proposals for strengthening 
the British air force. 87 Logically, Barthou interpreted the Baldwin declara-
tion, not as a guarantee of French security, but as a British design to use 
France's Rhine Frontier for the security of Britain. When the reaffirmation 
of the Three Power Declaration was published (September 27, 1934) concerning 
the independence of Austria, Barthou was already preparing a visit with Mus-
sol ini, first of all, to settle the problems existing between Yugoslavia and 
88 Italy. The time was ripe as Mussolini, himself, wanted to have an under-
standing with France. In order to show his goodwill, he supported the French 
proposal to invite the Soviet Union into the League of Nations, while the 
I 1. d d . . G 89 ta 1an press con ucte a strong press campaign against ermany. The only 
conditions of an Italian rapprochement was the desire to avoid further alien-
ating Yugoslavia, whose being displayed a growing pro-German sympathy. 90 
86Quoted in Arnold ~olfers, Britain and France Between Two Wars (New 
York: Norton & Norton, 1966), p. 229. 
87w. S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), 
p. I OJ. 
88 RAA 
--' p. 646. 
Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, ZJ, 79/Pol., September 25, 1934, 
' 
89orm~s, Eastern Security, p.329. 
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To the problems created by the Austrian crisis, Barthou seemed to find 
the following answers: 
The idea of the Eastern Pact proved to be impractical. 
Austria's interest remained of primary interest to France. 
Czechoslovakia was inclined to consider better relations with 
Austria.91 
The rapprochement with Italy became urgent and seemed feasible, 
and there was a chance to find a compromise between Italy and 
Yugoslavia. 
The League of Nations, with the Soviet Union included in it, 
would perhaps become a stronger instrument for France against 
Germany, as well as against any other attempt to modify the 
status quo. 
Barthou did not have time to realize the new system which was a French-
Italian alliance fortified by the Little Entente and the Rome Protocol, with 
a sympathizing Soviet Union against a German-Polish all lance and a hesitating 
England. In the time when he wanted to take his first step toward the real i-
zation of his new designs, he was cut down by an assassin's bullet with his 
guest Alexander, King of Yugoslavia, on October 9, 1934. The assassination 
created a new international crisis and put new leaders in the governments of 
France and Yugoslavia, who once again had to make a decision concerning the 
grand strategy of their respective states in relation to the rest of Europe. 
The Problems of France After the Assassination 
92 Doumergue left no doubt in the speech he gave at Barthou's funeral that 
he wanted to hold France's foreign pol icy along the al ready striken 1 ines. 
The appointment of Pierre Laval as foreign minister was the best manifestation 
91see p. 61 of this study. 
92Le Temps (Paris), October 13, 1934. 
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of this desire, because Laval was known in the diplomatic circles as a 11 stern 
and energic pol itician, 1193 who already during his minister-presidency, 94 
wanted to create a close cooperation with Mussel ini by personally visiting 
h. 95 1m. At the same time, he was known as a man who was firmly convinced of 
Germany's war guilt, but 11 is not an enemy of the German people. 1196 
His first problem was represented by the Yugoslavian reaction to the 
regicide of Alexander. It first of all was so overwhelmingly bitter and ag-
gressive against Hungary, that the French government circles were afraid that 
Yugoslavia would send 11 an ultimatum to Hungary following the pattern of the 
Austrian-Hungarian ultimatum of 1914. 11 97 Such an ultimatum could have led to 
similar developments as those in 1914. 
Even more dangerous was the possibility that the Yugoslavian reaction 
toward Italy would once again raise the question for France: which does she 
consider to be more precious, the friendship of Yugoslavia or the friendship 
of Italy? France had to avoid this issue because she needed the friendship 
of both states. The best solution seemed to be to refer the problem to the 
League of Nations, try to steer the new Yugoslavian leaders toward modera-
tion,98 and secure the continuous friendly attitude of Musso] ini. This, how-
ever was about all that Laval could do. 
93RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 83/Pol., October 15, 1934, 
p.656. -
94January 26, 1931-February 20, 1932. 
95RAA, .!..£.!._£., p. 656. 
96oGFP, C, 111, evaluation of Ermansdorff, Berl in, February 14, 1935, 
Doc. No. 491. 
97RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, 84/Pol ., October 17, 1934, p. 659. 
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The new Yugoslavian leaders enjoyed the unanimous support of the popu-
Jation. This support strengthened their position, and at the same time de-
manded them to re-examine the international situation of Yugoslavia, revise 
the successes and failures of Alexander's foreign policy, and select a course 
after honestly answering the following questions: 
Is it really the interest of Yugoslavia to remain faithful to her 
French patron? 
Is Germany really the greatest enemy of the status quo? 
Is it possible to serve Yugoslavia's interest better, if they 
follow a rapprochement pol icy with Italy? 
France, not having common frontier with Yugoslavia, and not having vital 
economic influence in Yugoslavia could impress her own designs only through 
the goodwill of some Yugoslavian politicians and groups. 
It was now Yugoslavia's turn to make an important decision, which was to 
influence the future of Yugoslavia, as well as the future of the whole exist-
ing French foreign political system. 
CHAPTER I I I 
THE SECOND CRISIS: THE ASSASSINATION 
OF KING ALEXANDER OF YUGOSLAVIA 
Yugoslavian Situation Up to 1934 
Minorities in Yugoslavia in 1934 
When World War ended, the little kingdom of Serbia found itself on the 
side of the victors. Due to this fact and due to the IJilsonian principles of 
self-determination, she was awarded with territories that formerly belonged 
to the Habsburg Monarchy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The dream of the Serbian 
patriots was the creation of a nation-state. However, the statistics denied 
that the realization of this dream had any realistic basis. According to the 
census taken in .January 1921, the Yugoslavians represented an overwhelming 
1 
majority of the population with their 82.8 per cent. Time proved, however, 
that these statistics were misleading for the 9,931 ,416 people who were called 
11 Yugoslavians, 11 were incorrectly identified. There was no such national 
group known in Central Europe or in the Balkans. 
The census of March 1931 realistically acknowledged the differences and 
broke down 11 Yugoslavians 11 into their original nationality groupings. It 
1 isted 5,953,000 Serbians; 3,221 ,000 Croatians; l, 134,000 Slovenes; and 
2,593,000 other non-Slavic minorities. 2 Yet, these numbers did not reflect 
1n.uoted by Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the ''ars, 1918-1941 




the real situation either, because it did not list the numbers of the Mace-
donian minority, which, although representing the most militant opposition to 
Serbian patriotism, was included in the number of Serbians. 
All these minority groups joined the ranks of the opposition to the gov-
ernment. Their numbers were overwhelming--some 7 million people against the 
5,900,000 Serbians (if we disregard the Macedonians3). Even the most skillful 
party politician could not rule successfully amidst such conditions without 
grave compromises. 
Political Refugees 
The disregard for national minority interest that prevailed in the Ver-
sailles and connected peace treaties produced a great flow of refugees in 
Europe. From the territories of the dissolved Habsburg Empire, great numbers 
of Germans, Poles, Hungarians, and Bulgarians migrated, usually to their re-
spective mother countries. These refugees did not represent any significant 
political force, with the exception of the Hungarians and Bulgarians who were 
able to convince their governments to adopt a strong revisionist pol icy. 
A much greater problem was the case of ethnic groups that did not have an 
independent mother country, and thus had no place to migrate to. At the same 
time, their group was large enough to demand at least a certain degree of 
autonomy from the states in which they originally lived. In Yugoslavia there 
were two such ethnic groups: the Macedonians and the Croatians. Their 
3No statistics are available for Macedonians. The official government 
position was that 11 there was no such thing as a Macedonian, there were only 
Serbs. 11 See: Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Times (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 145. 
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-Political leaders openly advocated federal ism or even separatism; both of the 
solutions would have meant an end to the unified Yugoslavian nation state. 
Under these circumstances King Alexander saw no other alternative than to as-
sume the role of a royal dictator4 on February 6, 1929. The separatist lead-
ers of the Macedonian, as well as of the Croatian minority groups, had to face 
the alternatives of imprisonment or 11 voluntary11 political exile. 
The bulk of Macedonians took refuge in Bulgaria, 5 the country which also 
held parts of the former Macedonia, but had not pursued a strong nationalistic 
policy against the Macedonians. As a matter of fact, the Bulgarian government 
did not even prosecute the members of the most militant Macedonian organiza-
tion, the IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization). The IMRO was 
formed in 1896 as a secret political organization with the purpose of l ibera-
ting Macedonia from the Turkish rule. Up to 1912, the organization "was a 
spontaneous expression of the people's irrepressible will for freedom. 116 How-
ever, after 1920 the IMRO directed its main activities against Yugoslavia, and 
under the leadership of Ivan Michailoff,7 chief of the IMRO from September 12, 
1924, it piled up a long record of terrorism, assassinations, guerilla warfare, 
kidnappings and other underground activities. Beginning in 1931, the Bulgarian 
government became more and more dissatisfied with the IMRO involvements in do-
mestic political questions and in the de facto existence of an IMRO state 
4The epithet "absolute king" or 11 enl ightened despot11 would have fit him 
better. 
5wolff, Balkans, pp. 87-88. ~ 
6stoyan Christowe, Heroes and Assassins (New York: Robert L. McBride & 
Co., 1935), p. 257. 
71bid., p. 267. 
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~within Bulgaria.8 In the Spring of 1934 a su.ccessful coup in Bulgaria put a 
pro-Yugoslavian government into power. The new government began at once the 
liquidation of the IMRO forces in Bulgaria.9 Michailoff escaped to Turkey, 
and others found refuge in Italy or Germany where they continued their activi-
ties against the Bulgarian and Yugoslavian governments, though with Jess and 
Jess vigor and effectiveness. 
The Croatian refugees, being more Western-oriented, looked and found asy-
Jum in almost every country of Europe. Their numbers were the greatest in 
France and Switzerland.JO They, too, organized an aggressive, militant organi-
zation, the USTASHE, whose members enjoyed the hospitality of Italy and 
Hungary--both governments hoping to use them for the promotion of their own 
designs concerning Yugoslavia. 
As the Bulgarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement policy restricted the activi-
ties of the IMRO, similarly, a secret Hungarian rapprochement with Yugoslavia 
meant an end to the USTASHE movement in Hungary. The steps of this rapproche-
ment were taken in 1933 by Nicholas Horthy, regent of Hungary, through his 
military attache in Belgrade. He hoped that Hungary would come to an under-
d • • h h h • hb 11 I I h k h l d • • stan 1ng wit er sout ern ne1g or, tans tote ong common tra 1t1on 
and common fate" of Serbia and Hungary. 12 One obstacle to that understanding 
was the fact that Croatian refugees who received political asylum in Hungary 
8christowe, Heroes and Assassins, p. 267. 
9F. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1962), p. 16. 
10L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 
and Winston, 1966), p. 638. 
1 l Horthy, Memoirs, p. 141. 
l 21 . . h . h J l 1 7 1969 nterv1ew wit Gustav Hennyey, Mun1c , u y , . 
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very often committed terrorist activities in Yugoslavia before their escape. 13 
In the summer of 1933, the Yugoslavians suggested a very unorthodox method of 
solving the Croatian refugee problem. The Yugoslavian chief of staff sug-
gested to the Hungarian military attache that 11 it would do a great service to 
Hungary, as well as to the Hungarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement, if you would 
close your eyes for a night. During that night we would cross the border to 
Janka Puszta 14 and would solve the Croatian emigrant problem. 11 15 Instead of 
accepting this proposal, th~ Hungarian government sent the Croatian refugees 
to Lausanne, 16 where Kvaternik17 organized their immigration to other European 
countries. 
13Reguete du Gouvernment Yuqoslave: relative aux responsabil ities 
encoures par Jes i\utorites Hongroises dans l 1 action terroriste dirigee contre 
la Yuqoslavie, Beograd, 1935. p. 51 passim. Though these documents certainly 
do not prove the preparation of the assassination by the Hungarian government, 
it proves the neglect as the Hungarian government handled the Croatian refugee 
problem, even though the Yugoslavian government frequently asked for coopera-
tion. 
14Janka Puszta was a farmhouse complex near the Yugoslavian border, owned 
and operated by Gustav Percec as an USTASHE refugee camp. 
l51nterview with Hennyey. 
16c. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth, p. 146. Dr. Tibor Ekhardt, in his 
book Regicide at Marseilles (New York: The American-Hungarian Library and 
Historical Society, 1964), p. 30 says 11 at my request, the '-lungarian Government 
had expelled the USTASHE 1 s ... from Hungary. 11 Gustav Hennyey describes this 
expulsion as fol lows: ;1Gombos and K~nya agreed that the Croatian refugees 
should be sent out of Hungary in one way or other. We looked for feasible 
solutions and finally we agreed that we should give Hungarian passports to 
about thirty politically prominent Croatian refugees in order to send them away. 
It was not a very good solution, but we could not find a better one. We gave 
Hungarian passports to two,three Croatian emigrants every month. Tf1ey went 
to Lausanne. General Kvaternik th~n collected their passports upon their ar-
rival and sent the passports back to us. Ve sent the first group in September 
1933 and the system worked without flaws for a whole year. 11 The fact remains 
that the refugees were leaving Hungary. 
17Kvaternik was working in the USTASHE organization under the leadership 
of Dr. Ante Pavel ic. 
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Both the IMRO and the USTASHE lost ground in 1934 due to the skillful 
diplomacy of King Alexander. No wonder that both organizations looked on him 
as their most dangerous enemy. In 1929 both organizations had already agreed 
upon joint terrorist actions to 1 iberate Croatia and Macedonia. 18 It was time 
for them to again act in cooperation with each other for the assassination of 
King Alexander. 
Effects of the Assassination 
Question of Responsibility 
It is not the aim of this study to go into the details of the regicide. 19 
However, there are certain events which need to be repeated and explained be-
cause they have a decisive effect on the foreign policy of Yugoslavia. 
The assassination took place on October 9, 1934, at about 4:30 P.M. 1n 
Marseilles. The assassin who killed King Alexander and Barthou was caught by 
the pol ice, severely injured, and died the same day. Later, he was identified 
as Vlado Gheorghieff Tchetnozemsky. Although even the newest publications on 
the assassination describe him as an USTASHE, it has been proven beyond a doubt 
that he was a member of the Macedonian IMR020 and had come into contact with 
18Macartney and Palmer, Independent Eastern Europe, p. 276. 
19Books describing the assassination: 
Allen Roberts, JJ:!e T.:i_~!:l-~11~L~~-~11_! __ (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970). 
Tibor Eckhardt, Regicide at Marseilles (New York: The American-Hungary Li-
brary, 1969). 
Vladeta Mil icevic, Eight for the Croat State (Munich, 1960). 
Vladeta Mil icevic, Der Konigsmord von Marseille (Bad Godesberg: Hochwacht 
Verlat, 1959). 
Claude Eylan, La Vie et la Mort d 1Alexandre (Paris: Bernard, 1935). 
20christowe, Heroes, p. 218; Eckhardt, Regicide, p. 29. 
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the USTASHE'S only after 1931.21 His aides were captured a few days later. 
They were Croatians, and probably members of the USTASHE; their names were 
Kral and Pospishil. The French investigation discovered that their Czechoslo-
vakian passports were forgeries. They traced the men's steps back to Lausanne, 
where they found out in the Hotel de 11Europe22 that the two men had regis-
tered there before with Hungarian passports. 23 The first results of the in-
vestigations directed every attention towards Hungary. 
The final res0iution of the League of Nations (December 10, 1934) stated 
that "certain Hungarian authorities may have assumed at any rate through neg-
ligence, certain responsibilities relative to acts ha 1.fing connection VJith the 
preparation of the Marseilles crime. 1124 This paragraph referred to the un-
deniable fact that the Hungarian passports of the two Croatian terrorists were 
genuine and asked the Hungarian government to take appropriate punitive 11 action 
at once against any of its authorities, whose guilt could be established. They 
2 li 1The Croats actually borrowed the assassin from the Macedonians. 11 In-
terview with Hennyey. 
22Hennyey refers to Hotel l 1Europe, while Christowe, Heroes, p. 9 refers 
to Hotel des Palmiers. The latest work does not give any references, not even 
bibliography; and its statements, generally, are highly questionable. 
23According to the Hungarian-Kvaternik agreement, the refugees were not 
supposed to register with the Hungarian passports. However, Kvaternik arrived 
late on this one occasion; Kral and Pospisil became impatient. They registered 
in the hotel, left their baggage and went for a sight-seeing walk, returning 
only in the evening when they finally met Kvaternik. A week later they par-
ticipated in the meeting which selected--by drawing lc·ts--two emigrants for 11 an important assignment. 11 Both of them drew the fatal card. They were se-
lected as helpers of the assassin. Interview with Hennyey who learned this 
version of the story personally fro~ Kvaternik in 1941. 
24League of Nations, Official Journal, December 1, 1934, pp. 1712-1728. 
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were told to report the result and agreed to do so. 11 With this resolution, 
the whole passport affair was forgotten and accepted as closed. The truth, 
however, was a little different. The Hungarian authorities really issued the 
passports, not only to Kral and Pospishil, but to some thirty other Croatian 
refugees (political), during the period September 1933 to September 1934. 26 
Why did the Hungarian government risk such an operation? The reasons can be 
found in the Yugoslavian official and unofficial complaints concerning the 
Croatian refugees in Hungary. The Hungarian government selected a solution 
that was no more orthodox than the Yugoslavian solution, yet offered a way out 
of the dilemma. 27 Although the Hungarian government, and even the I I. section 
of the general staff, 28 was innocent in the preparation of the regicide, 29 in 
such a tense situation the revelation of the Hungarian government 1 s role in 
providing the passports could have created an embarrassing situation. 
Reaction in Yugoslavia 
King Alexander was succeeded to the throne by his son Peter I I, who was a 
minor.30 In his name, according to the King 1 s will, a regency was to govern Yu-
l 
goslavia until 1941. The members of the regency were Prince Paul, the cousin of 
King Alexander; Stankovic, minister of education; and Ivan Perovic, governor of 
25Anthony Eden, F~cing the Dictators, 1928-1938 (Boston: Houghton-Miff! in 
Co., 1962), p. 131. 
26 See footnote 16 of this chapter. 
271bid. 
281ntell igence Department. 
291nterview with Hennyey. 
30He was only eleven years old. 
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croatia.31 The most important persons after the regents were General Ziffko-
vie, Prime Minister Uzonovic, and Foreign Minister Yevtic. 
General Ziffkovic was an ardent Serbian patriot, and at the beginning of 
the royal dictatorship he was prime minister and advisor to King Alexander. 32 
Later, he was appointed commander of the Royal Guard and was also chief of the 
Serbian secret military organization. 33 He felt that the assassination created 
a favorable condition for him to, on the one hand, restore his own importance 
against the civilians (especially against Yevtic who followed the moderate, 
reconciliatory foreign policy of the late King Alexander), and on the other 
hand to direct a mortal blow against the Hungarian revisionist pol icy. Though 
Yugoslavia had plans for the invasion of Hungary, these plans were worked out 
only in cooperation with the other Little Entente states.34 The time seemed 
to be right now, to put that cooperation into effect.35 
Prime Minister Uzonovic, an equally ardent Serbian patriot, believed that 
the unity of Yugoslavia--created by the assassination--could be further 
enemies of Yugoslavia, that is, against Italy and Hungary. Public opinion 
was especially hostile toward Italy, and there were demonstrations in front of 
the Italian embassy in Belgrade during the days following the murder. Uzonovic 
31Hoptner, Yugoslavia, p. 25. 
32~. 
33Montgomery, Hungary, p. 69. 
34 1nterview with Hennyey. 
35see the statement of the Little Entente ministers on October 19, 1934, 
in Belgrade, 11 we would insist with all possible force 11 --wording is clearly a 
threat of a possible military showdown. Quoted in Eden, Facing Dictators, 
p. 122. 
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""'i"ndicated on October 28, 1934, in his first speech as the newly reappointed 
prime minister that concerning the Marseilles assassination, he would demand 
the complete revelation of the guilty persons, that their responsibilities 
would be established, and the "indispensable sanctions applied. 11 36 
Foreign Minister Yevtic could be considered the only realistic politician 
among them. While he was a good Yugoslavian patriot, and while he believed in 
the undisputed pre-eminency of the Serbians in the leadership of Yugoslavia, 
he recognized that the international situation--in case of hasty Yugoslavian 
action--could bring grave consequences to his country. He sought support for 
the solution not only from the point of view of the Little Entente and the 
Balkan Pact states, but from France as well, and was ready for compromises. 
Prince Paul, the regent, seemed not to have too much influence on the 
foreign pol icy in these first days of his being in power. On October 23, 1934, 
the newly appointed government had among its members General Ziffkovic. This 
indicated a turn toward strengthening the royal dictatorship, while the release 
of Dr. Vladimir Macek--leader of the Croatian (Separatists) Peasant Party, who 
had been imprisoned by King Alexander--from the prison, suggested a recon-
ciliatory tendency toward the Croatian minorities. Yugoslavian foreign policy 
was still undecided. Only one thing was certain: no matter what direction 
the Yugoslavian policy would take, satisfaction had to be found in the punish-
ment of the criminals involved in the regicide. 
Facts Behind the League of Nations Sessions 
The investigation discovered th~t the assassination was planned by Ante 
Pavelic and Kvaternik who both escaped to Italy. Mussolini refused to 
36The use of the word "sanctions" indicated that he was after guilty na-
tions and not only after guilty persons. This expertise is interesting, be-
cause the trial of the criminals did not begin until November. Eckhardt, 
Req i c i de, p. 119. 
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extradite them because the French had never extradited anyone who had organized 
an attempt against the Duce's life. 37 More and more signs showed that Italy 
might be more involved in the case than Hungary. A Little Entente press cam-
paign began against Italy and Hungary,38 the Czechoslovakian and Rumanian pa-
pers leading them. However, neither England nor France wanted to endanger the 
French-Italian rapprochement,39 which since the assassination of Austrian 
chancellor Doll fuss, had reached very hopeful stages. Even French-Italian 
military cooperation against a German attack was worked out on the drafting 
boards. 40 On October 15, 1934, Pierre Laval was appointed successor to Bar-
thou. In his inaugural speech he blamed Hungary, alone, by name, for the 
assassination. 41 Unless the Little Entente states (among them Yugoslavia) 
wanted to create a breach with their patron, France, they would have to accept 
Laval 1 s statement. The Laval-Yevtic negotiations led to an agreement. Prime 
Minister Doumergue, in his speech on the extraordinary session of the Chamber 
of Deputies on November 6, 1934, reported: "Being aware of the dangers, which 
are threatening Europe, it became necessary (for Yugoslavia) to harmonize its 
government's actions with the actions of the Government of the (French) repub-
1 ic L . s 1 • • • 1142 . e ro1 est mart. a po 1t1que continue. 
37Hoptner, Crisis, p. 29, lln. 
38Eden, Facing Dictators, p. 122. 
391bid., p. 123. 
It became clear during 
4o la Goree (de), The French Army, p. 256-57; also see Map I I. 
41Eckhardt, Regicide, p. 120. 
~ 
42Journal Officiel, 1934, p. 2201. 
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the sessions of the League of Nations that Yugoslavian foreign pol icy was 
forced to fall in 1 ine with the French interests. 43 
There was only one episode which could be considered an independent Yugo-
slavian action, and that is the deportation and expulsion of thousands of Hun-
garians from Yugoslavia. However, it proved to have been done without the 
blessing of the Yugoslavian government (an action of General Ziffkovic) and 
when Eden expressed his dislike to Jevtic, the expulsions ceased.44 
Hungary fought against the charges by every means available, and by re-
vealing to Eden and Laval at a secret meeting the story of the passports as it 
really happened. 45 However, Benes and Titulescu went so far in their extreme 
accusations of Hungary, that the pub! ic revelation of the truth (excluding the 
responsibility of Italy) would have mortally damaged their authority and 
trustworthiness. A compromise solution was worked out at the suggestion of 
Eden, and the Council adopted the resolution without change. 
Yugoslavian Foreign Pol icy 
The Foreisn Pol icy of King Alexander 
The main principle of the Yugoslavian foreign policy was the maintenance 
of the status quo. This policy determined clearly her enemies and al I ies; 
:taly was her strongest enemy. Up to the Spring of 1934 the king relied on 
French support against Italian aims. Next in the row of enemies stood Hun-
gary, Austria, and Bulgaria. Hungary was encircled by the Little Entente, she 
was weak economically and even weaker militarily. It was true that Hungary 
' 
43Montgomery, Hungary, p. 69. 
44Eden, Facing the Dictators, p. 127. 
451nterview with Hennyey. 
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could not have threatened Yugoslavia unless in alliance with Italy, and only 
if Czechoslovakia and Rumania would not honor their· obligations determined in 
the mutual assistance treaties. 46 However, what the Little Entente feared was 
h H I '1. . bl H b b . 47 . not so muc ungary s m1 1tary power as a poss1 e as urg restoration 1n 
Austria and Hungary, or even the coronation of any other person as king of 
Hungary. The common tradition of the peoples Jiving in the Danube Basin, the 
long, though not always peaceful cooperation of the minority groups of the 
Habsburg Empire, the common problems of the economic crisis, and the great 
numbers of people I iving in the Little Entente states who secretly cherished 
their memories about the 11 good old days 11 made the idea of a Hungarian kingdom 
very attractive, even with an empty throne. With a king on the throne, a 
chain reaction could have been triggered which could have led to the dissolu-
tion of the successor states. Hungary and Austria were dangerou~ not because 
of their military might or aggressiveness, but because of their aid and comfort 
to the Croatian refugees. At the same time, the Austrian activities concern-
ing a possible Habsburg restoration were greatly exaggerated in the minds of 
·the Little Entente leaders because of the misinformed reports they received 
from their ambassadors.48 A rapprochement between Hungary or Austria and 
Yugoslavia seemed to be an impractical dream until they refused to modify their 
foreign political designs. Bulgaria, 1 ikewise a revisionist state, had repre-
sented a danger even more vivid than Hungary because of her support of the 
Macedonian revisionist and terrorist groups. 
f 46Mutual Assistance Treaties were signed between Czechoslovakia and Yugo-
slavia on August 14, 1920, and between Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia 
in April and July 1921. The formal creation of the Little Entente Pact was 
signed on February 16, 1933. 
47Hoptner, Cris is, p. 10. 
48
schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 90. 
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The fronts were sharply drawn: Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Bulgaria 
were the enemies; France, the Little Entente, and the Balkan Pact49 nations 
were the allies. It was a simple foreign policy, easily understood by every 
Yugoslavian patriot. 
In the field of economic interests, however, the international relations 
of Yugoslavia could not be directed according to nationalistic principles 
alone. The best buyers of Yugoslavian grain, meat, timber, etc., were Italy, 
Austria, Germany, and Hungary.SO France, with her well-balanced economy, did 
not need Yugoslavian raw materials or food products, and among her other al-
1 ies only Greece (food export) and Rumania (oil export) played any significant 
role. 51 Thus developed a basic contradiction between the Yugoslavian pol iti-
cal strategy and the realistic economic interests. 
King Alexander realized the precarious position and took the first steps 
toward the harmonization of political and economic pol icy. As far as Italy 
was concerned, the king al ready had established secret negotiations with Mus-
solini in 1932.52 However, after two years Musso] ini put an end to these 
negotiations by refusing to see Yevtic, who delivered to Rome a secret message 
from the king.53 Concerning Bulgaria, the relationship changed with the coups 
and with the new Bulgarian government's crackdown on the IMRO, which was 
49The Balkan Pact was signed in Athens on February 9, 1934, by Greece, 
Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey; and it aimed to guarantee the Balkan fron-
tiers against a non-Balkan country acting alone: Italy, Hungary, or the 
Soviet Union. 
50stavrianos, Balkans, p. 638'. 
51 see Table I I. 
52Hoptner, Crisis, p. 19; Montgomery, Hungary, pp. 245-261. 




followed by a personal meeting between King Boris of Bulgaria and King Alexan-
der in Sofia in September 1934, and which further promoted a mutual understand-
54 ing. Communication Jines were also opened secretly with Hungary, though 
seemingly without results.55 
This rapprochement pol icy of King Alexander was in harmony with French 
political designs; France sought a rapprochement with Italy against the grow-
ing danger of Germany.56 A rapprochement between Hungary and Yugoslavia could 
have eased the tension between Italy and Yugoslavia, as well as promote a bet-
ter understanding between France and Italy. This French policy made Czecho-
slovakia and Rumania suspicious; Prime Ministers Benes and Titulescu were 
working against such an understanding and successfully torpedoed Musso] ini 's 
Four Power Pact57 to such a degree that the final text of the pact "pledged 
rather the maintenance of the status quo than the alteration of it.58 
In this confusing international situation was fired the shot at Mar-
seilles on October 9, 1934, which killed Barthou and King Alexander, and which 
put the Yugoslavian foreign policy at the crossroads. 
54seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 251. 
551nterview with Hennyey; Horthy, Memoirs, p. 141. 
56see p. 43 of this study. 
5711 Britain, France, Germany, and Italy were to pledge themselves to 
collaborate for the maintenance of peace by methods which were to include the 
realization by peaceful means, both of parity of armaments, for the ex-enemy 
states, and of revision of the peace treaties ••• 11 Macartney and Palmer, 
Eastern Europe, p. 307. 
58 1bid., p. 308. 
96 
How the Assassination Influenced 
Yugoslavia's Foreign Pol icy 
The final resolution of the League of Nations and the whole handling of 
the assassination question taught Yugoslavia some very bitter lessons. 
Their king was murdered, the real criminals--Pavel ic and Kvaternik--
escaped punishment, and Italy was not even mentioned among those who bore 
responsibility. The League of Nations proved to be an instrument in the chess 
game of the Great Powers. Yugoslavia's most trusted friend, France, forced 
them to close their eyes to the guilt of Italy in order not to disburb the 
possibility of a French-Italian rapprochement. Clearly, French interests were 
more important than the Yugoslavian interests and the truth. The Little En-
tente states, who at the beginning loudly stressed their sympathy and support, 
calmed down and were not willing to risk any move against the wish of the 
Great Powers. England and her representative, Eden, played a key role in the 
whole affair. Again, not Yugoslavia, but England's interests proved to be 
more important. Only one conclusion could be drawn: "Yugoslavia felt iso-
lated both diplomatically and militarily ••• No country was committed by 
treaty to aid Yugoslavia in a war against ltaly. 11 59 It became the primary aim 
of Yugoslavian diplomacy, then, to break out of this isolation. 
From among the alternatives 60 open to Yugoslavia before the assassination, 
this bitter experience eliminated the possible adjustment of commercial trea-
ties to the traditional foreign pol icy, and made even more desirable the ad-
( 
justment of the foreign pol icy to the economic interests. A rapprochement wit 
59Hoptner, Crisis, p. 28. 
60 See pp. 97-105 of this study. 
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Italy, if Yugoslavia wanted to keep the friendship of France (and for the time 
being she certainly needed this friendship) became a necessary condition. A 
better relationship with Hungary, for the present, was out of the question; 
but it was clear, that in case of an Italian-Yugoslavian rapprochement, it 
could become a feasible policy. The Bulgarian-Yugoslavian relationship had 
not changed, while a closer relationship with Germany seemed to be a necessary 
security step in case France should be willing to sacrifice vital Yugoslavian 
interests in order to please Mussolini. It was clear that a compromise solu-
tion had to be found. A new ally presented itself during the sessions of the 
League of Nations: h S . u . 61 t e ov1et n1on. However, direct help from the Soviet 
Union depended on the willingness of Rumania to give permission to the Soviet 
troops (in case of war) to cross her territory. Rumania seemed unwilling to 
grant that permission, and therefore, that possible alliance with the Soviet 
Union represented only a moral support for Yugoslavia. 
Alternatives for Prince Paul 
Alexander's will appointed as First Regent, Prince Paul, who was disin-
terested in politics and who preferred to spend his time with his art col lee-
tion. He was educated in England and felt more at home in London or Paris 
than in Yugoslavia. Yet, he now had to re-examine the domestic, as well as 
the international situation, and design a domestic and foreign pol icy which 
would best serve the interest of Yugoslavia and primarily Yugoslavia. 
Domestic Pol icy 
Yugoslavia seemed to be well unified under the royal dictatorship of 
Alexander, but in reality, the country was very much divided. 
61 Litvinov vigorously supported the Yugoslavian standpoint. 
Yugoslav patriotism remained a phrase: Serbian and Croatian chau- · 
vinism survived; social discontent and political rivalries were 
repressed by force but were not removeg2 Hatred was only the more powerful for being driven underground. 
Prince Paul could continue this pol icy. It would mean that the conditions 
of the country would not improve, that the revisionist foreign powers would be 
able to continue to use Croatian discontent to promote their aims, and that it 
would make the Croatian emigrees some kind of heroes in the eyes of the Croa-
tians living in Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it would probably secure a 
reign without much disturbance and without greater crisis for the time being. 
In the long run, the continuation of this pol icy would undoubtedly lead to a 
greater alienation of the people, strengthen the opposition, and endanger the 
very existence of the Yugoslavian nation-state. 
The assassination of King Alexander created an unexpected unified re-
sponse on the part of every minority group in Yugoslavia.63 The continuation 
of the oppressive pol icy would certainly destroy this unity again. This 
unanimous indignation, this unified Yugoslavian outcry offered another al-
ternative for the direction of domestic pol icy--a domestic pol icy which would 
promote better understanding between political factions, and which would recon-
cile the alienated minority groups. This kind of program would certainly 
speed up the progress in the field of social and economic achievement and 
would strengthen the Yugoslavian state. The basic problem was represented by 
the Croatian minority. If they could be reconciled, then the Croatian emi-
grees would lose their influence, the revisionist countries' propaganda efforts 
62
seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 231. 
631bid. 
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would become ineffective. Such a policy would enable the government to pur-
f . I . . I . . h . d · 64 sue its ore1gn po 1t1ca aims wit more vigor an aggressiveness. 
The possible disadvantages of such a reconciliatory pol icy was the de-
mand of the Croatian minority for a greater share in the political 1 ife, even 
for autonomy. Compromise was possible, but even the smallest compromise would 
signal to the minorities that Prince Paul was willing to give up the idea of 
a Yugoslavian nation-state and was willing to accept the idea of federal ism. 
federal ism undoubtedly would weaken the authority of the royal government. 
Some extremist groups would probably demand, not only autonomy, but complete 
separation, which would endanger the very existence of the Yugoslavian state. 
To give a greater voice to the people would possibly mean that Yugoslavia 
might have to take into consideration some changes in its traditional foreign 
po 1 icy o 
Comparing the advantages and disadvantages, the reconciliatory pol icy had 
greater promises, but the pursuit of the pol icy had to be very cautious in 
order to avoid the greater dangers. 
Foreign Pol icy 
F o 1 1 ow i n g the t rad i t i on a 1 1 i n e of fore i g n po I i c y- - that i s , fr i ends h i p 
with France, the Little Entente, and the Balkan Pact states, while maintaining 
a strong pro-status quo attitude toward Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Bulgaria--
was one of the alternatives that Prince Paul could select. Though he most 
probably did not know about the rapprochement attempts of King Alexander, he 
~ 
had to realize the existing contradiction between the foreign political 
64During the funeral of King Alexander, the German delegation, led by 
Goering, "noticed the spiritual unity of the people. 11 DGFP, C, 111, Heeren to 
Neurath, Belgrade, October 22, 1934, Doc. Nos. 263-64. ~~ 
l 
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treaties and the commercial treaties of Yugoslavia. In case of an interna-
tional crisis or war, the very existence of the Yugoslavian economy depended 
on the goodwill of hostile nations. To put an end to this dualism was the 
primary interest of Yugoslavia. The harmonization of foreign policy with the 
economic interests of the country would be pursued by: 
adjusting the commercial treaties to the traditional foreign 
policy; 
adjusting the foreign pol icy to the economic interests; or 
finding compromise solutions if a radical solution would be 
impractical. 
Adjusting the commerical treaties to the traditional foreign pol icy would 
be almost an impossible task. Yugoslavia simply could not find markets enough 
in the friendly countries. To find new markets in at least neutral countries 
would take a considerable amount of time. A hasty action most certainly 
would create an economic depression, if not a crisis. Such a crisis would 
sharpen the internal political conflicts, would destroy the unity created by 
the indignation over the king's murder, and therefore, would play into the 
hands of the enemies of Yugoslavia. This alternative was completely imprac-
tical for the present situation. 
Adjusting the foreign pol icy to the commercial interests would demand a 
rapprochement with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Germany. 
Rapprochement with Italy 
Rapprochement with Italy would be possible because of the French-Italian 
' 
~approchement, already an open aim of France. It would give Yugoslavia two 
Great Powers as friends. The question was: what would Italy be willing to do 
to express her goodwill toward Yugoslavia? The primary requirement, on the 
part of Yugoslavia, was that Italy denounce her fon;1er revisionist policy <:>nd 
J 0 J 
pressure, and Hungary shouJd do the same. However, the events preceding the 
assassination of King Alexander point to the opposite direction. According to 
the French designs, it was YugosJavia, and not Italy, who was expected to make 
sacrifices for a better understanding, sacrifices which Yugoslavia was willing 
not to make.66 However, this French action made Yugoslavia skeptical toward 
the sincere friendship of France.67 There were further drawbacks of such a 
rapprochement--it would create a sharp division of opinion within Yugoslavia. 
Italian support given to the USTASHE was an open secret, and Italy was not ex-
pected to change this attitude, which meant that the open interference of Mus-
solini with the Yugoslavian domestic political affairs would continue. The ad-
vantage of such a pol icy were great, but only if France could convince Musso-
Jini to change his pol icy toward Yugoslavia. Finally, since the assassins of 
King Alexander were identified68 as members of the IMRO and of the USTASHE, it 
was probable that the Italian government was involved. In that case, the Yugo-
slavian public opinion would simply not allow a rapprochement policy. 
Rapprochement with Hungary 
Rapprochement with Hungary would be an easier matter. The Hungarian gov-
ernment indicated her willingness to cooperate with Yugoslavia by 1 iquidating 
the Croatian refugee organizations during the summer of 1934, but the revision-
ist pol icy of Hungary did not change. It was even more discouraging to know 
that during Barthou 1 s visit in Belgrade in 1934, he displayed a great amount 
65Mussol ini did not cease to demand the Dalmatian Coast promised to Italy 
during World War I but given to Yugoslavia in the Peace Treaty of 1919. 
66DGFP, C, Ill, p. 93, 5n. 
67Hoptner, Crisis, p. 24. 
68Eckhart, Regicide, p. 120. 
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~f reserve in replying to a strong anti-Hungarian speech of Minister-President 
uzonovic. 69 It was evident that France wished to moderate Yugoslavian hos-
tility toward Hungary. However, even if Hungary would be willing to modify 
her revisionist aims, the rapprochement would endanger the friendship of Yu~o-
slavia's natural allies. Czechoslovakia and Rumania would reconsider thei.r 
policy toward Yugoslavia; both countries were strong militarily and presently 
represented real force on Yugoslavia's side. To exchange their alliance for 
the friendship of a militarily weightless70 Hungary would be insane. Finally, 
too, Hungary might have been involved in the assassination of King Alexander. 
In that case a rapprochement with Hungary was out of the question. 
Rapprochement with Bulgaria 
The attitude of the new Bulgarian government was encouraging. Their 
attempted liquidation of the IMRO and the friendly visit of King A I exander of 
Yugoslavia7 1 improved the relationship of the two countries even further. Thi sl 
rapprochement did not oppose French interest and gave hopes that it would 
strengthen the Balkan Pact and would meet the approval of Rumania. 
Rapprochement with Germany 
During the funeral of King Alexander in Belgrade, the Yugoslavian public 
opinion and press displayed an unparalleled sympathy toward Goering and the 
German delegation.72 This was the second occasion that Yugoslavia openly 
69DGFP, C, 111, Heeren to Neurath, Belgrade, June 27, 1934, Doc. No. 39. 
f 
70lnterview with Hennyey. 
7lDGFP, Ibid., Doc. No. 459. 
7 2~., Doc. No. 263. 
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demonstrated her sympathies toward Nazi Germany.73 Yugoslavia did not have a 
common border with Germany; Germany did not have territorial aims; Germany was 
the best business partner of Yugoslavia; and Germany did not exploit the Yugo-
slavian economy. She charged competitive prices and did not restrict the 
types of goods she sold.74 Since the signing of the Three Power Declaration 
(February 17, 1934) by Britain, France, and Italy, and the signing of the' 
Rome Protocols (March 17, 1934) by Italy, Austria, and Hungary, it was clear 
that Germany's interests were not the same as those of Italy and Hungary. In 
case of a German-Yugoslavian rapprochement, Germany could become a valuable 
ally, putting a break on Italian, as well as Hungarian ambitions--a relation-
ship from which Yugoslavia would benefit greatly. On the other hand, Germany 
was the main enemy of France, and a Yugoslavian rapprochement would certainly 
I 
not meet French approval. Therefore, "it would hardly be possible in the near-I 
least not as long as France remained the strongest power of Europe. 
At I future pro-German sentiments to find expression in practical politics. 11 75 
i 
Rapprochement with Austria ! 
The relationship with Austria was ~uite cold. The USTASHE 1 S operated from 
Austrian territory, too, and were successful in committing terrorist actions 
73After the death of Doll fuss, the Austrian army rounded up the Austrian 
Nazi brownshirts and the stormtroopers, with the exception of those who took 
their escape route through Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia accepted them as guests and 
later sent them by ship to Germany. They were feted as if they were friends 
and visitors. Montgomery, Hungary, p. 66. 
74stavrianos, op. cit., p. 16; 
75oGFP, C, I I I, Heeren to Neurath, Belgrade, October 22, 1934, Doc. No. 
264. 
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against Yugoslavia,76 though without the knowledge of the Austrian government. 
On the other hand, Yugoslavia granted asylum to the Nazi terrorists after the 
murder of Doll fuss, an act which created hostility in the Austrian public and 
government. The successor of Dollfuss, Dr. Schuschnigg, was looked upon by 
the Little Entente as a person who, because of his pro-Habsburg convictions, 
might attempt a restoration and create with it the greatest possible threat 
for the integrity of the successor states. Austria enjoyed the patronage 
of Italy, a fact which even multiplied the dangers for Yugoslavia. A recon-
cil iation seemed impossible. 
The Nazi attempt to overthrow the Austrian government proved Hitler's 
great interest in the domestic and foreign pol icy of Austria. With a poss i b 1 e I 
I growth of German influence in Austria, the restoration of the Habsburg Monar- l 
I Therefore, the reconciliatory pol icy I chy in Austria would become improbable. 
was out of the question for the time being, and the help of Germany was 
needed for the neutralization of Austria. 
In 1 ight of the above investigation, an extreme solution was not ad-
visable. However, a compromise solution might include the advantages of one 
or two of the radical solutions without greater dangers. 
were: 
The unchangeable facts which could not be altered by Yugoslavian politics 
Yugoslavia needed the French patronage, as well as the alliance 
of the Little Entente. 
Yugoslavia had to make smaller concessions to Italy in order to 
preserve the goodwill of France. 
76The terrorists planted time bombs in Austria in the wagons of the Inter-






Yugoslavia did not have to and could not make concessions to 
Hungary because it would cause alienation of the Little Entente, 
as well as of the Balkan Pact, and so it would weaken the Yugo-
slavian position. 
Yugoslavia's economic interest demanded a closer, more friendly 
relationship with Germany.· 
Evaluation of the Yugoslavian Policy 
Many historians think that the times, problems, and challenges were too 
great for Prince Paul, and he just could not live up to his obligations as a 
statesman.77 On pages 99-104 of this study I have discussed the alternatives 
for foreign policy. The comparison of the optimum alternative with the chosen 
policy, may give a more objective description of thesequalities as a states-
man and a diplomat. 
Evaluation of the Domestic Pol icy 
The analysis of the alternatives for the domestic policy suggested the 
following solution: a reconciliatory domestic pol icy (loosening of the royal 
dictatorship) with great caution in order to avoid the dangers represented by 
the autonomist, separatist movements of the minority groups, and especially 
of the Croatian. 
Prince Paul took the first steps toward reconciliation. Dr. Macek was 
released from prison and expressed his hopes and desires for a better under-
standing with the government. In 1935, Yevtic, a strong Serbian chauvinist, 
was replaced as prime minister by Milan Stojadinovic, who belonged to the 
Radical Party,78 but who held more l~beral views than his predecessor. They 
released 10,000 political prisoners, moderated dictatorial methods and sought 
77Hugh Seton-Watson, Robert Lee Wolff, L. S. Stavrianos. 
78The Radical Party was the party of the Serbian patriots with a "Great 
Serbian" conviction. 
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an understanding with the Croatian Peasant Party.79 The main obstacle to com-
plete reconciliation and understanding lay in the Royal Constitution.SO How-
ever, in this matter, neither Stojanovic nor Prince Paul entertained uny ser-
ious plans for dramatic change.Bl 
If someone were to judge these steps from a contemporary point of view, 
considering the knowledge that Prince Paul and his aides had about the general 
situation of Yugoslavia, there can be only one conclusion to make: in 1935 
the regency tried to pursue the most promising and best domestic pol icy for 
the benefit of Yugoslavia. 
Evaluation of the Foreign Policy 
For the foreign pol icy of Yugoslavia, a compromise foreign policy seemed 
to be the most feasible. The regency followed such a policy--she strengthened 
her friendship with France and the Little Entente by cooperating with them 
during the investigation of the Marseilles crime and did not accuse Italy, and 
by this action, leaving a door open for a possible Italian-Yugoslavian rap-
prochement. The regency made a firm stand against Hungary, thereby forcing 
the Hungarian government to tone down the revisionist policy and propaganda, 
as well as forcing her to follow a stricter 1 ine concerning the Croatian refu-
gees. She expressed sympathy to Germany and in this manner paved a way to 
better economical relations, as well as political relations, doing so in order 
to harmonize her foreign policy with her economic interests.82 
79stavrianos, Balkans, p. 630~ 
BOA simple majority won in the popular elections awarded the victorious 
party with two-thirds of the seats in the Skuptsina (parliament). 
81
stavrianos, Ibid. 
82oGFP, C, I I I, Heeren to Neurath, Belgrade, October 22, 1934, Doc. Nos. 
263, 264. 
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Those historians who argue against this solution, argue in the knowledge 
of the later developments. However, neither King Alexander, Prince Paul, nor 
the Stojadinovic government had a crystal ball to see into the future. The 
actions, or rather inactions of the Western Powers, the failure of the Eastern 
Pact, and the French-Italian rapprochement all brought home only one lesson 
to Yugoslavia: her interests were only secondary in the eyes of her allies 
and protectors. With a sane mind, the leaders of Yugoslavia had to look 
(which gives them credit) and did look for alternate solutions and selected 
the one, which, in their time, seemed to serve best the interests of Yugosla-
via. 
A small power seldom has a chance to decide her foreign policy indepen-
dently from the great nations. Yugoslavia could and did make such a turn 
toward Germany, which meant that the interested Great Powers acted completely 
against her interests or--as was the case in the Yugoslavian situation--paid 
no attention to the developments in Central Europe or the Balkans. 
feel that the regency selected the best foreign pol icy for Yugoslavia. 
Prince Paul indeed I ived up to the challenges of the contemporary situation 
and the historians who condemned him83 have disregarded the simple fact that 
he could not see in advance the developments which followed in the later years 
and which are well-known today to every college freshman. 
The assassination of King Alexander at Marseilles was a terrible crime. 
However, it was more than that from the point of view of Europe. It speeded 
up the regrouping of the European ~ations; it weakened the confidence of the 
small powers in the great champions of the status quo; it opened the hemisphere 
83seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 232; Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 629. 
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for the German economic penetration which naturally led to a growth of German 
political influence; it signaled the beginning of a race in Central Europe and 
on the Balkans for the goodwill and grace of Germany; and it undermined the 
solidarity of the Little Entente and questioned the real value of the mutual 
assistance treaties. These were the consequences from the point of view of 
central Europe and the Balkans. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE THIRD CRISIS: HUNGARY'S DILEMMA 
Hungary Before 1934 
There is very I ittle known about the twentieth century history of Hun-
gary, due to the I imited number of scholarly works written in a language other 
than Hungarian, and even in Hungarian a thorough, objective history has yet 
to be written. The books available in English, German, or French are mostly 
the products of political emigres, most of them having had no profess tonal 
historical training, yet all of them possessing a fairly strong political 
bias. In order to understand any period of the post-World War I Hungarian 
history, one needs to be familiar with the conditions created by the war, as 
well as by the Peace Treaty of Trianon. For the purpose of this study it is 
necessary to describe only the most important consequences. 
The Aristocratic Governments, 1919-1932 
Domes t i c po I i c y 
The Peace Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920) and the reaction of the vic-
torious powers, especially of France, to the Socialist revolution and to the 
following Communist regime in Hungary marked out the road of future politics. 
This reaction helped the aristocracy to regain power in Hungary. Then, the 
aristocratic governments helped themselves to retain this power by introducing 
a new election law in 1922, which I imited the suffrage and introduced open 
ballots for the rural areas. This election law ab ovo secured the election for 
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the governmental party, which "was not a real political party, but a collec-
tion of individuals of proved loyalty and usefulness to the regime. 111 
The opposition was made up of three parties. The Independent Smallholder 
party represented the medium peasants' interest. The Liberal Party's member-
ship came from the ranks of the democratic intellectuals. The Social Demo-
.f.!atic Party limited its activities to the industrial workers. Thus, the 
landless peasants and agricultural workers had no real representatives in the 
parliament. At the same time, 55-60 per cent of Hungary's population was em-
d . . l 2 ploye 1n agr1cu ture. 
With the help of the League of Nations and other foreign loans, the Beth-
len government3 was able to lead the country toward prosperity in the second 
half of the 1920's, although the economic crisis of 1929 wiped out these re-
sults. The orthodox financial pol icy described for Hungary by the League of 
Nations4 indebted the peasantry and caused high unemployment for the indus-
trial workers. 
Foreign pol icy 
The main features of Hungarian foreign pol icy following the period of the 
Trianon Treaty were revisionism and a hope or fear of a Habsburg restoration 
in Hungary or in Austria. The Treaty of Trianon shocked the Magyar population 
of Hungary. Out of 325,000 kilometers, 2 only 93,000 kilometers 2 were left for 
1seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 191. 
2The Cambridge Economic His tort of Europe (6 vols.; Cambridge: University 
Press, 1965), VI, Part II, 609. 
3 1stvan, Count Bethlen, prime minister of Hungary. 
4 C. A. Macartney, Hungary: A Short History (Chicago: Aldine Publ. Co., 
1962)' p. 221. 
I 
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them.5 The population of the former 21 million was reduced to 8 mill ion.6 
It is true that of the territories incorporated in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, 
and Yugoslavia, the Hungarians were in the minority; yet, their number was 
considerable (745,431 in Czechoslovakia; 1,463,311 in Rumania; and 467,652 
in Yugoslavia?). This great number of Hungarians Jiving in the successor 
states of Central Europe provided a chance for friction within, as well as 
8 between the states. "The number of pure Magyars placed by the treaty under 
Czech, Rumanian, and Yugoslavian rule was so large as to cause legitimate 
bitterness to any Hungarian."9 This "legitimate bitterness" not only recom-
mended but demanded that every Hungarian government keep revisionism in its 
program in order to command the loyalty of the masses. JO Thus, revisionism 
became the first important axiom of contemporary Hungarian foreign policy. 
It determined--sometimes openly, sometimes candidly--the role of Hungary on 
the stage of international politics. She sought friendly relations with the 
nations opposing the status auo and displayed hostility toward the countries 
which were for the status guo. 
5seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 414. 
61bid. 
71bid. 
8For further study of the minority questions see Ibid.; C. A. Macartney, 
National States and National Minorities (Oxford, 1934);--p;:-oblems of the Danube 
~(Cambridge, 1942); Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Times (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1956). 
9seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 343. 
10 I ' Adam, Juhasz, and Kerekes, eds., Allianz Hitler-Horthy-Mussolini (Buda-
pest: Akademia ed., 1966), p. 14 (hereinafter referred to as Allianz) states 
that the ruling classes kept the revisionist propaganda alive to turn away the 
population's attention from the domestic problems. This statement suits the 
requirement of Marxist history writing but distorts the truth. Not only the 
government party, but also the opposing parties advocated revisionism in order 
not to lose popular support. 
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The Habsburg restoration question, instead of uniting Hungary as did re-
visionism, divided it. The aristocracy and the Catholic Church wanted a 
Habsburg restoration, because they hoped that the monarchial form of govern-
ment would be their best security to keep their power and privileges. The 
democratic intellectuals, as well as the great majority of the peasantry, 
which still respected and admired the Kossuth tradition of 1848, 11 opposed the 
Habsburg restoration. Regent Horthy and his followers opposed it only because 
of realistic political reasons, and would have welcomed a restoration if cir-
cumstances would have al lowed it. 12 Finally, the young generation of intel-
lectuals who were strongly National is ts, and anti-Communists, and be! ieved in 
a strong authoritarian government organized on the example of Musso! ini 's 
government, opposed a possible Habsburg restoration because of their social is-
tic ideas, their dislike of aristocracy and their dis I ike of unrestricted 
capital ism. 
Thus, the question of a Habsburg restoration made the aristocratic gov-
ernment's foreign pol icy friendly toward England, and even toward France in 
1921. 13 After that they remained admirers of England, followed a more cau-
tious pol icy toward France, and were very cool toward the Austrian and German 
republics. The desire for revision pushed them toward Italy and sharply 
separated them from the Little Entente states. 
11 Lajos Kossuth was the president of the first Hungarian Republic during 
the freedom fight of 1848-1849. 
12Horthy, Memoirs, p. 116-127.~ 




The G0mbos Government, 1932-1933 
Gyula Gombos was appointed as prime minister on October 1, 1932. Regent 
Horthy appointed him with a certain "hesitation," because he could not agree 
with some of Gombos' political convictions. Horthy, however, did not have 
any other choice. The economic crisis and the severe measures introduced to 
fight against it produced great dissatisfaction among the small farmers, un-
14 
employed civil servants, and jobless university graduates. The discontent 
took the form of a Radical Right movement and the leader of that Radical Right 
was Captain Gombos. 
The ideology of the Radical Right was a mixture of national ism, social-
ism, anti-Habsburg feeling, anti-semitism, and authoritarianism. All of these 
convictions had a well-founded basis. 
National ism was fed by the decisions of the peace treaties and prevailed 
in an ardent, aggressive cult of the glorious Hungarian past, as well as in 
revisionism. Its most devoted followers came from the ranks of intellectuals 
who fled to Hungary from territories annexed by the other successor states. 
Social ism became popular due to economic hardship and was considered as 
an alternate solution to the Marxist Social ism attracting the young anti-
Communist intel Jectuals, as well as the small peasants. Their devotion was 
not accidental. Hungary was a land of large estates owned by a group of 
aristocrats, bankers, rich businessmen and the Church. The statics of 1935 
. . I 5 give us some hints: 
14Macartney, Hungary, p. 221-222. 
15calculated on the basis of Seton and Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 121. 
Category of holdings 
0-5 hold 16 
5-50 hold 
50-1,000 hold 
1 ,000 and over 
114 
Per cent of total 





Per cent of 





These statistics indicate that 72.6 per cent of the peasants did not have 
enough land to support their families and had to rent additional land from 
the great landowners or had to hire themselves out as laborers. On the other 
hand, 30 per cent of the land was in the possession of the big landlords rep-
resenting only 0.1 per cent of the whole number of owners. 
While Hungary's neighbors introduced land reforms right after the war, 
Hungary's land reform plans 17 projected the distribution of only a small par-
tion of the great land estates (7.5 per cent of the total land), and even 
this reform had no real benefits for the landless peasants. It was allotted 
in plots of 1.6 hold onto 298,000 peasants out of nearly 3 million. l8 
Anti-Habsburgism 
Anti-Habsburgism also found its roots in these conditions. Gombos and 
his followers really believed that the Hungarian people were the victims of 
the former Habsburg aristocracy, and in order to improve social conditions, 
they wanted to destroy the aristocracy's power. 
Anti-Semitism 
Anti-Semitism also had some practical reasons. Under the economic pres-
sures, the Hungarian bourgeoisie c1nd intellectuals became much more interested 
16one hold= 1.412 acre. 
l7Macartney, Hungary, p. 218. 
18 1bid. 
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in industrial and commercial 1 ife, as well as in the free professions after 
world War I. Yet, the 54 per cent of the merchants, 48 per cent of the com-
rnercial personnel, 46 per cent of the physicians, 41 per cent of the veterin-
arians, 41 per cent of the factory owners, and 34 per cent of the newspaper-
men were Jews. l9 11 The domination of the economic I ife of the nation by an 
alien element became a subject of increasing resentment. 1120 The fact that the 
overwhelming majority of arrested Communists were Jews 21 gave added impetus to 
the anti-Semitism. 
Authoritarianism 
Authoritarianism and an admiration for it was created by the impression 
of Musso I ini 1 s Fascism, as well as Musso! ini's support of Hungary's revision-
ist aims, In 1927, Hungary already had signed a friendship treaty with Italy, 
directed against Yugoslavia. 22 In order to give strength to that treaty, Mus-
sol ini gave a hand to Hungarian rearmament providing a credit of thirty mil-
1 ion 1 i ras through the Banca d 1 Italia. The first shipment of arms (ten car 
loads) arrived in Hungary at the beginning of January 1933, but the rest of the 
shipment (forty car loads) was discovered in Austria at Hirtenberg creating a 
19odon Malnasi, A Magyar Nemzet Oszinte Torte,nete, "The Honest History of 
the Hungarian Nation" (MUnchen, Mikes ed., 1969), p. 149. 
20 Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 291. 
21 · · ' I Magyar Orszagos Leveltar, Horthy Miklos Titkos lratai (Hungarian Na-
tional Archives, 11 The Secret Documents of Nicholas Horthy11 ), ed. by M. Szinai 
and L. Szi.ics (Budapest: Kossuth Pub I. Co., 1965), Doc. No. 16. The arrests 
were made during the Spring of 1931~ 
22rhe interpretations differ on this point. C. A. Macartney accepts on 
the basis of evidence that the friendship treaty was directed more against 
Germany than against the Slavs (October Fifteenth, Part I, p. 136, footnote 3), 
While J. F, Montgomery saw it as an instrument 11 to strengthen Italy's bargain-
ing position toward Yugoslavia. ~d~m, Juh~sz, and Kerekes definitely state 
that "This alliance was directed first of all against the common opponent 
"Yua'.)slavia. 11 Al I ianz • 15. 
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smaller international crisis. The friendly gestures of Mussolini naturally 
attracted the admiration of Hungarian nationalists. While having these ideo-
logical considerations, G0mbos, as prime minister, was not able to realize his 
plans at once. He did not have real power to do anything. Regent Horthy 
"censored his list of ministers, and also refused him permission to hold new 
elections, so that he had to govern with a parliament mainly composed of 
Bethlen's adherents. 11 24 
In foreign pol icy, however, Gombos was able to gain command and more con-
tro 1. 
The Foreign Pol icy of Gombos 
Situation in 1932-1933 
As in the other European countries, so too in Hungary the economic crisis 
represented the main concern of the government. Hungary needed markets for 
her agricultural products and needed industrial products to satisfy the needs 
of the population. The denunciation of the Trade Treaty by Czechoslovakia 
marked the beginning of the end of the prosperity created by the Bethlen gov-
ernment. 25 Czechoslovakia bought 16.8 per cent of Hungary's total export, 
while the Czech products represented 21 per cent of the total import in 1930. 
These figures fel 1 to 4.2 per cent in export and 9.2 per cent in import in 
1931. 26 On March 31, 1932, Austria denounced her commercial treaty with Hun-
gary. It was again a heavy blow as Austria carried 30.1 per cent of Hungary's 
2 3p~l Nandori, A Hirtenbergi F~gyversz~ll it~s in Hadt6rt~nelmi K~zlem~­
.!JYek, 11 The .l\rmshipment of Hi rtenberg 11 (Budapest: Publications of Mi 1 itary 
History, 1968), XV, 636-57. 
24 Macartney, Hungary, p. 223. 
25seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 193. 
26Macartney, October Fifteenth, Part I, p. 90, 5n. 
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exports and 15.5 per cent of her imports. In a personal letter written to 
27 .. ,, 
Hitler on April 22, 1933, Gombos requested Germany's urgent help in that 
situation. His expectations were not in vain as 
exports grew from 11.2 per cent to 22.2 per cent 
Germany's share in Hungary's 
28 by the next year. As a re-
sult of the German trade, unemployment decreased and industrial production 
. l. d 29 was rev1ta 1ze. 
At the same time, due to heavy borrowing by the Bethlen and K~ro1yi gov-
ernments Hungary was indebted to the League of Nations, as well as to private 
banking interests in Britain, France, and the U.S. It was urgent to give to 
these circles some security that Hungary would not initiate Nazism servilely. 
Gombos moved swiftly in that direction to the great surprise of the Hungarian 
Right. Gombos initiated negotiations 30 with the representatives of the Jewish 
Neolog31 community and concluded an agreement on which the Jewish leaders 
11 recognized and approved Gombos' progressive policy, 11 while Gombos announced 
that he had 11 revised his views on the Jewish question. 32 
We may conclude that at the end of 1933, G6mbBs had a relatively united 
country behind him as far as his domestic policy was concerned. His economic 
policy, on the other hand, tied Hungary closer to Germany, but kept the U.S. 
and England friendly. With the declining external and internal pressures at 
27
wilhelmstrasse, Schnurte to Neurath, Budapest, February 12, 1935, Doc. 
No. 31. 
28Macartney, October Fifteenth, p. 141. 
29.!.£.l.£., p. 142. 
30 Ibid. , p. 112. 
3lrhe Hungarian Jews had two Churches: the modernized Neologs and the 
traditional Orthodox group. The Neologs were the more numerous. 
32Macartney, Octbber Fifteenth, p. 112. 
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the turn of the year, he was relatively free to select the foreign political 
moves which would serve Hungary's interest the best. 
Alternatives Open for Hungarian Foreign 
Policy at the End of 1933 
Gombos' basic political convictions partially promoted and partially op-
posed the foreign pol icy of the preceding aristocratic governments. He enthu-
siastically accepted the revisionist program, but rejected the possibility of 
a Habsburg restoration not only for the time being, but forever. These two 
principles already put some limitations on his choices for alternative solu-
tions on the field of foreign pol icy. 
33 Equally important was the influence of Regent Horthy and his foreign 
• • KI 1 I KI m1n1ster, a man anya. Regent Horthy never lost his admiration for the seas 
and considered the great naval powers as unchallengeable. He openly expressed 
this conviction several times to Montgomery, U.S. ambassador in Budapest (1933 
1941). 11 ¥/hat was true in the last war is no less true this time, namely that 
sea power will win the war. 11 Not only in government circles, but also in 
the wide public opinion of Hungary, it was well known that Horthy JS an 
Anglophile. Though legally he had no authority3f.+tointerfere with the foreign 
pol icy of Hungary, his position gave him the chance to influence the mind and 
decision of Gombos to at least display a certain caution not to alienate Eng-
land. 
I f ' Kalman Kanya was the ambassador of Hungary in Berl in from 1925 until his 
appointment by ~6mb6s (February 4, 1933) to the post of f~reign minister. 
33Montgomery, Hungary, p. 47. 
34According to the laws, the regent was actually a figure head. He 
could not make any foreign political decisions. The real power was in the 
hands of the prime minister and foreign ministers who acted upon the approval 
of the Crown Council. 
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"He knew exactly what he wanted for Hungary, which was all the revision he 
could get for her. 11 35 Because he was free from the influence of any ideology, 
he had no scruples concerning diplomatic morality of loyalty. 11 lnfinitely 
circumspect and profoundly cynical, Kanya trusted no man further than he could 
see. 11 36 His basic aim was to secure for Hungary a free hand, that is, not to 
ally Hungary with the victors. His aggressive character impressed even Gombos 
and moderated his enthusiasm for Hitler, as well as for Mussolini. 
Taking into consideration the discussed factors (revisionism, anti-
restorationism, Horthy's Anglophile sympathies and Gombos' own authoritarian 
admirations), one may see the following alternatives open for foreign policy 
at the end of 1933: 
Continuation of Bethlen 1 s foreign policy, i.e. toning down the re-
visionist claims, becoming firm allies with Italy, and trying to 
find a modus vivendi with the other European countries, including 
the Little Entente; 
Start a more aggressive foreign policy creating political and mil i-
tary all lances with the other revisionist states (Italy, Germany, 
Poland, Austrian, and Bulgaria) and trying to realize revision by 
force if necessary; 
Accept the status quo, give up rev1s1onism and drift into the camp 
of France and the Little Entente; and 
Reject every rigid line of foreign pol icy and pursue revisionism 
whenever the conditions favor it. 
Continuation of Bethlen 1 s Foreign Pol icy 
Developments in Germany, as well as the effects of the economic crisis 
(cancellation of the Czech and Austrian trade agreements) made this 1 ine of 
foreign pol icy obsolete. Before 1933 Germany had accepted the Versailles 
35rhe best, most sympathetic characterization of K~nya is written by 
Macartney, October Fifteenth, Part I, p. 108-110. 
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Treaty at least as far as her western borders were concerned in the Locarno 
Treaty, October 16, 1925. She had been a member of the League of Nations, 
was economically weak, had been cooperative and peaceful in international 
politics, and was insignificant militarily. By 1933, however, Germany 1 s pol i-
cy had become aggressive and openly revisionist. She began to play a more 
important role from the military point of view, and economically she was a 
desirable trading partner for every nation, and especially for the countries 
of Central Europe and of the Balkan. 
These changes in Germany's conditions made the Little Entente, especially 
Czechoslovakia, nervous; and it gradually turned the attention of France 
toward the problems of Central Europe. To discount the role of Germany would 
have been impractical from the Hungarian point of view, especially since the 
economic well-being of Hungary to a great degree depended upon her trade re-
lations with Germany. The alliance with Italy, however, remained just as im-
portant as before and needed to be incorporated in other diplomatic designs. 
The Start of a More Aggressive Foreign Policy 
This would create a political and military alliance with the other revi-
sionist states, that is, with Italy, Germany, Poland, Austria, and Bulgaria. 
Here again the events already cancelled out some of the realistic possibil i-
ties: Bulgaria gave up her loud revisionist pol icy and began to cooperate 
37 
with the pro-status guo Balkan states. Austria was completely alienated 
from Germany beca~se of the German supported anti-government propaganda in 
~ 
37The Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry was set up at Istanbul in 
1931, the Oriental Tobacco Office was set up in 1933, and the Balkan Entente 
was well under negotiations at the end of 1933 (signed in Februarv 1934) with 
Bulgarian participation. Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 373. 
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Austria, as we11 as because of Gennany 1 s financial pressure tactics.3 Long 
and hard diplomatic negotiations~were needed to stop Do11fuss from continuing 
a rapprochement with the French sponsored group.39 Italy was not Jess deter-
mined at that time to stop the growing German influence in Austria, and Mus-
solini openly expressed his displeasure over Gombos• visit to Hitler.40 The 
only improvement of relations within the anti-status quo camp was achieved by 
the German-Polish rapprochement. 
Also in Hungary there existed a great dislike of the idea of a closer 
cooperation with Germany. First, the public opinion, especially the univer-
sity students, were utterly disappointed because of Hitler 1 s demands concern-
ing the rights and privileges of the German minority group in Hungary4l and 
organized demonstrations against Germany.42 The majority of the Hungarian 
press attacked not only Germany, but also Gombos because of his visit to Hit-
ler. They commented on the visit as an unfortunate step 11 in a time when Ger-
many was going to be completely isolated. 1143 A too radical and open pro-
German policy could have created a problem, even a government crisis since 
38Kurt Schuschnigg, Im Kampf gegen Hitler (Wien, Fritz Molden Verlag, 
I 969) , p. l 42-14 3. 
39wilhelmstrasse, Conversation of Kopke with Mazirevich, Berl in, July 14, 
1933, Doc. No. 10. 
40~., Hassel to Neurath, Roma, June 30, 1933, Doc. No. 9. The visit 
took place June 17-19, 1933. 
41 1bid., Doc. Nos. 4, 8, 13. Also see: Gombos• conversation with Hitler, 
Budapest:"June 16, 1933, Allianz, Doc. No. 3. 
421bid., Bleyer to Schoen, Budapest, August ll, 1933, Doc. No. 13. 
431bid., Schoen to Neurath, Budapest, June 21, 1933, Doc. No. 8. 
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Gombos' followers were in a minority within the government party, and he did 
not possess the unconditional support of Horthy. 
From the economic point of view,a closer cooperation with Germany was 
certainly a requirement. Germany was to carry 20.35 per cent of Hungary's 
45 . 
total foreign trade in 1934. The friendly or hostile attitude of Germany 
would have made Hungary economically more dependent on friendly or hostile 
nations. If Germany was friendly, Hungary's trade was to depend on friendly 
countries for 54.22 per cent and only for 13.77 per cent on the hostile coun-
tries. A hostile Germany would have forced Hungary to depend for only 33.87 
per cent of its trade on friendly nations 46 and for 34.12 per cent on hostile 
nations. 
The pol icy to ally Hungary with the block of anti-status quo nations for 
the time being lacked all realism since no such block existed. However, if 
such a block were to be created in the future, economic, as well as revision-
ist political considerations recommended that Gombos join the block. 
Rejection of Revisionism and Joining with the 
Camp of the Pro-Status Quo States 
This was Oaladier's suggestion to Kanya, when he visited the French capi-
tal between September 15-18, 1933. Oaladier noted that France would welcome a 
more friendly attitude on Hungary's part concerning the proposals of Benes. 47 
44Nandor A. F. Dreisziger, Hungary's \.Jay to World War 11 (Toronto: Hun-
garian Helicon Society, 1968), p. 34. 
45Germany made the trade agreement with Hungary on the basis of a quota 
system on July 22, 1933. Macartney, October Fifteenth, p. 141. 
46see Table IV. 
47Benes held out the prospect of trade benefits for Hungary in return for 
the renunciation of revisionism. Wilhelrnstrasse, Doc. No. 14. 
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K~nya 1 s answer was that "any Hungarian government would fall at once if it 
would accept such suggestions. 1148 Was Kanya right in his reply? 49 Already 
the aristocratic governments accepted revisionism as their political platform 
in order to gain popular support. Even the leaders of the opposing parties 
agreed with the government on that point. Tibor Eckhardt, leader of the 
smallholder Party, the stongest opposing party, was no less revisionist than 
Gombos himseJf50 and, was the vice-president of the "Hungarian League for 
Rev i s ion. 1151 I Pal Auer, one of the strongest opponents of unrestricted Hun-
garian national ism and of Gomb6's felt it necessary, during his private con-
versations with Benes, to emph?size the disadvantages of the annexation of 
Hungarians by Czechoslovakia, and recommended to him a peaceful revision of 
borders fol lowing the ethnic 1 ines.52 
Hungarian school education, as well as the parental education did not 
cease to nurture revisic~ist sentiments in the younger generations and in that l 
way secured a continuous mass-support for revisionism throughout the decades l 
43vlilhelmstras;e, Doc. No. 14. 
49The offici.'il historical interpretation of rev1s1onism is accepted by 
every present-day Hungarian historian 1 iving in Hungary without argument. 
It prevails in tr"~ following stereotype sentence: 11 The Hungarian ruling 
classes did not .1ant the diminution of differences, but rather the continua-
tion of them b~cause by these means they could turn the bitterness of a great 
majority of the population against the dictates of Trianon and against the 
neighboring states. Their bitterness was actually caused by their misery." 
Allianz, p., .. 
50
seton-\·Jatson, Eastern Europe, p. 189. 
51 Eckhardt, Regicide, p. 96. ~ 
~'-Pal Auer, Fel evsz~zad, "Half a Century" (\vashington: Occidental 
Press, 1971), p. 111. 
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between the two wars. K~nya was right in asserting this fact, and Oaladier, 
himself, understood that the realization of anti-revisionist policy was an 
impossible task. 54 This policy was not feasible from the Hungarian point of 
view, nor was it feasible from the foreign political point of view either. 
The £!l!y advantage that Daladier had offered to Kanya for Hungary 1 s renuncia-
tion of revisionism was a support of Hungary 1 s rearmament demands in the Lit-
tie Entente states. What Hungary had needed at that time was, first of all, 
a helping hand in her economic situation. However, no such offer was made, 
because France herself was not in a position economically to help Hungary. 
A renunciation of revisionist pol icy could have resulted in loss of trade with 
Germany and Italy. Without French guarantees for the replacement of that loss 
the acceptance of such an offer would have been a naive, unrealistic pol icy. 
Rejection of All Rigid Lines of Foreign 
Pol icy and Pursuit of Revisionism 
Under Favorable Conditions 
This policy had to take into consideration all possibilities, such as: 
Revision through war; 
Revision through the League of Nations and review of the peace 
treaties (Article XIX of the Covenant); 
Revision through agreements reached with the Little Entente; 
Revision through agreements reached with the individual successor 
states; 
Revision forced upon the individual successor states through the 
decision of the Great Powers (Britain, France, Germany, and Italy). 
531 was born in 11 Trianon11 -Hungary, but learned the meaning of that ex-
pression from my uncle and his children of my age living in Czechoslovakia 
while we visited each other once or twice a year. In the whole public school 
I do not remember a student who would not react emotionally to the questions 
connected with the Trianon Treaty. 
54\'1ilhelmstrasse, Koster to Neurath, Paris, September 18, 1933, Doc. 
No. 14. 
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We may dismiss at once this first alternative. Hungary's military-
geographic position excluded any chance for success in case of an armed con-
flict with any of the Little Entente states. It would have been different if 
their Entente were to be dissolved, for then Hungary could have pursued a more 
aggressive pol icy against these states, and even then only against one of 
them. The aim of such a pol icy for the time being ought to have been directed, 
therefore, against the unity of the Little Entente, as well as against the 
understanding between France and the Little Entente. 
Revision through the League of Nations 
This alternative promised even less success. France and the Little En-
tente states were able to block not only the attempts directed toward the re-
vision of the treaty in the League, but were successful in preventing the 
League from fulfilling its obi igation as guardian of the minority rights.SS 
However, for the sake of international pub] icity and for propaganda purposes, 
it seemed to be wise to seize every opportunity in the League of Nations to 
stress Hungary's grievances. 
A revision through agreements with the Little Entente had depended upon 
the possibility of finding at least one acceptable basis to start more friend-
ly diplomatic relations. This basis was created by the attitude of the Little 
Entente states toward the Habsburg restoration problem. King Alexander of 
Yugoslavia had said that he would have preferred a German-Austrian custom 
union to a possible Austrian-Hungarian-Italian one.S6 Benes expressed his 
~ 
views in the following words: 11 1 prefer an Anschluss to an Austrian-Hungarian 
S5Eckhardt, Regicide, p. 58-59; also Macartney, October Fifteenth, p. 143 
S6oGFP, C, I, Albert Dufour to the Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, June 1, 
1933, D0Z:-No. 279. 
1 
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union. 11 57 Benes felt that a restoration would endanger the security of 
Czechoslovakia, but he was not afraid of the Germans, with whom the Czechs 
had had a cordial neighbor relationship for centuries.SB Also, Titulescu had 
no objections against a possible Anschluss, but he remarked that 11 in case of 
an Austrian-Hungarian unification, Rumania will order mobilization. 11 59 
The Little Entente and France approached Hungary already in 1932 to take 
part in the Tardieu Plan, 60 which envisioned the establishment of tariffs on 
the basis of the most favored national principles among the Danubian states 
(Austria, Hungary, and the Little Entente), and then the creation of an eco-
nomic block, a kind of custom union under French tutelage. The plan failed, 
not because of the Hungarian, but because of the German, Italian, and British 
opposition to it. 61 The plan, however, was also unacceptable from the Hun-
garian point of view because it would have demanded as a pre-condition the 
62 
renunciation of Hungary's revisionism. 
Unless Hungary was ready to denounce revisionism, there was no hope to 
find any solution for reconciliation with the Little Entente states as a 
block. 
Hungary was not ready to and could not take such a step. The Hungarian 
political leaders in the government, as well as in the opposing camp could 
57DBFP, Second Series, V, Doc. No. 273. Also, interview with P~l Auer. 
S8Auer 
' 
Half a Century, p. 100. 
59DGFP, Memorandum by Neurath~ London, June 21, 1933, Doc. No. 328. 
60A. Basch, The Danube Basin in the German Economic Sphere (Nevi York: 
Columbia University Press, 1943), p. 160. 
6 ID . . H I I 61 M d H d th L. 1 E re1sz1ger, ungary s ~..Jay, p. ; ag a, ungary an e 1tt e ntente, 
p. 53. 
62wilhelmstrasse, Negotiations of K~nya and Goring, Budapest, October 11, 
1936, Doc. No. 14. 
,.. 
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work only on some kind of alternative compromise. The idea was to renounce 
at least part of the revisionist demands against one country, but keep the 
demands intact against the other countries. 
Reconcil iat.ion with Yugoslavia 
In Horthy's judgment the country that was the best choice for a friend-
~hip was Yugoslavia. He had frequent private contact with King Alexander 
through Admiral Prika, with whom Horthy served in the KUK Navy, and who was 
now the adjutant-general of the Yugoslavian king.63 It was even more impor-
tant that the Yugoslavian minister of foreign affairs, Yevtic, shared Horthy's 
views concerning the necessity of rapprochement between Hungary and Yugoslavia. 
He said to Hennyey, the Hungarian military attache, during the presentation of 
his credentials: 11 1 am convinced that you will have a good time in our 
country, because there are no real differences between the two people. 1164 
Not only sentimental and personal emotions suggested a rapprochement with 
Yugoslavia, but also realistic considerations. Yugoslavia had the smallest 
group of Hungarians,65 and the political refugees escaping from Yugoslavia to 
Hungary were mainly Croatians and not Hungarians. Furthermore, Yugoslavia and 
Hungary had mutually important trade relations. 66 There were signs of mutual 
goodwill on both parts. For example, early in 1933 the chief of staff of the 
Yugoslavian army objected to the presence of Croatian refugees in Janka Puszta. 
Hungary began to send away the Croatian refugees, not only from Janka Puszta, 
631nterview with Hennyey. 
641bid. 
65382,000 according to the census of 1921. Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, 
p.343. 
66see Table IV. 
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but also from Hungary. The private information that Horthy had received gave 
him "every reason to believe that King Alexander would, as soon as circum-
stances permitted, accept the proffered hand of friendship. 1167 This friendly 
hand was offered as early as the first days of May 1933. Dudic, the Yugosla-
I 
vian ambassador in Budapest, paid a visit to Kanya and expressed the friendly 
feeling of Yugoslavia toward Hungary, and he suggested the creation of an 
Italian-Hungarian-Yugoslavian alliance against the threat of an Anschluss.68 
At the same time, the pub I icly known relationship of the two countries seemed 
to be hopelessly hostile, and this hostility prevailed not only in newspaper 
articles, 69 but also in actions, which the two countries had taken in form of 
complaints at the League of Nations. 70 These actions and press attacks, how-
ever, did not play too important a role. In Yugoslavia, the press was firmly 
under the government 1 s control, and it could change the tone of articles from 
one day to another. In Hungary, only the government press published extreme 
revisionist articles, while the opposing press followed a more liberal line 
and advocated a pro-French and pro-reconciliatory pol icy.7 1 So there was also 
·no problem, and if the stopping of the press campaign was in the interest of 
the governments, both could have done so with ease. 
Reconciliation with Czechoslovakia 
On September 27, 1933, President Masaryk made his interesting remarks 
about the possibility of a Czech-Austrian-Hungarian union, but he added the 
67Horthy, Memoirs, p. 141. 
68wilhelmstrasse, Schoen to Neurath, Budapest, May 9, 1933, Doc. No. 5. 
69lnterview with Hennyey. 
70Ad~m, Hungary and the Little Entente, pp. 62-63. 
711nterview with P~l Auer, Paris, June 25, 1971. 
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condition to it that 11 The probability is very small that the Hungarians will 
come to their senses. If Hungary would follow a realistic policy we could 
discuss--no doubt with positive results--some kind of border revisions. 1172 
(italics mine) The wording of this proposal certainly was not apt to awaken 
Hungarian sympathies. The substance of it even less: it projected a coal i-
tion of the three states who were the members of the former Habsburg Monarchy, 
in which Hungary for centuries (before the compromise of 1867) played second 
fiddle to the other two. The proposal reminded Gombos of the possibility of 
a Habsburg restoration, and that alone was enough to elicit his opposition to 
the plan. The attitude of the Czech government toward the Hungarian minorities 
also did not promote a possible better understanding. 11 There were the usual 
complaints, often justified, about insufficient educational facilities, the 
impossibility of entering the civil service, and the tactless behaviour of 
officials in the majority nation in purely Magyar districts. 11 73 It was natural 
for the population living in such districts to turn to the Hungarian govern-
ment for protection; and this provided a constant chance for hostility between 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. 
Reconciliation with Rumania 
This seemed to be the least desired and least possible alternative be-
cause Rumania held the greatest part of former Hungarian territories with the 
greatest Hungarian population: l ,354,000 according to the Rumanian census and 
1,900,000 according to the Hungarian census. 74 The greatest number of politi-
' 
cal refugees I iving in Trianon-Hungary were represented by those escaping from 
72Quoted in Adam, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 58. 
73seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 344. 
741bid., p. 343. 
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Transylvania. These refugees were politically the most active and influential 
(Bethlen, himself, was a Transylvanian), working for revision. Titulescu, the 
Rumanian foreign minister, on the other hand, was one of the strongest anti-
revisionist statesmen, whose activities were instrumental in the torpedoing of 
the Four Power Pact,75 as well as in the preparations of the anti-revisionist 
Balkan Entente. 76 
The success of any of these alternatives depended entirely on the consent 
of Italy and Germany. Hungary could not afford to loose Italian sympathies 
what with Mussolini being the only statesman who openly supported Hungary's re-
visionist aims.77 Also, Hungary could not afford to loose Hitler's goodwill, 
the Hungarian foreign trade being greatly dependent upon the export-import 
business with Germany. It was important to learn their attitude and harmonize 
Hungary's foreign pol icy with them. 
Gombo's learned about the convictions of Germany and Italy during his vis-
its. In Berl in (June 17-19, 1933) he learned from Hitler that Germany could 
not support the Hungarian revisionist requests directed against Rumania and 
Y 1 . 78 b h 1 d G I . • c h 1 ugos av1a, ut e cou count on ermany s cooperation against zec os ova-
kia. 79 Furthermore, Hitler expressed his dissatisfaction with Dol ]fuss. Gorn-
bos had asked Hitler if a more moderate pol icy would not be possible visa vis 
75see Macartney and Palmer, Eastern Europe, p. 308. 
76
stavrianos, The Balkans, pp.738-739. 
77since 1928, Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe, p. 347. 
' 
78 1bid., p. 59. 
79Adam, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 58. 
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Austria,tlO but the reply was disappointing.~ 1 The Hungarian leadership, how-
ever, sympathized with Hitler's conceptions and did not want to get involved 
82 II •th in that "fratricidal struggle. 11 Nobody could have expected Hungary w1 a 
I 
sane mind to take the side of Germany in the Anschluss question,'' wrote Kanya 
f h B 1. . . 83 a ter t e er 1n v1s1t. 
A revision with the help of all the Great Powers did not seem to be feas-
ible after the experiences with the Four Power Pact and after the K~r1ya-Daladier 
negotiations. 84 Yet, the attitude of England created some slight reasons for 
hope. With the enlistment of Lord Rothermere to support the Hungarian revi-
sionist aims, at least the Hungarian public was led to believe that the support 
of the English pub I ic opinion could be secured. 
Therefore, Hungarian revisionist propaganda was strengthened in the \-Jes-
tern world, and especially in Britain and France, but it created greater re-
sponse in Central Europe. The Little Entente feared that Hungary might con-
vince the Great Powers that they were very unjust to Hungary during the peace 
negotiations. 85 As a result, Benes and Titulescu nipped in the bud every 
French idea of a possible revision and led in their respective press a continu-
ous anti-revisionist propaganda campaign, which proved to be more successful 
than the Hungarian one.86 
80All ianz, negotiations of Gombos with Hitler, Budapest, June J6, 1933, 
Doc. No. 3. 
81 Ibid., Gombos to Musso! ini, Budapest, June 24, 1933, Doc. No. 4. 
82 . 1 h I ' D N 8 W1 e mstrasse, Schoen to Neurath, Budapest, June 21, 1933, oc. o. • 
83Quoted in Ormos, Eastern Security, p. 240. 
84see p. 124 of this study. 
8S1nterview with Hennyey. 
86seton-Watson, Eastern Europe. p. 347. 
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During the last months of 1933, as well as in January 1934 there were 
. 8 
rumors about the possibility of a German-Little Entente Non-Aggres~ion Pact• 7 
Gombos asked Germany for clarification, and finally he wrote a letter to Hitle~ 
himself, but after a while Germany decided not to give any reply.88 These ac-
tions of Germany were just as disturbing as Hitler's attitude toward the German 
minorities question in Hungary, 89 all of which recommended to Gombos a cautious 
rapprochement with Germany. 
Gombos learned about Mussolini •s designs during his visit in Rome (July 
25-28, 1933); Mussolini repeated to Gombos his formerly explained designs90 
concerning Central Europe. The kernel of this plan was a ''tight cooperatior1 I 
between Austria and Hungary, 11 91 which should be realized on the commercial, as 
1
1 
well as on the political fields. At the same time, Musso] ini assured Gombos 
j 
that Italy remained "in strong opposition to a Habsburg restoration.1192 In the f 
second state of this pol icy the Austrian-Hungarian agreement, strongly sup-
ported by Italy, should be extended to the neighboring states, and first of 
all to the Little Entente. and to Germany.93 
87oGFP, C, I I, memorandum by Kopke, 
memorandum by Bulow, Berl in, January JI, 
rath, Berl in, January 18, 1934, Doc. No. 
January 24, 1934, Doc. No. 216. 
Berl in, December I, 1933, Doc. No. 95; 
I 934, Doc. No. I 75; ~ernorandum by Neu-
192; memorandum by Bulow, Berl in 
' 
881bid., Gombos to Hitler, Budapest, February 14, 1934, Doc. No. 252; Dr· 
Lammers~Neurath, Berl in, February 28, 1934, Doc. No. 288; Dr. Lammers to 
Neurath, Berl in, March 29, 1934, Doc. No. 371. 
89wilhelmstrasse, Doc. Nos. 16, 18, 19, 20. 








The effects of Hitler's and Mussolini's plans on all the alternatives of 
the Hungarian foreign pol icy were disastrous. Gennany wanted an Anschluss, 
and Italy opposed it. Germany wanted a close cooperation with Hungary for the 
dissolution of the Little Entente and the destruction of Czechoslovakia, and 
Musso] ini wanted a reorganization of the whole Danube Basin through reconcil ia-
tion and understanding with France. Both Germany and Italy opposed a possible 
Habsburg restoration. None of the mentioned alternatives was feasible without 
alienating one or another Great Power. Consequently there remained only one 
remotechance to promote the Hungarian foreign political aims--the creation in 
the future of an understanding between Hit] er and Musso] ini. Until that time 
only one road was left open for Hungary: to try to retain her freedom of ac-
tion without offending either of the two powers. 
The preceding analysis hopefully proved what the Communist-controlled Hun-
garian writers of history were not allowed to say before 1968-1969,94 but was 
accepted as "historical fact" by many prominent experts in the free world as 
early as 1945; 95 that is that Gombos did not bind Hungary to unconditionally 
~
·follow the Italian, or German political lines· 
I Gombos and Kanya saved Hunga ry1s 
freedom of action to follow a pol icy which would serve Hungary's interest the 
best. As we shall see in the following chapter, they kept this point of view 
throughout 1934 and were ready to play the twO powers against each other if 
they believed that such an immoral, blackmailing, double-crossing pol icy would 
benefit Hungary. 
' 94The first new interpretations may be found in ~d~m, Hungary and the Lit-
tle Entente; also Ormos, Eastern Security. 
95seton-Watson, Eastern Europe; also Macartney and Palmer, Eastern Europe. 
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Events of 1934 
The German-Polish Non-Aggression 
Pact (January 26, 1934) 
The official relationship of Hungary and Poland was correct, but very cool 
following World War I. Though the two countries had friendly connections for 
centuries before the war, and the two peoples mutually cherished the memories 
of old times,96 the peace treaties placed the two countries into opposing 
camps. Poland 1 s rebirth was the work of the Versailles Treaties, while the 
Trianon Treaty mutilated Hungary.97 The result of this was that the old 
friendly relations were manifested only in negative actions: Poland had not 
ratified the Trianon Treaty and did not participate in any designs of the 
French or Little Entente diplomacies, which were directed against Hungary. 
Hungary, on the other hand, did not see any practical value of a closer Polish-
og 
Hungarian cooperation in such circumstances.~ These circumstances began to 
change with the increasing Polish-German tensions in 1931-1932, and the ten-
sions created by German revisionist aims and propaganda concerning the Danzig 
corridor.99 Musso! ini indicated in his conversation with Avenal, the secre-
tary of the League of Nations, that he would welcome an eastward shift in Ger-
man expansion, because this direction would be the least threatening for 
Italy. JOO The Four Power Pact earned the unconditional opposition of Poland 
96A detailed description of Polish-Hungarian relations is out of the frame 
of this study. I intend to describe them in my planned book in a separate 
chapter. ' 
97Andras Hbry, A Kul issz~k Mogi::itt, ''Behind the Scenes" (Wien: author 1 s 
edition, 1965), p. 15. 
98rbid. 
99Lipski Papers, p, 64. 
l0'.) 1 b"d 64 
' I • • • 
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~and could have strengthened her relations with the Little Entente. 101 During 
his visit to Prague, Beck discovered, however, that the smaller states of Cen-
tral Europe with their "ultra-submissiveness to the Great Powers 11 102 represented 
an obstacle to the formation of a solid anti-Four Power Pact front. Pilsudsky 
believed that the only alternative left for Poland under such circumstances 
was direct negotiation with Germany as early as April 1933.103 This negotia-
tion led to the successful closing of the Non-Aggression Pact. 
Parallel with these negotiations, Beck tried to establish personal con-
tact with the Hungarian government,104 but his visit was cancelled because of 
the protest of the Yugoslavian government. l05 The Czech government was alarmed, 
too, and began to look at Poland with suspicious eyes. After the signing of 
the Non-Aggression Pact the Czech general staff considered Poland as one of her 
,nain enemies. 106 From the Hungarian point of view the Non-Aggression Pact could 
have meant one more ally against Czechoslovakia. 107 Therefore, the Gombos gov-; 
ernment sent a committee to l.:Jd:-saw 11 to renew the friendly relations, 11 108 but 
the visit did not promote political negotiations and Polish-Hungarian relations 
remained unchanged. Marshall Pilsudsky rejected the idea of a Hungarian-Polish 
l 01 Lipski Papers, p. 64-65. 
I 021 bid. , p. 66 
l031bid., p. 71. 
I04lEJ._£., p. 66. Hory mistakenly writes that the initiation fo~ the re-
vival of Polish-Hungarian friendship came on the part of Hungary. Hory, Behind 
the Scenes, p. 15. 
l05Lipski Papers, p. 66. 
l061nterview with General Fl ipo. 
107Poland claimed the territory of Teschen from Czechoslovakia since the 
creation of the two states after World War I. 
I 08 I • Hory, ~., p. 15. 
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alliance, but he promised "never to make war on Hungary, and to do his best to 
restrain Rumania. 11 109 Polish policy did not influence Hungarian foreign policy 
during the course of 1934. However, from that time on Hungary looked upon Po-
]and as a probable ally against Czechoslovakia. 
The Rome Protocols (March 17, 1934) 
The German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact created a certain degree of alarm 
in France, and the new government was anxious to show a united front of Great 
Powers against the possible renewal of German aggressiveness in Austria. This 
anxiety produced the Three-Power declaration regarding Austrian independence 
on February 17, 1934, signed by Britain, France, and Italy. With this declara-
tion the mood changed, and France turned its attention toward the planned Eas-
tern Pact. Italy seemed to have firm control over Austria and Hungary, es-
pecially since the three states planned to further regulate their relationship 
in a formal treaty. 110 
Yet, there were certain signs which indicated that the supposed Italian 
influence was not so strong in Hungary as in Austria. Hungary signed a new 
German-Hungarian commercial treaty on February 21, 1934. This treaty put Hun-
gary, from the economic point of view, into the German orbit, lll the latter 
holding 20.35 per cent of Hungary's foreign trade. However, Gombos did not 
Feel that this would mean that because of that he would sink to an inferior 
position. On February 14, 1934, he thanked Hitler in a personal letter112 for 
l09Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 144. 
llOThe preliminary negotiations of the Rome Protocols had al ready begun 
in January. 
111 see Table V. 
11 2wilhelmstrasse, Doc. No. 19. 
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the "attention" of the German trade delegation, but at the same time he re-
asserted his own po 1itica1 independence. Wh i 1 e stressing the common revision-
ist interest of Germany and Hungary, he asked Hitler to order the German mi-
norities in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia to cooperate with the Hun-
garian minorities and not to take, under any circumstances an anti-revisionist 
position. He had demanded also the discontinuance of the German Nazi propa-
ganda and financial ''support of the German minority groups in Hungary.11113 
(italics mine) The German reaction to this letter may be best seen in the mir-
I 
ror of the negotiations between Kanya and Hans Georg von Mackensen, the German 
minister in Hungary. K~nya told him that while Hungary would not participate 
in any agreement directed against Germany, the Hungarian government would watch 
with great concern the alienation of Germany and Italy because of the Austrian 
question. 114 Kanya also added that if because of the Austrian-German problem 
an open conflict would break out between Germany and ltaly,'~he Hungarian gov-
! 
ernment would be forced to follow a brutal Hungarian pol icy}'ll5 (italics mine) II. 
This expression is certainly vague. However, it made the impression Kanya 
had hoped for: the German ambassador understood it as a possible threat, l l6 a 
Hungarian-Italian cooperation against Germany. Though there is no reason to 
suppose that Mussel ini did not have any knowledge about this German-Hungarian 
ll3wilhelmstrasse, Doc. No. 19. 
1141bid., Mackensen to Neurath, Budapest, February 26, 1934, Doc. No. 20. 
ll51bid. 
ll61bid., Mackensen to Neurath, Budapest, February 28, 1934, Doc. No. 21. 
,.. 
negotiation,117 Mussolini felt 
Fulvio Suvich, to Hungary.118 
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it necessary to send his political director, 
Suvich found reassuring and disheartening fore-
bodings. Hungary followed Mussolini's recommendation and Gombos, against the 
advice of Horthy, established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 1 l9 
Hungary was ready to fully cooperate with Austria and Italy on the field of 
trade, but she expressed her desire to keep out of an anti-German formation.1 20 
K£nya seemed to be unmoved by Suvich 1 s statements about the growing nervousness 
of Mussolini.1 21 These controversial actions indicated that Gombos, though 
trying to maintain Mussolini's goodwill, started a new, more independent for-
eign pol icy. What was exactly the main idea of that new foreign pol icy was 
explained by Gombos, himself, for while accepting the invitation of Mussolini, 
the two statesmen held an eye-to-eye conversation in the closing negotiations 
of the Rome Protocols. 122 Doll fuss, while present at the signing of the pro-
tocols was not invited into that conversation. 12 3 
During that meeting Gombos explained to Musso! ini the. fol lowing basic 
axiom of his foreign pol icy: 11 Hungary feels her cal I ing is to practice a par-
ticular policy, relying on Italy for the area south of the Danube and on 
117sorrowfully enough, the Hungarian-Italian documents were not available, 
tom:, but it can be safely concluded by knowing the personal friendship of 
Mussolini and Gomb6s that Gomb6s informed him just as wel 1 as he had informed 
Hitler about the state of affairs of Hungary with Italy. 
1 l8The visit took place on February 21-23, 1934. 
119wilhelmstrasse, p. 73, sn. 
120 1bid., Mackensen to Neurath~ Budapest, February 26, 1934, Doc. No. 20. 
121 Ibid. 
122A 11 '1 anz, 115 gn p. , • 
1231bid. 
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Germany for the area north of the Danube.1il24 (italics mine) This statement 
left Mussolini speechless. It sounded like a declaration of independence, 
and truly that is what it was! Then Gombos expressed his doupts concerning 
the trustworthiness of Doll fuss, who wanted to keeP the door open for an un-
k ''h. derstanding with France and the Little Entente, a~d wanted to eep IS con-
nections with us only apparent. 11 125 Gombos did not hide his dissatisfaction 
over Doll fuss• Habsburg policy, 126 and remained doubtful even when the Duce 
expressed his opinion that the restoration was not timely for the present. 127 
Gombos stressed that Hungary was happy with the present situa~ion and a res-
toration in Austria would find the Hungarian government stron9 enough "to 
defend its position. 11 128 Mussolini argued that even the Hunggirian interest 
demands the preservation of an independent Austria. Gombos agreed, but stated 
. 129 h 
that Hungary needed Germany's cooperation against czechoslova~1a. For t at 
reason, he asked the Duce to keep the Rome Protocol an open treaty, allowing 
l 24 J J • ·· · R M h l 3 A 1 anz, Gombos 1 note f·::r negotiations with Musso 1 in i, ome, a re ' 
1934, Doc. No. 6. 
1251bid. Gombos stated that he had received this information from Theo-
dore Hornbostel, who was the political secretary-general of the fed~ral ch~n­
cellery of Austria. Hornbostel explained that "Austria was disappointed with 
the Rom~ Protocols because they did not include any statement ~: guarantee 
concerning the inviolability of Austria's territorial sovereig~ity. Doll fuss, 
keeping the door open to France, wanted to pressure Italy and 1 '~ngary to. in-
c~ude such a statement in the Protocols, but could not succeed· Interview 
with Theodore Hornbostel, Vienna, July 12, 1971. 
126Dollfuss, though he, himself, was not a monarchist favc::::>red. the Austrian 
legitimists, because "they were for sure anti-Nazis .. '' lntervi&w with Horn-





for other powers to join it.130 Mussolini agreed, and Kanya (on March 20, 
1933) hurriedly instructed the Hungarian ambassador in Berlin to call the at-
tention of the German government to that article of the Rome Protocols. He 
hoped that Hitler would agree and the protocols would be transformed to a wider 
cooperation of Austria, Italy, H~ngary, and Germany. l3l 
Gombos' foreign political conceptions were triumphant and created a new, 
more advantageous position for Hungary. In this position Hungary continuously 
enjoyed the support of Italy against Yugoslavia and Rumania, while being per-
mitted to cooperate with Hitler against Czechoslovakia. At the same time, 
Gombos worked himself up to the position of mediator between Italy and Germany. 
The revisionist pol icy had no realistic chances before as the military-
political evaluation of the Hungarian chief of staff stated on June 10, 1933, 
11 Hunga ry was unab I e to wage a war against the Litt I e Entente to rea 1 i ze her 
revisionist aims. 111 32 In the League of Nations Hungary had the legal right, 
according to Article 19, to ask for the revision. However, the reconsideration 
of the treaties could come only through the unanimous decision of the assem-
bly, l33 which meant never. However, G~mbos had created a situation, which 
hopefully could lead to some kind of revision, because now Hungary enjoyed the 
support of both Italy and Germany. While securing this support, Gombos was 
able to avoid any committments which could have alienated one or both of them, 
130All ianz, Gombos• note for negotiations with Mussolini, Rome, March 13, 
1934, Doc. No. 6. 
l3l Ibid., negotiations of K~nyi and Coloma, Budapest, February 21, 1933, 
Doc, No.~ 
132Tibor Het~s and Mrs. Tamas Morvai, Csak Szolg~lati Hasznalatra, 11 Strict 
ly Confidential 11 (Budapest: Zringi Military Book ed., 1968), Doc, No. 76, 
133Auer, Half a Century, p. 68, 
l 
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or could have secured the right for them to interfere in the domestic affairs 
of Hungary. 
As far as the Habsburg problem was concerned, Gombos received assurance 
from Mussolini that a restoration was "not timely," and thus provided an oppor-
tunity to reach a better Austrian-Hungarian understanding. 
Gombos• triumphant feeling disappeared during the summer. The Hitler-
Mussolini meeting (June 14-15, 1934), instead of creating a favorable atmos-
phere for the promotion of a Rome-Berl in-Budapest-Vienna understanding, brought 
disaster. While Mussolini sympathized with Hitler's revisionist policy, he 
firmly asserted his opposition to an Anschluss, l34 at the same time Hitler ex-
pressed his views that an Austrian-German reconciliation could not take place 
until Doll fuss held power in Austria. l35 
The fatal blow to Gombos• designs was given by consequences of murder of 
Doll fuss. 
Nazi Putsch in Vienna (July 25, 1934) 
Gombos• anxiety grew during the summer, because of conditions in Austria. 
All the European papers reported the frequent Nazi terror actions and their 
effects on the Austrian politics. Doll fuss sought a reconciliation with the 
d . I d h h. · . · h · 13 6 mo erate soc1a emocrats to strengt en 1s own pos1t1on against t e Nazis. 
There were violent disagreements within the government over the possibility of 
including legitimists in the government, 137 and finally news circulated in the 
134DGFP, C, 111, Hassel to Neurath, Rome, June 21, 1934, Doc. No. 26. 
1351bid., circular of Neurath, Berl in, June 16, 1934, Doc. No. 10. 
l 36DGFP __, 
re i chs (Kol n: 
C, 111, Doc. No. 17; also Joseph Buttinger, Am Beispiel Oster-
Verlag f~r Pol itik und Wi rtschaft, 1953), pp. 206-07. 
l37DGFP, C, 111, memorandum of Ritter, Berl in, June 16, 1?34, Doc. No. 9. 
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most diverse circles of Austria about the possibility of a government crisis. 
G0mbos also learned about a coup d 1 e'tat in preparation against Oollfuss 139 and 
tried to warn him about the danger, 140 but without success. 
In Gombos' judgment, the Nazi Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss repre-
sented a severe setback to his political designs. The vehement reaction of 
Mussolini and the hostile press campaign in Italy; 141 the bellicose mood in 
Yugoslavia, 142 which ran parallel with the fact that the Yugoslavians opened 
their borders for the Nazi escapees; 143 and the resurgence of anti-German feel-
ing in Yungary144--all of these phenomena signalled the collapse of his plan 
concerning an Italian-German-Austrian-Hungarian cooperation. From Hungary 1 s 
point of view, the danger could come from two directions--from the powerful 
Germany, as next door neighbor, or from Italy, in the form of a new French 
rapprochement policy. The threat of a strong Germany was eliminated by the 
swift actions of Mussolini. Hitler, at least for the time being, gave up the 
idea of an Anschluss. Yet, an Italian-French detente seemed to be closer than 
ever before. 
138DGFP, C, 111, memorandum of Ritter, Berl in, June 16, 1934, Doc. No. 9 
l391bid. 
140E. R. Stahramberg, Between Hitler and Mussolini (London, 1942), pp. 
114-15; also Macartney, October Fifteenth, p. 146, ~ 
141DGFP, Hassel to Neurath, Berl in, October 25, 1934, Doc. No. 132. 
142 1bid. 
143see p. 74 of this study. ' 
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rhe Hungarian newspapers between July 27-August l, 1934, strongly 
hinted the German involvement in Austria. 
143 
Mussolini had already indicated in the summer of 1933 that he would 1 ike 
to see a reconci 1 iation with France. Gombo's did not believe that this recon-
cil iation was possible on the part of Italy without giving up the support of 
Hungarian revisionism, while Mussolini believed that he could convince France 
to give up the support of the Little Entente and win her consent to some kind 
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of rev1s1on. 
Barthou 1 s visit in Rumania and Yugoslavia in June 1934, his speeches in 
the two capitals, and his final declaration upon his arrival in Paris proved, 
in Gombos• eyes, that a French-Italian rapprochement would mean the end.of Hun 
garian revisionist hopes. Barthou said: 
My travel has underlined the importance of the Little Entente, 
which is more united and stronger than ever before. Benes, 
Titulescu, and Yevtic demonstrated their solidarity with us, with 
the League of Nations, and with the peace. The respect for the 
existing treaties seems for all of us to be the right precondition of 
peace. The revisionist pol icy is not only unjust and contrary to 
the desires of peoples, but also magnifies the danger and carries 
the germs of war.146 
The French papers celebrated the fifteenth anniversary of the Versailles 
Treaty in long editorials and stressed that though the treaty was denounced 
by Germany, nevertheless is served the European peace in the last 15 years. 
Both manifestations gave the impression that France and the Little En-
tente were strongly united and Mussolini 1 s designs were in need of realistic 
foundations. 
Then, on July 6, 1934, Barthou contradicted himself by stating that re-
vision was possible according to Article 19 of the Charter of the League of 
~ 
145ormos, Eastern Security, p. 242. 
146Le Temps (Paris), June 29, 1934. 
Nations, and if the international conditions were right, "France is ready to 
t .. 147 coopera e. 
Then came the Austrian crisis. Yugoslavia openly turned against France's 
will, and Czechoslovakia and Rumania supported her. The chief of staff of 
the Hungarian army, General Vilmos Roder, evaluated the situation for the gov-
ernment and stressed that in case of an Anschluss, the Little Entente would 
not follow the French leadership. 148 Czechoslovakia mademilitary preparations 
against Hungary instead of against Germany.149 I/ Roder supposed that in case of 
aggressive German action in Austria, the Little Entente would act in harmony 
against Hungary according to their military plans 150 and would not follow the 
French advice concerning moderation. From the military-political point of 
view the Hungarian general staff demanded the diplomatic preparationl51 of a 
Hungarian military action in case of an Anschluss--for the reoccupation of 
Burgenland. 152 As far as the direction of the Hungarian foreign policy was 
concerned, the general staff recommended a much closer cooperation with 
l47ormos, Eastern Security, p. 312. 
148Het~s and Morva, Strictly Confidential, No. 78. 
l491bid. 
15011 1 had a chance to see these strategic plans in detail. They were pre-
pared for only a coordinated action. None of the Little Entente states con-
sidered an attack on Hungary alone. 11 (italics mine) Interview with Hennyey. 
151To gain the consent of the Little Entente. The general staff did not 
expect any German objection and did not feel it necessary to receive Germany's 
consent. Hete's and Morva, Strictly Confidential, No. 78. 
~ 
152surgenland, a Hungarian territory, was given to Austria according to 
the resolution of the Trianon Treaty. 
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Italy. 153 To make this cooperation possible, Roder ordered his military at-
tache in Rome to make the following statements· 154 
Hungary will never use the arms received from Italy against Italy. 
The Hungarian army will never communicate military information re-
ceived from Italy to Germany or to any other state. 
Hungary will never participate in an anti-Italian, German block. 
A misunderstanding of German pol icy on the part of Italy may push 
Germany into the "arms of the Little Entente." Therefore, Hungary 
recommends negotiations to create a mutual understanding. 
In conclusion, the general staff recom~ended that Gombos reassure Musso-
1ini 1 s support, and at the same time keep the door open for a German-Hungarian 
understanding, because instead of the fast political retreat of Germany, l55 
the Austrian question had not yet been closed. 
Gombos, who was a former professional army officer, accepted this evalua-
tion. The Italian friendship was already secured and it did not suffer any 
setbacks during the Austrian crisis, but the German situation became very 
delicate. While G~mb6s did not want to see a great Germany as his next door 
neighbor, there were other signs which suggested a better understanding with 
Hitler. These signs, ironically enough, came from Yugoslavia. During Bar-
thou 1 s visit, KinJ Alexander revealed to Barthou that he preferred a German-
Yugoslavian rapprochement in order to secure his country against Italy, to a 
Italian-Yugoslavian reconciliation, as Barthou suggested to him. 156 The 
153Hetes and Morva, Strictly Confidential, No. 78. 
154 1bid., No. 79. 
1551bid., No. 78; also seep. 65 of this study. 
156ormos, Eastern Security, p. 313. 
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negotiations ended in a deadlock concerning Barthou's desire to gain the diplo-
matic recognition of King Alexander for the Soviet Union. l57 
A German-Yugoslavian understanding would have meant a diminution of 
chances for revision against Yugoslavia. However, the same effect would have 
been created by an Italian-Yugoslavian rapprochement. The Hungarian foreign 
pol icy, therefore, decided to demonstrate to Italy the importance of Hungary 
over Yugoslavia158and did the same concerning the German-Yugoslavian rapproche-
mentJ59 K~nya went so far as to demand Hitler's gratitude for Hungary's oppo-
sition to the Danubian Pact}60 At the same time he strove to convince Hitler 
to give up his plans directed against Austria.161 To this Hitler gave contra-
versial replies. While he stressed that "his friendship with Mussolini did 
indeed matter more to him than the whole of the Austrian state. 11162 On the 
other hand, he could not "see eye to eye with Austria where foreign pol icy ,,1as 
concerned. 11163 Among such circumstances, a stronger pro-German policy would 
have been unwise to follow. 
Concluding the effects of the Austrian crisis, we may safely say that 
while Gombos did not give up his hopes for the realization of an Italian-
German-Austrian-Hungarian block, he became more cautious and strengthened his 
l57ormos, Eastern Security, p. 313. 
158Hetes and Morva, Strictly Confidential, p. 342. 
l59wilhelmstrasse, conversation of K~nya and Hitler, Berlin, August 6, 
1934, Doc. No. 25. 
160 1bid. 
l 6 l 1 bid. 
162DGFP, C, Lammers to Neurath, Berl in, August 7, 1934, Doc. No. 150. 
1631bid. 
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relations with Italy. He still pursued an independent policy, but he stood 
much closer then to Mussolini than before the Austrian crisis. 164 
Assassination at Marseilles 
Threads of the investigation led toward Italy, Germany, and Hungary. To 
finish the investigation with the result that Italy, and particul iarly Musso-
lini was guilty, ran contrary to the interest of France, even if Mussolini was 
I 165 f. d G b . 1 t 166 . t h . gui ty. To 1n ermany to e gu1 y was aga1ns t e interest of not 
only Germany, but also Yugoslavia because of economic relations, as well as 
because of political considerations. However, the uproar of the Yugoslavian 
press and pub I ic opinion made it clear to everyone that nobody could hush up 
the question of responsibility, and if they could not name the real criminals, 
they would have to find a convenient scapegoat. This scapegoat was found, on 
the basis of superficial evidence, in Hungary. The manifestations of the dif-
ferent governments no doubt influenced Gombos• foreign pol icy to a great de-
gree. 
France openly took the side of the Little Entente and Yugoslavia, and 
1 I . d d h 1 . . 167 Lava secret y tr1e to mo erate t e Yugos avian aggressiveness. 
164The reaffirmation of the Three Power Declaration of February 17 on 
September 27, 1934, undoubtedly also influenced Hungary to take a more pro-
1 ta 1 i an pos i ti on. 
165vladeta von Mil icevic, Der Konigsmord von Marseille (Bad Godesberg: 
Hochwacht Verlag, 1959), pp. 24-26. 
166Germany 1 s involvement is discussed in Ibid., pp. 43-46; also in Adam, 
Hungary and the Little Entente, p. ts. 
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Germany unconditionally took the side of Yugoslavia, and the German press 
d I • b · 1 • 168 hinte at Hungary s respons1 1 1ty. Goring's declarations concerning the 
German attitude toward Hungarian revisionism 169 disappointed the Hungarians; 
and when Gombos had learned that the German government judged an anti-
revisionist political rapprochement feasible with Rumania,170 he sent his am-
bassador to the German foreign minister, Constantin von Neurath, with a real 
ultimatum. "If Germany did not abandon her friendly relations with Yugoslavia 
soon, Hungary, together with Czechoslovakia and Austria, would form a Danubian 
confederation and close the Danube Basin to us. 111 71 The German reply was 
brusque: the Hungarians could do what they wanted, but Neurath did not want 
to discuss these matters any further. 172 Gombos, not being able to do any-
thing else, retaliated by delaying the realization of his promises concerning 
the schooling of German minorities in Hungary. 173 
Italy, on the other hand, stood firmly behind Gombos during the whole Mar-
seil Jes crisis. Musso] ini assured Gombos during their meeting on October 7, 
1934, in Rome that if the Yugoslavians were to invade Hungary, he would mobiliz 
168oGFP, C, 11 l, memorandum of Neurath, Berl in, October 25, 1934, Doc. 
No. 269. 
169 1bid., Doc. No. 305. 
170~., Doc. No. 284. 
l7IDGFP, Ibid., November 17, 1934, Doc. No. 336. 
172 1bid. 
173wilhelmstrasse, Mackensen t~ Stieve, Budapest, November 30, 1934, Doc. 
No. 29. The original promises held out the prospects for the 11 B11 type schools 
for the German minorities. In the "B" type schools geography, history, civil 
rights and duties, writing and reading, mathematics, and physical education 
Were instructed in the mother tongue and in Hungarian, while the foreign lan-
guage, ecology, chemistry, home economics, drawing, and handiwork were in-
structed only in the mother tongue. 
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the whole Italian nation and would cross the Yugoslavian border with his 
troops. 11174 Suvich very actively mediated between Laval and Eckhardt, 175 and 
Mussolini without hesitation offered political asylum to the one remaining 
Croat refugee in Hungary to save Hungary from further embarrassment. 176 
It was good to know that Italy protected Hungary with such fervor. Yet, 
it was disquieting to see that France and Italy became such close friends. It 
was also discouraging to learn that Yugoslavia again returned to the French 
side and servilely followed Laval's advice. Finally, Eden's friendly atti-
tudel77 suggested to Gombos a possible regrouping of the Great Powers, unify-
ing Britain, France, and Italy on the one hand and isolating Germany. The 
circumstances and interests clearly demanded Hungary's siding with this group 
and Go~bos followed this alternative. His neutral, independent policy had 
failed. He had ended up where he had begun: Hungary's only friend was Italy 
and the realization of the revisionist demands seemed to be farther away than 
ever since he had taken office. Yet, Gombos did not give up hope and patient-
ly waited for the opportunity to again promote his favored dream, that is, the 
creation of a Berl in-Rome friendship, which would benefit Hungarian revision-
ism. Those were trying days for Gombos. Laval took the initiative and sur-
'Jrised the world by announcing his visit to Rome in the beginning of January 
1935. This visit could have led to a possible French-Italian rapprochement, 
174 . Quoted in Adam, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 68, 137n. 
175 Eckhardt, Regicide, p. 21 l; also interview with Hennyey. 
' l76The last refugee was transported by airplane. The pilot lost radio 
contact in the stormy weather over the Karst Mountains, and it was feared 
that he would mistakenly go to Yugoslavia. After a long, sleepless night, the 
Hungarian foreign ministry had learned that the pilot had made a crash landing 
in Italy. Both the refugee and the pilot escaped harm. Interview with Baron 
Anton Radva'nszky, Paris, August 10, 1971. 
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which again posed the question to G0mbos: which is most in the interest of 
Hungary?--to promote or to sabotage that rapprochement. His attitude depended 
on the results of the Laval-Mussolini meeting. 
CHAPTER V 
FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER LAVAL 
Laval Takes the Initiative 
The assassination at Marseilles created a domestic political crisis in 
France, and the Doumergue government resigned. The new government of Pierre 
Etienne Flandin obtained the confidence of the Chamber on November 13, 1934, 
although the Right accused his cabinet of "murdering the national unity, 111 and 
the Left believed that his cabinet was 11 too far on the Right. 112 The government 
could only rely on the majority of those deputies who believed that the new 
ministers were the "defenders of the strict republican orthodoxy.''3 
The most important change concerning personalities occured in the post of 
the war minister, in which General Maurin replaced "Old Marshal" Petain. 
Pierre Laval, the successor to Barthou in the Doumergue government, retained 
his post within the new cabinet. 
The Flandin government began its activities successfully. The new mil i-
tary budget submitted by General Maurin received unanimous approval 4 (a phenom-
ena which had been absent in the Chamber for a long time) on November 24, 1934, 
and Laval's foreign political expose was accepted on November 30, 1934.5 
1 " ' ; Edouard Bonnefous, Histoire Pol itigue de la Troisieme Republ igue (6 
vols.; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), V, 304. 
21bid. 
31bid. 
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5RAA, Moel lwald to Waldeneqq, Paris. ZI, 96/Pol •. December 2 lG14. o. 687. 
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The government, as we 11 as Lava 1, himself, stressed its conviction that in 
the field of foreign pol icy, they would continue the work of Ba rthou. 6 They 
expressed their hope that "France and I ta 1 y, with England in reserve11 7 would be 
able to solve many of Europe's problems with mutual agreement. However, this 
statement, alone, proved that they did not completely share Barthou's political 
views, or at least not in the judgment of priorities. Barthou had worked anx-
iously to keep the friendship of the Little Entente, to convince England of the 
necessity of a more active participation in continental affairs, to enlist the 
support of the Soviet Union against the growing German menace, and tb secure 
the cooperation of Mussolini. It was this last aim that Laval considered most 
important for success. By arranging this list of priorities, ·he proved to be 
a more realistic diplomat than his predecessor. He was anxious to avoid hurt-
ing France's relationship with the Little Entente by emphasizing that his pro-
jected negotiations with Italy "would not correspond with the spirit of his 
aims, if it would not guarantee, at the same time, a rapprochement between 
Italy and the Little Entente, especially Yugoslavia. 118 The assassination of 
King Alexander, however, created such a public uproar in Yugoslavia that this 
goal was hardly satisfactorily attainable for both Italy and Yugoslavia. Laval 
valued the Italian friendship more, and with the help of Eden, settled the 
problem without offending Italy, while at the same time leaving the door open 
for a Yugoslavian reconciliation. 
Laval used a more moderate approach toward Germany by assuring Hitler that 
~ 
"contrary to the lately published interpretations, the French-Soviet preliminary 
6RAA, Moel lwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 94/Pol., November 18, 1934, p. 683. 
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agreement for mutual assistance is not intended to be a two-sided agreement,"~ 
and he expressed his hopes that Germany would find ·it possible to join the 
Eastern Pact "as one among equals. 111 ° Concerning the expected outcome of the 
Saar plebiscite, Laval declared that "France wi11 recognize the result of the 
plebiscite as binding and unalt~rable. 1111 
12 He commented very favorably on Baldwin's speech, which had expressed the 
British disapproval over German rearmament plans and had concluded that 11 now 
the English government agrees with France in the principles of preservation of 
peace in Europe. 111 3 
Everything seemed to work in Laval's favor. His declarations and activi-
ties even impressed the Germans, and Hitler, himself, found some signs in 
Laval's activities pointing toward a detente in the German-French relations. 14 
Members of the Polish government thought that 11 they went too far with Germany!• 
because France, in spite of her difficulties, 11 is and will remain a military 
and financial factor which should not be underestimated. 11 15 
Laval went ahead now with ful I speed, to realize the rapprochement with 
Italy. On December 14, 1934, he learned that Mussolini was anxious to see him 
11 as soon as possible. 1116 Four days later in a speech in the French Senate, he 
9RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 96/Pol., 1934, Doc. No. 2, p. 69U 
I01bid. 
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expressed his confidence in the success of the upcoming negotiations with 
ltaly, 17 and almost at the same time, he learned that Germany disliked his de-
signs concerning Italy and the Eastern Pact. 18 It was natural to expect that 
Germany would try to thwart a French-Italian rapprochement, and it was natural 
for Laval to visit Mussolini before the Germans could succeed. The visit to 
Rome was announced on January 2, 1935, and took place on January 4-8, 1935. 
In order to appreciate fully the importance of the Laval-Mussolini meet-
ing, it is necessary to analyze the advantages Laval hoped for and the risks 
involved. 
Advantages and Risks on the Part of France 
The basis for the negotiations was given by the common interest of France 
and Italy in the preservation of Austria's independence. However, the Austrian 
crisis had already proved that a bilateral agreement between France and Italy 
could not be respected by Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and they were not 
willing to "accept a factual protectorate of Italy in Austria. 1.19 Thus, the 
differences existing between Italy and France played a secondary role. Laval 1 s 
primary concern was the preservation of the goodwill of her client states, 
while reaching an agreement with Musso! ini. However, it would have demanded 
concessions only on the part of Italy, and why should she give such conces-
sions? Mussolini had his own problems with Austria and Hungary. Schuschnigg 
flatly rejected the idea of having foreign troops on Austrian soil in defense 
of Austria. Since the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary had feared the realization of 
~ 
17Journal Officiel, 1934, pp. 1396-98. 
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Benes' dream concerning the creation of a corridor on Austrian or Hungarian 
territory in order to make direct communication possible between Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia, 21 even though Yugoslavia's participation in the guarantee of 
Austria's independence could have led to that very situation. To disregard 
completely the sensitivity of Austria and Hungary would have meant the loss of 
influence in Central Europe for Mussolini. Laval had to offer a very alluring 
compensation in order to gain his approval for such a design. 
On many occasions in history it has happened that statesmen and diplomats, 
obsessed by their own designs and plans, have misinterpreted the real interests 
of their respective nations. In the case of Laval and Mussolini, we shall see 
in the following analysis that both statesmen evaluated the interests of their 
countries very objectively. Therefore, it was clear from the beginning that 
both Laval and Mussolini were ready for compromises only on points not in-
volving their own national interest. If we keep this principle in mind, the 
solution of the problem is more easily discerned. 
France's interest was to gain the friendship of Mussel ini, not only for 
the sake of Austria's independence, but also for France's own interest! The 
French Army Council had already concluded in May 1933 that the French army 
could not face the German and Italian forces without grave risks. 22 A rap-
prochement with Italy would secure France's rear in case of a conflict with 
Germany, and though the French arm~· had great shortcomings, it still contained 
577,000 men. 23 Adding this number to the tremendous defensive strength of the 
Maginot 1 ine, it was more than a mafch for the German army, which was in a 
21 Interview with Theodore Hornbostel. 
22 1a Goree (de), The French Army, p. 255. 
23Gamel in, Servi r, 11, 148. 
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stage of transformation, projecting the strength of its army in 300,000 men. 2 
from the strategic point of view, the rapprochement with Italy was a question 
of primary importance for France. It is interesting to note that the critics 
of Laval's foreign policy, as well as his defenders 25 failed to point out what 
perhaps is the most important aspect of the French-Italian rapprochement. 
In my judgment the security of France was worth the risk involved, that 
is, the further alienation of Yugoslavia. However, this alienation of Yugosla-
via was risked only if Laval were to give in to the revisionist demands of 
Mussolini. The recognition of the righteousness of revisionism would have led 
to the alienation of not only Yugoslavia, but the whole Little Entente; but 
even that would not have been too high a price to pay for the security of 
France. Laval, however, skillfully avoided that danger. 26 
Laval's visit was, according to my judgment, an immense success for the 
French diplomacy. The agreements comprised of a general declaration, worded in 
such-a way that it could not offend anybody; a proces verbal concerning Aus-
tria 1 s independence, which projected consultations in case of a new Austrian 
crisis; a protocol concerning disarmament, which condemned unilateral rearma-
ment; a treaty on Africa concerning territorial revisions and special rights 
secured for both parties in Tunisia; and, an exchange of letters about Abys-
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The most important results of the Rome Agreements were: 
the harmonization of French, Italian, Yugoslavian, and Czech stand 
points concerning the independence of Austria; and 
the secret military clause which secured for France not only the 
chance to strengthen her German frontier, but also the cooperatio28 of the Italian army and air force in case of war against Germany. 
The details of this military cooperation were worked out not only between 
France and Italy, but also between these two Great Powers and the Little En-
tente.29 This military plan represented a sharp deviation from the existing 
French strategic principles of strictly defensive operations. It renewed the 
old conception of the cooperation of French-Italian-Czech forces against Ger-
many, known as the Foch Plan, at the time of the Versailles peace negotia-
tion.30 However, the changed political situation made several alterations 
necessary. These alterations did not change the basic idea, but made the exe-
cution of the plan more difficult. 31 
To avoid a possible clash between the Italian and Yugoslavian forces, it 
became necessary to insert between them a French army corps. The objective 
of the Yugoslavian, French, and Italian right flank was the occupation of 
Vienna in cooperation with the Czech forces. 32 
28G 1. ame 1n, Servi r, I I , 168-69. 
291bid.; also see Map I I. 
301a Goree (de), The French Army, p. 166-68. 
3l I have learned the following details from a French authority who prefers 
to remain anonymous until the respective French documents are open for re-
search. 
32Gamel in, Servi r, 11, 169, as well as my anonymous source clearly stated 
the projected participation of the Czech army, while General Flipo denied the 
existence of any Czech offensive plans. 
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This simple change in the original Foch plan created numerous difficul-
ties: it delayed a swift reaction to German aggression because of the long 
transportation route involved (cca. 350 miles from the French border); and 
since the French army was not motorized, the march-up was planned by using the 
railroads. The French military trains would have crossed.the transportation 
1 ines of the Italian army, causing many possible chances for delays and confu-
sion. The supplying of the French army corps with ammunition, should the oper-
ations have dragged on, would have represented new problems. Transportation 
from France was difficult, while supplies in Yugoslavia were not at hand in 
satisfactory amounts. Supplies from Italy were not feasible because of the 
differences of weapons. 
The march-up of the Italian army corps to the right flank of the French 
army projected much fewer difficulties since their routes did not cross the 
French transportation 1 ines, and since the army corps was mainly comprised of 
air force units with the assignment to operate over the territories of southern 
Germany. 
The plan seems to be too complicated and difficult. Yet, it was feasible 
in 1935, since Germany was not satisfactorily armed even at the time of the 
Rhineland occupation in 1936. The plan was good in its conception, but its 
success depended on future political decisions that the two governments might 
possibly make. 
With these political and military agreements, France again became the 
commanding power of Europe. What co~cession had Laval given for such a great 
success? As Mussolini put it, "nothing but a desert in Africa."33 The free 
hand given to Mussolini in Abyssinia cost even less. France had no essential 
33Cole, Laval, p. 60. 
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interest in that country, 11 and Mussolini agreed with Laval to expand by 
peacefu 1 means.' i35 
The French public opinion, as well as the Chamber and the Senate, was 
pleased with the results.36 The success of the Rome Agreement concerning Cen-
tral Europe, however, depended to a great degree on the approval of other 
states, such as Germany, Hungary, and the Little Entente. They expressed cer-
tain scepticism, as we shall see, but Laval and Mussolini hoped that their ob-
jections would be overcome in the Danubian Pact.37 
34Gamel in, Servi r, 11, 172. 
35 6 Cole, Laval, p. O. 
36Le Temps (Paris), January 13-14, 1935. 
37 RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 18/Pol., February 6, 1935, p. 52 • 
• 
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Reaction in Europe to the Rome Agreements 
The announcement of the Laval-Mussolini meeting created nervous reaction 
in Central Europe. Neither Hungary, Czechoslovakia, nor Yugoslavia had uncon-
ditional confidence in their own patrons. 
The Hungarian Budapesti Hirlap published a comment which, without doubt, 
wanted to calm down the nervousness of the revisionists. It stated, "The Hun-
garian revisionist aims will not suffer any setback in Rome because the mutual 
non-interference treaty will guarantee only the independence of the states, but 
not their borders. 1138 Yugoslavia, having expressed her confidence in Laval, 
expected that "Mussolini will try to further reduce the role of the Little En-
tente in Central Europe. 11 39 Titulescu felt it necessary to call an extraor-
dinary meeting of the Little Entente Counci1. 4° Czechoslovakia proved to be 
the most optimistic, as the diplomatic circles in Prague expected Italy to 
realize that the support of Hungarian revisionism would harm her own interest. 
"If Italy would sign this agreement, she would notice that instead of loosing 
something, she would gain a great deal in the future through a friendly cooper-
ation with the Little Entente. The agreement would furthermore promote a rap-
prochement of the Danubian states. 1141 
38Budapesti Hirlap, "Pester Lloyd 11 (Budapest), January l, 1935. 
39Le Temps {Paris), January l, 1935. 
40 1bid., January 3, 1935. 
41 Ibid., January 5, 1935. 
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It is noteworthy to compare these expectations of the Danubian states 
with the aims of France and Italy. Both states wanted to secure the indepen-
dence of Austria, France wanted to strengthen her mi1itary-strategic position 
against Germany, 42 and Italy wanted to gain a free hand concerning Abyssinia. 43 
What the Danubian states feJt important remained to be unimportant in the eyes 
of Laval and Musso) ini. Yet, an agreement depended on the approva1 of these 
sma11 states, unless Laval or Mussolini or both were wi11ing to give up their 
inf1uence in the Danubian Basin. It seems that Lava) was the more faithful 
patron, as he constantly consulted the three Litt1e Entente states, "whilst 
Italy had merely kept Hungary informed in general terms without consulting 
her. 1144 Gombos sent warnings to Musso] ini: "If the Laval-Musso) ini agreement 
would guarantee the present borders in Central Europe, and this kind of guaran-
tee would be against Article 19 of the League of Nations charter, Hungary would 
be forced to change her pol icy and place her confidence in the future in Ger-
many instead cf ltaly. 1145 At the same time, Czechoslovakia expressed great 
satisfaction that "Italy will not be the enemy of the Little Entente in Central 
European affairs anymore. 1146 
The official text47 was pub I ished on January 13, 1935, and was celebrated 
by the French press as a great victory for Laval. Without question, it was his 
victory, for the official text included not only the guarantee of independence 
42G 1 · ame 1n, Servi r I I, 
43DGFP, C, 111, Hassel to Neur•th, Rome, January 8, 1935, Doc. No. 417. 
441bid., January 2, 1935, Doc. No. 405. 
45Le Temps (Paris), January 9, 1935. 
461bid. 
471E..l_i., January 13, 1935. 
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of the Danubian states, but also recommended a Danubian Pact in which the par-
ticipating states would have accepted the mutual obligation to respect each 
other's national frontiers. 48 
The upcoming Saar plebiscite49 from that time on held the attention of 
Western Europe, and very few statesmen paid attention to the conments of the 
Hungarian semi-official paper: 11The success of the Danubian Pact depends on 
the joining of Germany and Hungary, but that is guestionable. 1150 (italics mine) 
The Danubian Pact 
The Italian-French communication of January 6, 1935, recommended to 11 the 
States which are most interested, 1151 the conclusion of a non-interference 
treaty. The participants were to obi ige themselves not to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of other countries and 11 not to stir up or support any action 
which was directed against the territorial integrity or against the political 
and social order of any of the contracting countries. 1152 This agreement was 
to be concluded between all the neighbors of Austria (with the exception of 
Switzerland) and Austria, herself, and also left the door open for France, Po-
land, and Rumania to join. 
48Le Temps (Paris), January 13, 1935. 
49rhe Saar plebiscite was held in January 1935 according to the conditions 
of the Versail Jes Treaty. The result was a great victory for Germany: 2, 124 
votes were cast in favor of ~emaining with French and 477,000 in favor of re-
joining Germany. Bonnet, Quai d 1 0rsay, p. 119. 
50Budapesti Hirlap, 11 Pester Lloyd 11 (Budapest), January 14, 1935. 
~ 
5IRAA, Moel lwald to Waldene.gg, Paris, ZI, 4/Pol., January 11, 1935. 
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The treaty was to provide future consultations among the participating 
states "in case Austria's independence and integrity should be menaced. 11 53 
The Danubian Pact was to be based on the cooperation of Austria, Czecho-
slovakia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Yugoslavia. It was strange to expect 
that these states would join in a single pact. It was wishful thinking on the 
part of Laval, as well as Musso! ini, to hope that it would work. However, that 
cooperation was to them the most feasible solution to satisfy the demands of 
particul iar French and Italian interests. 
On France's part it was an attempt to create an alternative plan for some 
of her allies, namely Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, who bitterly opposed 
the Eastern Pact. Their opposition was directed against those articles of the 
Eastern Pact that wanted to secure the right for the Soviet troops to pass 
through their territories. The Danubian Pact left out the Soviet Union and 
thereby eliminated the reasons for that opposition. By this very same act it 
was made easier for Germany to join. Yet, the projected non-interference 
the support of revisionist propaganda among the Hungarian minorities of the 
Little Entente states. In other words, the Danubian Pact was an alternate plan 
to secure the status guo in the Danube Basin. Italy's participation in it 
created the impression that France gave up her claims of influence in that re-
~ion; but in reality, the pact assured for her the preservation of this influ-
ence indirectly--through the cooperation and consent of Italy. It was even 
Li more important from the military pbint of view that the reorganized French arml 
5~AA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, ZI, 4/Pol., January 11, 1935. 
54 1t began in December 1934 with the vote of credits for annaments, avia-
tion pro9:·ai:1, a ne11 0/1,Jsc o~' n31;,Jl C'.Jn<rruction:;, dfr::i "_::·;•~,,, «L~i, __ :-, ;h-
Maginot I ine. See Flandin 1 s speech in Lyon on March 6, 1935 in Le Ter;10s. 
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could have launched an attack on Germany with hope of success, if the bulk of 
the German army was to be engaged with the Italian troops.55 
Italy 
Italy was hoping that the Danubian Pact would secure the independence of 
Austria even better than the Three Power Declaration by eliminating Yugosla-
via 1 s jealousy and creating an atmosphere of cooperation within the Danube 
Basin. Mussolini still very strongly opposed a possible Anschluss, and on 
February 13, 1935, he wrote a long article in the Popolo d 1 Italia, in which he 
analyzed the history of Austria and concluded that Austrian independence was 
a 11 particular Italian problem, but not exclusively Italian, for it is also a 
European problem. 1 ~6 The Danubian Pact, in Musso! ini 1 s mind, was the best 
solution for Austria, and certainly a better solution than his alternative 
plan; that is, if the European powers would not be willing to limit Hitler's I 
expansionist schemes, then the German expansion should I be directed toward Po- i 
I 
land instead of toward Austria.57 Receiving the green light from Laval for thef 
j 
' ! 11 peaceful solution 11 of the Abyssinian confl ict,58 the Danubian Pact seemed to j 
fu I 11 secure Italy's influence in Central Europe, even if Italy were to turn her 
attention toward Africa. 1 
Britain 
On February 1-3, 1935, shortly after the Rome Agreement was made, Laval 
visited London to inform the British government about the agreement and to 
55Gamel in, Servi r, 11, 165. 
56Quoted in full by Zara de Philippe, Mussolini Contre Hitler (Paris: 
Fernand Sarlot, 1938), pp. 111-115. 
57Lipsky P.Jpers, ~., p. 64. j 
58cole, Laval, p. 60. I 
.._ _________________ ~ ..... -----------------------------------------------------------! 
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harmonize its reply concerning the probable continuation of an aggressive Ger-
man policy. The British government cordially greeted the Rome declaration and 
congratulated the conclusions of the Rome accord concerning Central Europe.59 
For Western Europe, they had suggested an air agreement with Britain, France, 
Italy, Germany, and Belgium 11 to act in harmony against an aggressor of any of 
these nations. 1160 
Germany 
Germany received the Danubian Pact plan with less hostility than she re-
ceived the Eastern Pact. Hitler thought that 11a settlement could be reached in 
spite of considerable difficulties with the problem of the definition of inter-
vention.1161 What made Hitler more conciliatory toward the Danubian Pact was 
the absence of the Soviet Union,6 2 because under no circumstances was he will-
ing to sign a treaty of mutual assistance in relation to Russia.63 On the 
other hand, the preservation of the status guo and the principle of non-
interference was still unacceptable to Germany. Hitler had not flatly re-
jected the Danubian Pact; he only expressed his reservations and demanded fur-
ther clarifications. 64 These demands were phrased in general terms, yet they 
clearly expressed that Germany was not enthusiastic about the following points 
59Le Temps (Paris), February 5, 1935, published the offical text of the 
French-dritish negotiations. 
60 RAA, Moel lwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 18/Pol. February 6, 1935, 
p. 53. 
61 Lipski Papers, Lipski to Beck, Berl in, March 16, 1935, Doc. No. 38. 
6Z~dam, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 70. 
63Lipski Papers, ~· 
64:)GFP, C, 111, memorandum by Bulo1r1, Berl in, January 4, 1935, Doc. No. 4Jo,; I enclosure o 
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of the Danubian Pact: 5 the strengthening of ties of Austria with other 
states, especially with Italy; and the creation of sort of a Italian-French 
protectorate over Austria. The required clarifications, such as the inclusion 
of Switzerland and Britain, the precise definition of the idea of non-
intervention, and finally the clarification as to whether or not the pact would 
be concluded within the framework of the League of Nations66 hardly camouflaged 
Hitler's desire to make the Danubian Pact prove to be abortive. 
The Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union naturally saw in the Danubian Pact an attempt to exclude 
her from the European affairs. The Russians realized that they would become 
dispensable from the French point of view if the Danubian Pact were to be a 
success. However, it was a delicate situation. Potemkin67 and Litvinov had 
to frustrate the French plans in order to gain the closer cooperation of France 
Very ski I I fully they did not openly oppose the Danubian Pact, but only ex-
pressed scepticism. Potemkin thought that 11 the Rome accords had only relative 
values, and that the Little Entente would not join the Danubian Pact without 
. I . 11 68 H d h h L . I E I d d d h . st1pu at1ons. e guesse t at t e 1tt e ntente wou eman t e connection 
of the Rome Agreement with the Eastern Pact and with the Balkan Pact.69 Fur-
thermore, he did not see any possibility for the realization of the Danubian 
Pact because of the unstable political conditions of Yugoslavia, where General 
65Lipski Papers, Lipski to Beck, Berlin, February 5, 1935, No. 35. 
66Germany had not been a memb;r since October 14, 1933. 
67soviet ambassador to France. 
68 RAA, Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 6/Pol., January 15, 1935, p. 23. 
691bid. 
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Ziffkovic seemed to have much greater influence within the.government than 
Yevtic, himself. If this was true, then there was no hope for a Hungarian-
Yugoslavian reconciliation. 
At the same time, both Litvinov and Potemkin pushed for a separate French· 
Soviet mutual assistance agreement, and they concluded their negotiations with 
Laval on May 2, 1935. It was stated: 
In the event of France or the U.S.S.R •••. being the object, in 
spite of the genuinely peaceful intentions of both countries, of 
an unprovoked attack on the part of a European state, the U.S.S.R., 
and.recipro76lly France shall ilTlll]ediately give each other aid and 
assistance. 
With this French-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty, the French diplomacy over-
played its hand for security. It exchanged the Eastern Pact for the Danubian 
Pact; that is, it exchanged Soviet cooperation for Italian cooperation, and 
then after securing the friendship of Musso! ini, Laval returned to the old 
formula, alienating Mussel ini and completely confusing the small Central Euro-
pean states. 
The Little Entente 
The Little Entente states made clear their attitude concerning the Danu-
bian Pact in a common declaration agreed upon at their Laibach Conference. The 
basic tone of the declaration was not the same as before, that is, only comp! i-
ments for France,71 On the contrary, they stated their conditions72 1 ike an 
ultimatum before they would join the Danubian Pact. They demanded the exemp-
tion of the question of Habsburg restoration from the general operation of the 
70Quoted in Desmond Donnelly, The Cold War, 1917-1965 (New York: St. Mar-
tin's Press, 1965). 
7IRAA __ , Moellwald to Waldenegg, Paris, Zl, 6/Pol., January 15 1935 
p. 23. ' ' 
72Adam, Hunqarv and the Little Entente, p. 72. 
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non-intervention principles; they were more anxious to keep the status quo 
concerning Hungary. They demanded the renunciation of revisionism by the Hun-
garian government as a price of recognition of Hungary's right to rearm; they 
demanded the Hungarian government to give up its protection of Magyar minori-
ties on their territories; they wanted the firm pledge of Hungary against a 
possible Habsburg restoration; and finally they wanted Hungary to sign with 
them, not only a non-aggression, but a mutual assistance treaty.73 Perhaps the 
strongest opposition of the Little Entente was expressed in their desire to 
see France promote the Eastern Pact over the Danubian Pact. The most desperate 
was Yevtic. He demanded the connection of the Danubian Pact, not only with the 
Eastern Pact, but also with the Balkan Pact. Vevtic remarked that "France 
forces Yugoslavia to fol low her own interest 1 ike Poland does. 1 .74 At the same 
time, Yevtic also presented Mussolini with conditions that were rejected. 
However, Musso! ini was thinking of making some kind of gesture of peace toward 
Yugoslavia to overcome h . . 75 tat oppos1t1on. The success of the Danubian Pact 
was doomed by the naive belief of Laval that the Little Entente would uncon-
ditionally follow the demand of France. 
Austria 
Schuschnigg protested against the exclusion of Austria from the French-
I 1. . . 76 ta 1an negot1at1ons. He rejected the consultation article of the pro-
jected Danubian Pact and desired to see a more positive mutual assistance 
treaty. In February 1935, however, Schuschnigg decided to act according to 
7~d~m, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 72 quotes these demands from 
Russian sources. 
74Quoted in Ormos, Eastern Security, p. 348. 
75o::;FP, C, 111, H0ssel to Neurath, Rome, January JI, 1935, Doc, No. L;23. 
76 J rmos I b i d • 
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the resolutions .of the Rome Agreement. He visited France ''to save Austria's 
existence as an independent state. 1177 Schuschnigg described the visit as 
friendly, and he received the impression that Laval understood the Austrian 
position. Yet, in the Danubian Pact question Laval was not willing to force 
his allies further for the benefit of Austria, while Schuschnigg was not will-
ing to give a formal pledge that Austria would not restore the Habsburgs to 
the throne.78 The outcome of his visit to London was not much better. Sir 
John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary (1931-1935), assured him that "Eng-
land's attitude concerning Austria's independence had not changed and would 
never change. 1179 Simon asked him about the possibility of a plebiscite con-
cerning the Anschluss problem, after having abandoned the democratic form of 
government. Schuschnigg found the plebiscite idea, as well as the abandonment 
of the Austrian-type Fascist government impractical. As it happened in France, 
so in England positive support was not available for Austria because of ideo-
logical differences. 
The envisaged Danubian Pact of Laval and Musso! ini disregarded the econo-
mic considerations. Due to the German trade activities, the influx of German 
products grew from 20.3 per cent in 1934 to 22.2 per cent in 1935, while the 
German market of Central European products grew from 18.3 per cent to 24.7 
per cent.80 The analysis of the individual states prevails the fol lowing 
77schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 124. 
78 schuschnigg, .!EJ..i., p. 133. 
79schuschnigg, .!EJ..i., p. 140. 
Bo ·· ( Johann Wuescht, Yugoslawien und das Dritte Reich Stuttgart: 
Verlag, 1969), p. 83. 
Seewald 
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conditions: Germany became the first best trading partner of Yugoslavia,~ 1 
Czechoslovakia, 82 and Rumania, 83 and the second best trading partner of Hun-
gary. 84 
The percentage of German participation in the trade of these countries 
was so high85 that the smallest economic pressure or restrictions on their 
trade on the part of Germany would have produced catastrophic consequences. 
These trade relations, on the other hand, were so insignificant with Italy and 
with France that these two countries could not extort any political concessions 
using economic pressure.86 France faced the same problem as did the Eastern 
Pact of Barthou: her allies were much more independent that France thought, 
and they would follow the French political designs, only if they believed that 
these designs would also serve their own interests. 
Hungary 
The official text of the Rome Agreement very much disappointed the Gombos 
government. Instead of a hard defense of the Hungarian revisionist aims, Italy 
conceded to the demands of Laval and the Little Entente and undersigned the 
text which guaranteed not only the integrity of the Danubian states, but also 
their national frontiers. The plans for the Danubian Pact signaled the coming 
of further trouble. The demands to cease revisionist propaganda, the 
81Morini-Comby, Les Echanges, p. 54. 
82 1bid., p. 25. 
83 ~ " 
,, Haas Ernst, Die Aussenhandelspol itik der Ehemal igen Republ ik Osterreich 
Wahrend der Weltwirtschaftkrise bis zum Anschluss (\vurzburg-Aumuhle: Konrad 
Triltsch Verlag, 1939). 
84Morini-Comby, Ibid., p. 30. 
85rhe lowest in Rumania, 7 per cent; the highest in Yugoslavia, 18.7 per 
cent. 
86see Table II. 
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non-intervention treaty, and the opposition of Germany to the Danubian Pact 
indicated that Italy and Germany were once again on a coll is ion course. Gombos' 
dream about the Ital ian~German-Austrian-Hungarian block seemed to be farther 
from reality than before. Hungary once again had to examine her own realistic 
interests before joining or opposing the Danubian Pact. 
On the field of domestic policy, the Gombos government gained respect and 
popularity because of the successful maneuvers during the Marseilles affair. 
In the second half of January 1935 the R~kosi 87 trial began. It created a 
Co~munist scare and further strengthened the population's support, as well as 
the position of the Rightist, anti-Communist-Revisionist forces. At the same 
time, the outcome of the Saar plebiscite raised the hopes for the realization 
of Hungarian revisionism. 
These successes encouraged Gombos to dissolve the Parliament on March 6, 
1935, and declare the holding of new parliamentary elections.88 The elections 
were held in April and gave further indication to Gombos which of the foreign 
political alternatives was the most popular in Hungary. The Gombos party, with 
a strong Revisionist program, gained an overwhelming majority. 89 Not only the 
districts with open ballots, but also the districts with secret ballots gave 
their unconditional support to his pol icy.90 The government press emphasized 
871'1athias Rakosi was People's Commissar in Hungary during the 1919 Com-
munist regime. After the fall of the regime he escaped to the Soviet Union. 
In the Fall of 1934 at Stal in 1 s orders, he returned to Hungary to organize an 
underground Communist Party. In Hungary he was promptly arrested for his 
crimes committed in 1919, as well as for his illegal entry, and was put on 
trial in 1935. f 
88Budapesti Hirlap, 11 Pester Lloyd 11 (Budapest), March 7, 1935. 
89Mussol ini requested Hungary to stop emphasizing the necessity of revi-
sion. Adam, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 71. 
90audaoesti Hi rlao, Ibid. 
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as an important success the setback suffered by the Legitimist (Habsburg res-
torationist) Party.9 1 
Gambos then had to select the course of the foreign pol icy of Hungary fr 
the following alternatives: 
give up revisionism and unconditionally join the Danubian Pact; 
moderate revisionist aims and while relying on Italy, continue to 
1 ive day by day hoping for the best; 
change Mussolini's support for the possible support of Hitler; 
try again to bring about a reconciliation of Italy and Germany 
and make the old dream come true, that is, Hungary's dominating 
Central Europe in cooperation with Germany north of the Danube 
and with Italy south of the Danube. 
The results of the elections cancel Jed out the feasibility of the uncon-
ditional acceptance of the Danubian Pact. 92 
The reliance on Mussolini 1 s so]e support seemed to be a dangerous course. 
It would have demanded Hungary 1 s adherence to the Danubian Pact. However, the 
projected Danubian Pact contradicted Hungary 1 s desires. The whole Laval-
Mussolini cooperation indicated to Gombos that Mussolini was willing to bar-
gain, not only with Laval, but also with the Little Entente to secure the in-
dependence of Austria, and during this bargaining he was susceptible to for-
getting the Hungarian interests. 93 Equally im?ortant from his point of view 
was learning that Musso! ini 1 s attention concerning Central Europe as a whole 
was declining, and the Italian-French agreement 11 was an important pro~lem, 
which could not have been postponed any longer ••• because of ltaly 1 s 
9 1 sud§!.nestj_H_L!:.I~, 11 Pester Lloyd 11 (Budapest), April 10, 1935. 
921bi~., April 9, 1935. 
93~nowing Gcimb~s 1 political conviction, we may safely sa1 that G~rnb~s 
would not have chosen this alternative anyway because of his own political con-
victions. 
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interests in Abyssinia.119 Neither Horthy. nor G0mbos saw the Italian friend-
ship as an eternal one and judged it as only a necessity created by circum-
stances.95 
Hungary needed and welcomed Italy's support during the Marseilles affair, 
but soon the danger was over. In order to continue the Hungarian foreign 
policy of revisionism, Gombos needed the support of a Great Power. If Italy 
was not available anymore, he would have to turn again to the other revision-
ist power--Germany. 
Ganbos tried to keep the door open to a renewal of German-Hungarian 
friendship. He began to change his tough attitude96 and to use a reconcil ia-
tory tone as early as January, and he ordered his Berl in ambassador to call 
the attention of the Germans to 11 the fact that the (Rome) agreements were ob-
viously directed against Germany, and therefore the Hungarian government has 
the gravest doubts about them. 11 97 (italics mine) However, this rapprochement 
of Gombos was not received with great enthusiasm in Germany. The Germans tried 
to gain special privileges for the German minorities in Hungary, which G·ombos 
98 
refused to grant them. The German minority of Hungary entered its own candi-
dates in the Hungarian parliamentary election opposing Gombos• program, and 
Gombos practiced the same 11 terror11 against them that he used against the other 
94wilhelmstrasse, Mackensen to Stieve, Budapest, April 6, 1935. 
95Report of the Hungarian ambassador in Rome (Baron Frigyes Villani) 
quoted in Ormos, Eastern Security, p. 351. 
~ 
96..>ee p. 130 of this study. 
97 4 DGFP, C, 111, memorandum by Bulow, Berl in, January 4, 1935, Doc. No. 10. 
9SWilhemlstrasse, Ibid. 
174 
opposing candidates. Hungary sharply protested against maps drawn by pro-
Hitler. youth groups in Hungary, on which the German borders were marked just 
north of Lake Balaton.JOO Hitler still did not answer Gombos• friendly letter 
sent a year before 101 and found G0mbos 1 plan to visit Germany "untimely. 11102 The 
greatest obstacle to a German-Hungarian rapprochement was the German-Yugoslavian 
rapprochement,103 which tended to curtail not only Hungary's revisionist aims, 
but--in case of a German-Yugoslavian all iance--threatened Hungary with the pos-
sibil ity of being sandwiched in between two unfriendly nations. To servilely 
follow the German 1 ine was clearly against the interest of Hungary. To gain 
Germany's goodwill was necessary to make revisionism feasible against Czecho-
slovakia. The old dilemma had not changed as Hungary clearly needed the sup-
port of Mussolini, as well as of Hitler. 
The success of G§mbos 1 conception concerning the role of Hungary in Cen-
tral Europe 104 depended on a rapprochement between Italy and Germany. The ob-
stacle to this cooperation was the Austrian question. The differences between 
Germany and Italy were even more exaggerated by the Danubian Pact. As Gombos 
recognized, in order to bring about any rapprochement, it was necessary to 
99wilhelmstrasse, Mackensen to Stieve, Budapest, April 5, 1934, Doc. No. 33. 
lOOwilhelmstrasse, Ibid.; also see Map I. 
10llbid., February 14, 1934, Doc. No. 19. 
1021bid., Neurath 1 s note, Budapest, January 12, 1935, Doc. No. 30. 
1031t began with Goring's vis~t to Belgrade for the funeral of King Alex-
ander. Already at that time Germany had begun to play the role of Yugoslavia's 
protector against Hungarian revisionism. DGFP, C, 111, memorandum by Neurath, 
Berl in, October 26, 1934, Doc. No. 273; Snurre to Kopke, Budapest, November 6, 
1934, Doc. No. 305; memorandum of Neurath, Berlin, November 17, 1934, Doc. 
No. 336; memorandum by Bulow, Berl in, November 23, 1934, Doc. No. 349. 
104_,ee the last alternative on p. 172 of this study. 
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torpedo the pact without openly offending Mussolini. G0mbos then began double-
dealing. He tried to prove to Mussolini that Hungary was willing to accept 
Musso) ini 's suggestion concerning the need of only a peaceful revision, l05 
while he began to asseverate to Hitler that Hungary was a more worthy ally than 
1 . 106 Yugos av1a. 
These were the considerations that made Gombos state the demands that were 
looked upon by Hungary as preconditions of her joining the Danubian Pact: 
the closing of the Marseilles affair; l07 
recognition of Hungary's right to rearmament; 
securities for the bettering of the Hungarian minorities' condi-
tions in the Little Entente states; 
h . . f h 1 • t t. 1 08 d t e rejection o t e mutua ass1s ance trea 1es; an 
the adherence of Germany to the Danubian Pact. 109 
Evaluatron of Gombos' Foreign Pol icy 
Mussel ini wanted 11 to secure calmness in Central Europe, for the period of 
"possible military operations" in Abyssinia110 with the help of the Danubian 
Pact. This desire of Mussolini made him touchy concerning the Hungarian de-
mands. "The Hungarians forget, 11 he complained, "that they cannot count on Ger-
many for support of their revisionist pol icy. They also forget that Hungary 
105 DGFP, C, 111, Hassel to Neutrath, Rome, January 11, 1935, Doc. No. 423. 
106 Gembos 1 speech in Budapesti Hirlap, "Pester Lloyd11 (Budapest), Janu-
ary 25, 1935. 
l07The League of Nations' invJstigation ended with the December 10, 1934, 
resolution, but the criminal procedure continued in the French courts until 
February 12, 1936. Milicevic, Konigsmord, p. 81. 
108AdJm, Hungary and the Little Entente, p. 75. 
109ormos, Eastern Security, p. 349. 
llOQuoted in Ormes, Ibid., p. 363. 
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needs Italy and there is no way around it. 11 Yet, slowly he gave in to the 
Hungarian demands, especially when he experienced the same rigidity on the part 
of the Little Entente.11 2 G0mbos 1 foreign political plans worked successfully 
vis a vis Mussolini. 
Hitler step by step realized his plans without serious objection on the 
part of the pro-status quo powers. 11 3 At the same time, he loosened his grip 
on Austria and welcomed Schuschnigg 1 s opinion that "there are strong possibili-
ties for an Austrian-German cooperation •111l4 
Britain 
After expressing her approval of the Danubian Pact, Britain published the 
White Paper on Defense, 115 and then tried to learn the convictions of the Great 
Powers through the visits of Simon and Eden to Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague. The 
Stresa Conference (April 11-14, 1935) impressed the world with the unity of 
England, France, and Italy; and shortly after, the Anglo German Naval Accord 
(June 18, 1935) demonstrated the disunity of the same powers. The publication 
116 
of the Oxford Peace Ballot forced the British government to be even more 
compromising than before. 
lllQuoted in Ormos, Ibid., p. 362. 
11 2sudapesti Hirlap, 1iPester Lloyd 11 (Budapest), June 13, 1935 reported that 
according to Musso] ini, nothing more could be expected from the Danubian Pact. 
113Reintroduction of conscription and abrogation of Part V of the Ver-
sai l le Treaty. 
114sudapesti Hirlap, Ibid., J~nuary 12, 1935. 
1151t justified increased military expenditures in Britain on the plea of 
German rearmament. Albrecht-Carrie, Diplomatic History, p. 478. 
116The Oxford Union passed a resolution saying, "that this House will un-
der no circumstances, fight for its king and country. 11 The ballots were taken 
on February 9, 1933, and were publicized on June 27, 1935. The votes were: 
275 for and 133 against. Albrecht-Carrie, Ibid., p. 482, 28n. 
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France 
After the original success of her new Italian policy, France bitterly 
recognized that her hands were tied because of the resoluteness of her allies. 
She vaccilated between the oldll1 and the new118 foreign political I ine, and 
finally gave up the hope to realize the Danubian Pact 11 9 after the September 
30, 1935, resolution of the Little Entente. 
Czechoslovakia 
Czechoslovakia signed a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union 
on May 16, 1935, and though at the beginning openly supported Laval's Danubian 
plans, soon began to withdraw and sided more strongly with her Little Entente 
partners. 120 
Rumania 
Rumania continued her traditional policy of by-passing the existing ob-
I igations concerning France, the ~ittle Entente, and the Balkan Entente and 
tried to establish direct contacts with Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.121 
Yugoslavia 
Yugoslavia openly opposed the Danubian Pact and drew closer to Germany 
because of her fear of Italy; and though she officially opposed the Anschluss, 
h 11 • j j h d • t • 11 122 s e emot1ona y a no objections aga1ns 1t. 
l17French-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance was signed on May 2, 1935. 
IJ8The new French-Italian pro~osals for the Danubian Pact were pub! ished 
in July 1935. 
11 9Adam, Hungary and the Litt)e Entente, p. 74. 
120ormos, Eastern Security, p• 359. 




Hungary could look back to her diplomatic activities with satisfaction. 
Gombos had successfully preserved his freedom to continue the revisionist 
policy, he had successfully moderated the dispute between Austria and Germany, 
and had prevented the complete alienation of Hitler and Musso! ini. He was able 
to keep the goodwill of Mussolini "south of the Danube" and. obtained Hitler's 
cooperation "north of the Danube." However, there were defeats on the balance, 
too. The Yugoslavian-German, and Yugoslavian-Italian rapprochements were cer-
tainly not in Hungary's interest, but nothing irrevocable happened •. 
Gombos was equally successful to curtail German influence in Hungary, and 
using his anti-German resistance as a propaganda weapon, he was able to keep 
the sympathy of Britain, 123 as well as the U.S. 124 
The only Power with which Hungary could not make and wished not to make 
closer relationships was France because of her strong support of the Little 
Entente's anti-revisionist attitude. This French support of Hungary looked 
less and less important. France's international authority declined, and even 
the French alliance system existed only on paper, as the events of 1935 had 
demonstrated. 125 
Gombos' foreign pol icy served Hungary's interests well. This foreign 
pol icy enjoyed the support of the masses and secured a unique position for Hun-
gary among the small states of Central Europe. She remained uncommitted and 
could continue to change her pol icy as the realistic interests demanded. 
~ 
123audapesti Hirlap,''Pester Lloyd'' (Budapest), .l\pril 10, 1935 May 2, 1935 
and May 16, 1935. 
12~ontgomery, Hungary, p. 77; also Ibid., June 2, 1935. 




In my introduction I wr,ote that the purpose of this study is to explain 
the reasons behind the diplomatic decisions of the three small states, By this 
method I hoped to shed light not only on the history of these Central European 
states, but also to answer the crucial question of who was really responsible 
for not checking the growing danger that Germany presented, and who was respon-
sible for allowing the unchallenged German domination of Europe to come about. 
Looking back on my investigations, one may clearly see two distinct periods. 
From 1920 to 1934 the French alliance system controlled Europe without 
challenge. However, in 1920 the French leadership was accepted on the basis of 
superior strength not only ideologically and economically, but also militarily. 
The Versailles Treaty and other connected treaties were signed with the suppo-
sition that France would always remain strong enough to preserve the new status 
quo in Europe. Conditions, however, destroyed this French superiority. French 
political leaders quarreled endlessly over the question of priority of whether 
the resources of France should be used to improve the domestic conditions, and 
economic and social situation, or whether they should be used to sustain the 
military strength, and through it the international position? Sorrowfully 
enough, the French leaders did not ~ealize that the posing of this question in 
an 11either-or" form was already a mistake. When economic and social conditions 
deteriorate, then, too, the military capacity declines. Also, on the stage of 
international politics, no nation, even with the most progressive economic and 
social system, can stand up if its military strenqth is not readv to defend 
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that system against outside aggressions. The bitter struggle over "either-or" 
hindered the development of both social-economic and military strength, and put 
France in an inferior position well before 1934. 
found the second reason for the disappearance of the French leadership 
in Europe in the abusement of democracy. Until this democracy stood alone, in 
Europe as the form of government of the strongest European country, every na-
tion respected it and more or less accepted it as the most workable political 
system. Up until 1933 the existing two totalitarian systems (the Soviet Union 
and Italy) did not command the admiration of other countries. Even the Yugo-
slavian royal dictatorship of King Alexander was regarded only as a temporary 
emergency measure. However, in 1934 the situation changed. The unrestricted 
number of political parties in France made even the coal it ion governments un-
productive, and the political arena of 11 free democracy" tragically performed 
a show that more resembled a demagoguery anarchy, than democracy. Even the 
British and American two-party systems seemed to be restricted political or-
ganizations compared to the happy French democracy. However, the great masses 
within, as well as outside of France, did not value or condemn the political 
systems by the degree of political freedom alone! They also passed their 
judgment by considering the number of unemployed, the rising prices, and the 
deteriorating wages. As a result, in the minds of mill ions of common men in 
Europe, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union began to appear as 
better political systems. 
The resultant force of the abdve-mentioned three factors were speeded up 
by the world-wide economic crisis, which reached its peak in 1934 when not onl 
France herself, but also her allies and all of Europe recognized her weakness. 
Of course, France did not completely adjust her foreign political aims to 
the changed conditions. What she could not Ion er do alone she tried to do 
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with the help of new allies. The whole Eastern Pact, as well as the Danubian 
Pact negotiations, were aimed at securing the political status quo, although 
the economic, social, and military situations were against it. The French de-
signs of the Eastern and Danubian Pacts revealed to allies and foes, as well as 
to the uncommitted nations that France sunk from being a leader to a position 
where she could no longer command without a strong ally. 
Looking for an ally, the ideologically determined French policy found the 
solution first in the Eastern Pact through the help of the Soviet Union. It 
never occured to France that the aid of the Soviet Union was militarily use-
less, and that Stalin might follow realistic considerations more than ideo-
logical sympathy. 
In 1935, with Laval as foreign minister, France tried a more realistic 
I ine. The buying of Musso! ini 1 s cooperation with a 11 piece of desert 11 was un-
questionably a great French diplomatic success. The projected Danubian Pact 
would have created such a strong Central Europe that Hitler WOJld not have 
dared to risk any further aggressive actions, being dependent on Central Europ 
for food, oil, and other important raw materials (such as aluminum). However, 
this beautiful French design lacked realistic foundations as it did not take 
into consideration the changed economic condition or the national interests of 
the Little Entente or of the enemies. This neglect and ignorance of the French 
diplomacy actually paved the way for Hitler's future successes. 
Austria 
Among the three states analyzed, Austria was the weakest, but yet was 
seemingly the center of the political interest of every nation. Dollfuss and 
Schuschnigg both realized that their country was unable to withstand the pres-
sure of the Great Powers. The opportunities of joining Germany, and later Hun-
gary or Czechoslovakia were missed before 1934 due to the objections of France, 
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England, and Italy. In 1934 the interests .of these Great Powers s·ti11 demanded 
an independent Austria, and she was saved for the time being. With the decline 
of this interest in 1934 and further decline in 1936, Austria found herself 
deserted. It is a credit to the Austrian statesmanship, and especially to 
Schuschnigg, that he realized the situation and tried to do his best to secure 
Austria's independence using some means other than subservient obedience. 
In January 1936 Schuschnigg visited Czechoslovakia to discuss economic 
1 problems concerning the two countries, but at the same time the Austrian for-
eign minister, Baron Berger-Waldenegg, hoped for a possible friendship treaty 
with Czechoslovakia. 2 This latter possibility caused great anxiety in the Hun-
garian government circles.3 The new Czech prime minister, Hodza, received 
Schuschnigg with real friendliness and fulfilled as much of the economic re-
quests of Austria as he could. 4 However, even he could not overcome the deep 
hostility of the Czech population toward Austria, and his friendly gesture of 
presenting Schuschnigg with the statue of Field Marshall Radetzky {kept in a 
basement since 1919) failed because of the opposition of the City Council of 
Prague {which was the legal owner of the statue).5 Thus, his visit did not 
bring positive political results. The repercussions of the visit in Hungary, 
Italy, and Yugoslavia, on the other hand, created alienation and hostility. 
1schuschnigg, Austria Reguiem, p. 143. 
2Hdry to K~nya, Warsaw, January 16, 1936, in Diplom£ciai lratok Maqyaror-
sz~q Kulpol itik~j~hoz, 1936-1945 (Diplomatic Documents to the Foreign Pol icy of 
Hungary, 1936-1945), (4 vols.; Budapest: Akad~mia Pub I., 1962), I, Doc. No. 6. 
3DFPH, I, reports of the Hungarian ambassadors from Prague, Belgrade, and 
Vienna~nuary 16-25, 1936, Doc.Nos. 6, 7, 9, 13, 15. 
4schuschnigg, Ibid., p. 146. 
51nterview with Schwarzenberg. 
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The German diplomacy used this visit very skillfully. Mackensen, German am-
bassador to Budapest, warned Foreign Minister K~nya that Schuschnigg had mad 
unfriendly remarks to Benes about the Hungarian revisionist aims. 6 Hungary, 
whlJe still regarding Austrian independence in the interest of Hungary, 7 began 
8 
to diplomatically prevent the realization of an Austrian-Czech rapprochement. 
Prince Paul of Yugoslavia expressed his opinion that the independence of Aus-
tria was not the vital interest of his country.9 
When Musso! ini expressed his views that he did not think it was time for 
him to interfere as mediator11 in the Austrian-German disagreement, Schuschnigg 
and the Austrian government felt it necessary to explain their position con-
cerning their policy toward the Little Entente, and to regain the goodwill of 
Italy by stating that Austria would not seek closer connections with the Little 
Entente without the consent of Italy and Hungary. 12 
Thus, Schuschnigg's efforts to try a new, broader foreign pol icy than that 
of Dollfuss' had failed. Austria remained completely dependent on Italy and 
when the Ethiopian War weakened Mussolini's influence in Central Europe, 
6DFPH, I, conversation of K~nya and Mackensen, Budapest, February 12, 
1936, Doc. No. 31. 
7DFPH, I, Kanya to Szt6jay, February 27, 1936, Doc. No. 53. 
8DFPH, I, conversation of K~nya with Macke~sen, Budapest, February 25, 
1930. 
9DFPH, I, Al th to K~nya, Belgrade, February 16, 1936. 
10DFPH __, . I, Ullein-Reviczky to Kanya, Zagreb, February 19, 1936. 
l !DFPH 
--· 





I, Wettstein to Kanya, Prague, March 16, 1936. 
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Austria 1 s only chance for remaining independent lay in the goodwill of Hitler. 
As we know today, the appeasement policy also failed. 
If we want to draw any worthy conclusions concerning the causes of the 
failure, we would have to analyze the possible errors in Schuschnigg 1 s diplo-
macy. If he wanted to continue along Doll fuss• line of thinking, rather than 
in the field of domestic pol icy, Schuschnigg had to follow the course that he 
did: strengthen the government forces, and fight against Nazism, as well as 
against the Social Democrats. However, this domestic pol icy I imited his for-
eign political alternatives to the Rome Protocol. The independence of Austria 
was based on the theory that the Italian-German misunderstanding would never be 
resolved. !3 
If Schuschnigg wanted to be consistent, he should not have considered the 
Italian-German differences to be eternal either. Rather, a sharp turn in Aus-
trian foreign pol icy from the Rome Protocols to the Western democracies and to 
the Little Entente would have had great consequences, not only internationally, 
but also domestically in July 1934. 
In 1934 the situation was different. Britain, France, and even Czechoslo-
vakia displayed a great understanding for Austria's domestic problems. 14 The 
reoccuring obstacles for a better understanding with these countries were two-
fold: (a) Schuschnigg 1 s stubborn refusal to renounce the possibility of a 
Habsburg restoration; and (b) his unwillingness to participate in any combina-




is interesting to see that at the same time he considered it to be 
to base his country's independence on the French-German misunder-
Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, p. 131. 
14
czechoslovakia, for example, stopped the Socialist emigree's activity in 
Brno and moved them to Paris. Schuschnigg, ..!EJ.£., p. 146. 
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Both 11 questions of principle, 11 as he put it, created great difficulties 
for Austria's foreign policy and finally left her no other alternative than 
the one she followed to the end. 
Schuschnigg emphasized many times that he did not consider a Habsburg 
restoration timely. It was poss.ible that even the leaders of the Little En-
tente states did not consider it as an imminent danger, 15 although it was one 
reason for their fear and suspicion. The Yugoslavians, on the other hand, 
took this danger so seriously that they considered it necessary to prepare a 
possible German-Yugoslavian military cooperation in case of a Habsburg res-
toration attempt~ 16 It is known today that by October 1936 the Seventh German 
Army Corps received orders, that in case of a Habsburg restoration, they 
should invade Austria while the Yugoslavian entered from the south. l7 Instead 
of comforting the Little Entente states concerning the question of the Habs-
burg restoration, Schuschnigg tried to en! ist the support of the Vaticanl8 to 
explain his pol icy to the Little Entente, but they were shamed away·from this 
assignment. The Habsburg question had to be postponed because of the con-
certed protest of France, England, and the Little Entente. It, however, was 
not renounced, and thus it represented an equally important obstacle to the 
1511 0nce I asked Jan Masaryk about the Habsburg restoration. He said that 
somehow the government of Czechoslovakia was not so much afraid of it as Ru-
mania. However, if one asked the Rumanians, it was supposedly Benes who was 
afraid of it. 11 Interview with Schwerzenberg. 
J6Eichstadt, Von Dollfuss zu Hitler, p. 87. 
171bid. 
18 I b i d. , p. 88. 
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Danubian Pact, as did the Hungarian revisionism. 9 The reason for it certain-
1y cannot be found in practical political considerations. 
The rejection of participation in anti-German combinations was based more 
on the pangerman and pro-Nazi sympathies of a great number of Austrians than 
on the romantic, German nationalist and loyalist sympathies of Schuschnigg. 
This pangerman sentiment grew day by day and had no real opposition, since the 
Socialists were driven underground. Though every statesmen of Europe showed 
some understanding toward this problem, it probably hurt Austria's chances as 
much as the question of the Habsburg restoration, especially after Schuschnigg 
began his appeasement policy toward Hitler. 
It is outside of the task of a historian to speculate what would have 
happened if Therefore, we must be satisfied with the fact that 
Schuschnigg had a chance to eliminate the disturbing question of the Habsburg 
restoration and the pro-German loyalty, although he did not. The conclusion 
we may draw, therefore, must be something 1 ike this: while Schuschnigg cer-
tainly was a good Austrian and tried to serve the interest of his country as 
·well as he could, because of his personal convictions and prejudices, he 
failed to explore all the possibilities that were open for Austrian foreign 
policy 1n the years 1934-1936. 
We tend to dismiss the importance of such failures, because we know what 
happened during the years following 1936. However, my conclusion remains valid 
against this argument, simply because nobody knew for sure in 1936 what would 
happen in 1938 or later. 
19oFPH, I, conversation of K~nya and Mackensen, Budapest, February 25, 
1931, oOC:-No. 49. 
Dollfuss successfully blocked both movements and commanded the loyalty 
of the Austrian people. 
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Yugoslavia 
Yugoslavia's problems came into the center: of European diplomatic interest 
only with the assassination of King Alexander. Yet, this very same problem of 
the fear of Italy, and to a lesser degree, Hungary and Bulgaria, existed well 
before that time. King Alexander and, after his death, Prince Paul tried to 
eliminate the greater menace of Italy. The modus vivendi created with Bul-
garia and the rapprochement attempts with Mussolini are examples of the good 
judgment of Yugoslavian statesmanship. 
What made Yugoslavian pol icy pro-German? In the 1 ight of our investiga-
tion we may safely answer that it was due to: economic interests, for Yugo-
slavia depended on German trade much more than on any other trade; political 
interests, because she found in Germany a more effective patron against Hungary 
than France ever was; and ideological interests, because her fear of Communism 
and the Eastern Pact would have forced her into closer cooperation with the 
Soviet Union. 
After the assassination, Yugoslavia made an attempt to straighten up her 
relationship with France--willy-nilly, but (and only the results are important) 
she agreed not to accuse Italy in the affair. 
France did not realize the importance of this gesture, just as she did not 
realize the anxiety of Yugoslavia during the Danubian Pact negotiations. Right 
before the Danubian negotiation, the German-Yugoslavian trade treaty and diplo-
matic rapprochement opened up the ~econd choice for Yugoslavia, that is, to 
get rid of the selfish French patronage. In response to the demanding voice 
of Laval, the Yugoslavian statesmen answered with a selection of better op-
portunities. What is important to realize is that they saw this better oppor-
! 
tunity while France did not. Even if she had, Laval believed that Yugoslavia 1 sl 
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loyalty and gratitude would force them to see the Nazi danger from the French 
side, forgetting the Yugoslavian side. Hypnotized by the spectacular actions 
of Hitler, France concentrated her attention entirely on Western Europe, later 
on Ethiopia and on Spain. She failed to reassure her smaller allies and 
neglected them, trying to find a stronger ally against the rising danger of 
Germany. Finding an ally in the Soviet Union, France actually alienated Yugo-
slavia even more. 
If Franc~ had even tried to understand the Yugoslavian interests during 
the latest Danubian Pact negotiations, France would have reassured Yugoslavia 
that she would not abandon Yugoslavia and would restrain Mussolini from ag-
gressive action. She could have used her tacit agreement with Mussolini over 
Abyssinia as a convincing argument to regain Yugoslavia's confidence. However, 
she did not. The Yugoslavian statesmen followed a realistic foreign policy 
that promised the most advantages for their country. 
Hungary 
In regards to Hungary the French pol icy was based on the assumption that 
Hungary was an anti-democratic state, but at the same time, so weak that she 
would never play any important role in international politics. The complete 
neglect of geographical conditions allowed France to believe in the validity 
of this last assumption. Due to the geographic location, it was naive on the 
part of any power to believe that a strong Central European block could be 
created without the participation of Hungary. This geographic location made 
• 
Hungary much more important than her military strength suggested. The Hun-
garian statesmen realized this and played skillfully to secure for their nation 
the most benefits. 
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It is true that the Hungarian politicians were short-sightedly revision-
ist. However, their revisionism was well-founded and justified even in the 
eyes of many prominent Little Entente statesmen. In the 1920 1 s, France would 
have been strong enough to lay down the sol id basis for a Central European 
cooperation by using the League of Nations charter to prosecute a revision 
according to the ethnographic borders. Yet, France did not feel it necessary 
to even analyze the consequences of such a move. Such a revision would have 
great effects on Hungary. Fulfilling this Hungarian demand, France would have 
been able to take away the mass support from those very much resented authori-
tarian 11 Fascis.t11 politicians. The pressing economic and social problems would 
have dominated Hungary's political life and the solutions to these prcblems 
would have created the bases for an unsuspecting, close cooperation of all the 
successor states in the Danube Basin. 
After the rise of Hitler and the appointment of Gombos, the French diplo-
macy made only one weak attempt to lure Hungary into the French camp. Such 
attempts might or might not have produced results. The pro-French groups in 
·Hungary were so strong in the first half of 1934 that Gombos openly complained 
against them and criticized their activity, although at that time, France was 
no longer in a position to force even the smallest concessions for revision on 
her al 1 ies. A deeper evaluation of Hungary's pol icy could have only produced 
the conclusion that the Gombos government was not a servile and obedient ally 
of Italy; and while Gombos praised German Nazism, he was not hesitant to re-
act most aggressively toward the Qterman attempts to spread Nazism in Hungary. 
During the Danubian Pact negotiations, the French diplomacy looked upon 
Hungary as an Italian satellite and made no direct contacts with the Gombos 
government. Yet, Mussolini 1 s handling of Gombos opened an opportunity for 
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France to not only gain Hungary's confidence, but also to prevent her rap-
prochement with Germany. France, however, missed this opportunity. 
Under such circumstances, the selected policy of Gombos seemed to be the 
most beneficial for Hungary. 
In conclusion, the above analysis put the question of responsibility on 
the shoulders of France. She was not able to create a mood of reconciliation, 
nor was she able to enforce a loyal pro-French policy. She realized that she 
could not eliminate the revisionist forces, and yet she did not realize that 
without solving the Danubian problem, she could not count on her allies' sup-
port against Nazi Germany. With this misunderstanding of the individual aims 
of the different Central European states, she left the door open for the Ger-
man penetration. 
Germany thus gained an uni imited amount of food supplies, as well as raw 
materials. Without these resources, Hitler could not have so easily realized 
his rearmament program; could not have grown strong enough to challenge France 
and Britain openly; could not have destroyed Czechoslovakia without firing a 
shot; and could not have enslaved, in the first years of the war, almost all of 
Europe. 
All this happened in the years 1934-1935. They were crucial years, in-
deed, not only for the three small states discussed here, but also for all of 
mankind. With better diplomacy, France could have prevented World War I I dur-
ing these years. 
DECLINE OF THE FRENCH TRADE 
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RANKS AS TRADING PARTNERS IN 1934 
Rank as Trading Partner 
Trader 
Germany France Italy 
Austria 1 10 less than 10 
Czechoslovakia 1 5 less than 10 
Hungary 2 5 3 
Rumania 1 less than 10 less than 10 
·-
Yugoslavia 1 8 2 
' Note: Assembled on the basis of Morini-Comby, Les Echanges, 
pp. 13, 25, 36, 46, 61. 
Czecho-
Year Germany slovakia Hungary 
1933 19.68 13.29 11 • 30 
1934 17.45 13. 63 11. 03 
1935 17.00 12.7 9~4 
- -· 
1936 17. 1 1 r:4 9.3 
1933 15.7 7. y, 10.6 
1934 16.3 7.7 10.4 
1935 16.0 7.3 14. l 
1936 16.3 7.3 13 .4 
TABLE I I I 
PERCENTAGE OF AUSTRIAN IMPORT 1 
Switzer- Yugo-
Poland U.S. land slavia 
6.45 5.20 3.69 8.75 
6.20 5.28 3.88 8.36 
6.3 6.o ' 3.3 6.7 
.. .. ~--. - . 
5.9 6.2 3. 1 6. 1 
I 
PERCENTAGE OF AUSTRIAN EXPORT3 
7.0 9.9 7.9 5.6 
6. 1 11. 3 7.3 6. 1 
5.9 10.6 5.6 6.2 
5. 1 9.8 4.8 6.9 
............ 
Rumania England Italy France Others2 
4.46 3. 11 4.33 2.8 16.94 
5.55 4. 38 4.23 3.2 16.81 
7.0 4.4 5.0 3. 1 19. 1 
8.o 4.4 4.7 3.7 20. 1 
6.4 4.3 3.9 2.3 18.7 
4.o 5.4 3.8 1 .5 20. 1 
4.2 4.3 3.6 1.9 20.3 
5.0 5.5 4.5 2.4 19.0 
lAs quoted in Ernst Haas, Die Aussenhandels ol itik der Ehemal i en Re ublik nsterreich Wharend der Weltwirtschafts 
Krise bis zum Anschluss (W~rzburg, Konrad Triltsch ed., 1933), Table 11,'Statistik des Aussenhandels sterreichs,'' 
Volumes: 1933, p. 12; 1934, p. 12; 1935, p. 12; 1936, p. 12. 
2split among different countries in insignificant small amounts. 
3Haas, Ibid., Volumes: 1933, p. 13; 1934, p. 13; 1935, p. 13; 1936, p. 13. 
TABLE IV 
PERCENTAGE OF AUSTRIAN FOREIGN TRADE IN 1933-1934 
Czecho- Yugo- Switzer-
1933 Germany Italy Hungary slovakia Rumania slavia Poland U.S. land England France Others 
Import 19.68 4.33 11. 30 13.29 4.46 8075 ' 6.45 5.20 3.69 3. 11 2.8 16'. 94 
Export 15.7 3.9 10.6 7.7 6.4 5.6 7.0 9.9 7.9 4.3 2.3 18.7 
Friendly Nations Total Hostile Nations Total Neutral Nations Total 
Import 35. 31 26.50 38. 19 
... Export 30.2 19.7 :·· 50. 1 
.. . - '" ... -.. -
'. ' • 
Czecho- Yugo- Switzer-
1934 Hungary Italy Germany France slovakia Rumania slavia Poland U.S. land England Others 
- ·--
Import 11 .03 4.23 17.45 3.2 13.63 5.55 8.36 6.2 5.28 3.88 4.38 16.81 
Export 10.4 3.8 16.3 1.5 7,7 4.o 6.1 6. 1 11. 3 7.3 5.4 20. 1 
----~- --- -· --- . - --- -- ~ ---·--
F.riendlt Na t 1 on s To a 1 Hostile Nations Total N~tral Nations Total 
Import 15.26 54.39 30.35 
Export 14.2 41. 7 44. 1 
~--· ..... 
TABLE V 
HUNGARY'S TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE IN 1934 
;1 
· 'Switzer-
Austria I ta 1 y Germany Rumania Yugoslavia France England land Others Total 
·Mi 11 ion 
179.406 74.764 152.891 
" 
50.313 Pengos 25.167 24. 158 49.438 27.660 166.296 750.093 
% 23.91 9.96 20.35 6.7 3.35 3.72 6.59 3.68 21.74 100 
Friendly Nations Total Hostile Nations Total Neutral Nations Total 
% 54. 22 13. 77 32.01 100.00 
Note: Data for Ge~an trade calculated on the basis of Macartney, October Fifteenth~ Part I, p. 141. 
Data for Austrian and Italian trade calculated on the basis of Ibid., p. 145. 
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List of Important Personalities 
Alexander I. King of Yugoslavia. He succeeded the throne in August 1921, and 
established his royal dictatorship in 1927. He was a great supporter of 
Serbian nationalism and oppressed the Croatian and Macedonian separatist 
movement. He made several unsuccessful attempts to find a modus vivendi 
with Mussolini. He was assassinated at Marseilles on October 9, 1934. 
Alth, Waldemar. Hungarian Ambassador to Yugoslavia. 
Baldwin, Stanley • ..Leader of the British Conservative Party and Lord President 
of the Council in the National Government from November 10, 1931; Prime 
Minister, June 7, 1935-May 28, 1937. 
Barthou, Louis. Chairman of L'Union Democratigue et Radicale in the French 
Senate, and Foreign Minister in the Doumergue government, February 9, 19 
October 9, 1934. 
Beck, Colonel Josef. Polish Foreign Minister. 
Benes, Edouard. Czech Foreign Minister, 1918-1935, and President of the Repub-
1 ic, December 18, 1935-0ctober 5, 1938. 
Bethlen, Count lstv~n. Hungarian Prime Minister, 1921-1931. 
Bleyer, Jakab. University Professor; Vice-President of the Cultural Associa-
tion of Germans in Hungary. 
Blum, Leon. Leader of the French Social is ts, and Prime Minister of the Popular 
Front, June 4, 1936-June 22, 1937. 
Bulow, Bernhard. Political Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, 1934-
1936. 
Campbell, Sir Eric. British Charge d'Affaire in Paris, 1934-1935. 
Chlapowski, Alfred. Polish Ambassador to France. 
Clemenceau, Georges Benjamin. French Prime Minister, 1917-1920. 
Colonna, Ascanio. Italian Ambassador to Hungary, October 6, 1932-December 21, 
1936. 
Cot, Pierre. French Air Minister who visited the U.S.S.R. with a French air 
squadron during the days of French-Russian rapprochement in July 1933. 
Daladier, Edouard. Leader of the French Radical Socialists; Prime Minister 
and Minister of Defense, January I, 1933-0ctober 23, 1933: Minister of 
Defense, October 26, 1933-January 27, 1934; and Prime Minister and Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, January 30, 1934-February 7, 1934. 
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Doll fuss, Engelbert. Austrian Federal Chancellor from May 1932 to.his assassi-
nation on July 25, 1934. In 1933 he founded the Fatherland Front to em-
brace all Austrian political parties supporting·his government. He in-
troduced a Fascist-type system in Austria based on the ideas of the papal 
encyclical Quadragesimo Anno. 
Doumergue, Gaston. President of the French Republic; French Prime Minister in 
the "Government of National .Union, 11 February 9-November 8, 1934. In his 
radio addresses he tried to gain public support for his pol icy against 
the opposftion in the Chamber of Deputies. 
Eden, Anthony. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 
the National Government, November 10, 1931-December 31, 1933; Lord Privy 
Seal without Cabinet rank, January I, 1934; Rapporteur of the Marseilles 
affair in the league of Nations, October-December 1934. 
Ermansdorff, Otto. Deputy Director of Department I I of the German Fa.reign 
Ministry. 
Fabry, Colonel Jean. Minister of Defense in Laval 1 s government. He was 
strongly anti-Communist, and as such, an opponent of the Soviet-French 
rapprochement. 
Flandin, Pierre Etienne. Chairman of the Republ leans de la Gauche, and Minis-
ter of Public Works in the Doumergue government. 
Gamelin, General Maurice. Military advisor of Barthou and Laval; Chief of 
Staff of the French army from January 1935. 
Gombos, Gyula. Hungarian Minister of Defense, October 10, 1929-September 21, 
1932; Prime Minister, September 30, 1932-0ctober 6, 1936; and one of the 
prominent leaders· of the Nationalist and Revisionist leagues. 
Goring, Hermann Wilhelm. Minister President and Minister of Interior of Prus-
sia; Air Minister from Apri I 1933. 
Habsburg, Otto von. Son of Charles, the last emperor of Austria and King of 
Hungary. His succession to the throne was blocked by the resolution of 
the peace treaties. He had many supporters in both countries who wanted 
him to restore the monarchial form of government and reunite the old lands 
of the Habsburg monarcy. 
Hassel, Ulrich. German Ambassador to Italy, 1932-1938. 
Heeren, Victor von. German Ambass~dor to Yugoslavia, 1934. 
Herriot, Edouard. Leader of French Radical Socialist Party; Minister of State 
without Portfolio in the Doumergue and Flandin governments, February 9, 
1934-May 30, 1935. 
Hodza, Milan. Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, November 6, 1935-September 
1938. 
200 
Hornbostel, Theodore von. Political Secretary-General in the Foreign Office 
of the Federal Chacellery of Austria. 
Horthy, Miklos (de Nagyb~nya). Regent of Hungary. 
I I 
Hory, Andras. Hungarian Ambassador to Italy, 1927-1934; Under-Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, 1934-1935; Ambassador to Poland, 1935-1940. 
Jeanneney, Jules. President of the French Senate. 
I I I Kanya, Kalman. Hungarian Foreign Minister, February 4, 1933-November 28, 1938. 
Kopke, Gerhard. Director of Department I I of the German Foreign Ministry. 
Koster, Roland. German Ambassador to France, 1932-1935. 
Kvaternik, Eugen. Assistant leader of the USTASHE organization. He became 
Minister of Pol ice in the Nazi-satel 1 ite Croatian state in 1942. 
Lammers, Hans Heinrich. Di rector of the Reich Chancery. 
Laroche, John. French Ambassador to Poland 
Laval, Pierre. Member of numerous French governments from 1925; Minister of 
Colonies in the Doumergue government, February 9-0ctober 13, 1934; suc-
ceeded Barthou as Foreign Minister, October 13-November 9, 1934, in the 
Flandin cabinet until May 30, 1935. 
Lipski, Josef. Polish Ambassador to Germany, November 15, 1934-September l, 
1939. 
Litvinov, Maxim Maximovich. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1930-1939. 
Macek, Vladimir. Leader of the Croatian National Peasant Party. 
Mackensen, Hans George von. German Ambassador to Hungary, 1933-1937. 
Marek, Ferdinand. Austrian Ambassador to Prague. 
Masaryk, Thomas Garrigue. President of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1935. 
Mazirevich, Szilard. Hungarian Ambassador to Germany, 1933-1936. 
Michailov, Ivan. Assistant leader of the IMRO. 
' 
Muff, General Wolfgang. German Military Attache to Austria. 
Neurath, Constantin von. German Foreign Minister, 1933-1938. 
Neusstadter-Sturmer, Odo. Labor Secretary in the first Dollfuss government, 
1932-1933. 
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Papen, Franz. Vice-Chancellor of the Reich and Saar Plenipotentiary until 
July 26, 1934. He was a Minister in Austria on a special mission direct)~ 
responsible to Hitler. 
Paul-Boncour, Joseph. French .Prime Minister, December 14, 1932-January 29, 
1933. He represented the Yugoslavian royal family at the Marseilles 
t ri a 1 • 
Pavelich, Ante. Leader of the Croatian USTASHE movement. 
Petain, Marshal Philippe. Minister of War in the Doumergue cabinet. 
Pilsudsky, Josef. Marshal of Poland; Minister of War; and Inspector General of 
the Anny. 
Potemkin, Vladimir. Soviet Ambassador to France. 
I Radvanszky, Baron Albert. Vice-President of the Upper House of the Hungarian 
Parliament. 
' Rakosi, Mathias. People's Commissar in the Kun Communist government in Hun-
gary. 
Ritter, Karl. Director of the Economic Department of the German Foreign Minis-
try. 
R8der, Vil mos. Hungarian General; Minister of Defense, October 12, 1936-
May 13, 1938. 
Schnurre, Karl. Councillor of the German Embassy in Hungary, 1934-1936. 
Schoen, Hans. German Ambassador to Hungary, 1926-1933. 
Schuschnigg, Kurt van. Austrian Federal Chancellor, July 29, 1934-March 11, 
1938. 
Simon, Sir John. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1931-1935. 
Stieve, Friedrich. Director of the Cultural-Political Department of the Ger-
man Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Stojadinovich, Milan. Yugoslavian Prime Ministe~ and Foreign Minister, June 
23, 1935-February 4, 1939. 
' Suvich, Fulvio. Under-Secretary of State in the Italian Foreign Ministry. 
I 
Tardieu, Andre. French Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister with short in-
terruption between 1928-1932. 
Titulescu, Nicolae. Rumanian Foreign Minister, 1932-1936. 
Ullein-Reviczky, Antal. Director of the Press Department in the Hungarian 
Foreign Ministry. 
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Wettstein, Janos. Hungarian Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 1935-1939 .• 
Yevtic, Bogoljub. Yugoslavian Foreign Minister until December 4, 1934, when 
he became Minister President and Foreign Minister. 
Ziffkovich, General Pero. Prime Minister during the Royal dictatorship of 
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